Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

Time-varying integration,interdependence and contagion

Bekaert et al. (2005) define contagion as “correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals”. Based on a two-factor asset pricing specification to model fundamentally-driven linkages between markets, they define contagion as correlation among the model residuals, and develop a corresponding test procedure. In this paper, we investigate to what extent conclusions from this contagion test depend upon the specification of the time-varying factor exposures. We develop a two-factor model with global and regional market shocks as factors. We make the global and regional market exposures conditional upon both a latent regime variable and three structural instruments, and find that, for a set of 14 European countries, this model outperforms more restricted versions. The structurally-driven increase in global (regional) market exposures and correlations suggest that market integration has increased substantially over the last three decades. Using our optimal model, we do not find evidence that further integration has come at the cost of contagion. We do find evidence for contagion, however, when more restricted versions of the factor specifications are used. We conclude that the specification of the global and regional market exposures is an important issue in any test for contagion.     

Financial globalization, financial crises and contagion

Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. non-financial sectors since the mid-1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets. Using an open-economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role, we show that financial integration leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and to large asset price spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. The impacts of these shocks on asset prices are amplified by bank capital requirements based on mark-to-market.     

Cyclical correlations, credit contagion, and portfolio losses

We model aggregate credit losses on large portfolios of financial positions contracted with firms subject to both cyclical default correlation and direct default contagion processes. Cyclical correlation is due to the dependence of firms on common economic factors. Contagion is associated with the local interaction of firms with their business partners. We provide an explicit normal approximation of the distribution of portfolio losses. We quantify the relation between the variability of global economic fundamentals, strength of local firm interaction, and the fluctuation of losses. We find that cyclical oscillations in fundamentals dominate average losses, while local interaction causes additional fluctuations of losses around their average. The strength of the contagion-induced loss variability depends on the complexity of the business partner network.     

Bank capital,interbank contagion,and bailout policy

This paper develops a theoretical framework in which asset linkages in a syndicated loan agreement can infect a healthy bank when its partner bank fails. We investigate how capital constraints affect the choice of the healthy bank to takeover or liquidate the exposure held jointly with the failing bank, and how the bank’s ex ante optimal capital holding and possibility of contagion are affected by anticipation of bail-out policy, capital requirements and the joint exposure. We identify a range of factors that strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout. Recapitalization with common stock rather than preferred equity injection dilutes existing shareholder interests and gives the bank a greater incentive to hold capital to cope with potential contagion. Increasing the minimum regulatory capital does not necessarily reduce contagion, while the requirement of holding conservation capital buffer could increase the bank’s resilience to avoid contagion.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

No contagion,only globalization and flight to quality

In this article, tests for globalization and contagion are separated using an ex ante definition of crises, and contagion tests are neutralized with respect to globalization effects. A large database is constructed to study the stability of correlation matrices for four asset classes: equities, government bonds, investment grade corporate bonds, and high-yield corporate bonds, in four geographical zones. Overall, the results confirm the instability of correlations and point to a combination of globalization and flight to quality, while emphasizing that contagion on the equity markets appears as an artifact due to globalization.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Financial contagion and depositor monitoring

This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact. We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are undercapitalized, and the probability of success of the risky asset is low, depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment.The results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline.     

Information acquisition and financial contagion

This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.     

Financial contagion,spillovers and causality in the Markov switching framework

In this paper, we introduce the concept of causality in the Markov switching framework into the analysis of financial inter-market dependencies. We extend the methodology of testing for financial spillovers between capital markets by explicitly defining contagion, spillovers and independence, and providing statistics to test for the existence of causality. We apply the methodology to stock index returns on the Japanese (Nikkei 225) and the Hong Kong (HSI) markets during the Asian crisis and find no evidence of contagion between the markets, but strong evidence of feedback spillovers between them.     

Assessing stock market dependence and contagion

This paper assesses evidence of the linkages and contagion among important stock markets in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina), Europe (UK and Germany), Asia (Japan and Singapore) and the USA from 6 September 1995 to 19 April 2013. To accomplish this task, this paper combines copula modelling with time-varying parameters and pair-copula composition of multiple dependence. The bivariate analyses show an asymmetric dependence between the stock markets as well as contagion. In addition, this work proposes a method to assess the linkages and contagion between two stock markets which takes into account the effects of a third stock market. In applying this method, conditioned on the USA market, most of the evidence of contagion between the Latin American or European markets disappears, but important dependence levels still remain.     

Financial contagion and the real economy

This paper studies the spread of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 from the financial sector to the real economy by examining ten sectors in 25 major developed and emerging stock markets. The analysis tests different channels of financial contagion across countries and sectors and finds that the crisis led to an increased co-movement of returns among financial sector stocks across countries and between financial sector stocks and real economy stocks. The results demonstrate that no country and sector was immune to the adverse effects of the crisis limiting the effectiveness of portfolio diversification. However, there is clear evidence that some sectors in particular Healthcare, Telecommunications and Technology were less severely affected by the crisis.     

Industry contagion in loan spreads

Spreads on new and renegotiated corporate loans are significantly higher when the loan originates (or is renegotiated) in the two years surrounding bankruptcy filings by industry rivals. This industry-specific contagion is particularly severe in the middle of industry bankruptcy waves. Furthermore, this contagion in loan spreads is mitigated in concentrated industries, consistent with the hypothesis and evidence in Lang and Stulz (1992) that bankruptcy filings in concentrated industries can have positive consequences for rivals (increased market share and/or power). There is also some evidence that contagion affects non-spread terms in loan contracts.     

Unobservable shocks as carriers of contagion

We propose an identified structural GARCH model to disentangle the dynamics of financial market crises. We distinguish between the hypersensitivity of a domestic market in crisis to news from foreign non-crisis markets, and the contagion imported to a tranquil domestic market from foreign crises. The model also enables us to connect unobserved structural shocks with their source markets using variance decompositions and to compare the size and dynamics of impulses during crises periods with tranquil period impulses. To illustrate, we apply the method to data from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis which consists of a complicated set of interacting crises. We find significant hypersensitivity and contagion between these markets but also show that links may strengthen or weaken. Impulse response functions for an equally-weighted equity portfolio show the increasing dominance of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crises and covariance responses demonstrate multiple layers of contagion effects.     

A simple model of credit contagion

We propose a simple model of credit contagion in which we include macro- and microstructural interdependencies among the debtors within a credit portfolio. The microstructure captures interdependencies between debtors that go beyond their exposure to common factors, e.g., business or legal interdependencies. We show that even for diversified portfolios, moderate microstructural interdependencies have a significant impact on the tails of the loss distribution. This impact increases dramatically for less diversified microstructures.