Systemic banks and the lender of last resort

We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects.     

Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: Private and public sources

Caught between the end of the National Banking Era and the beginning of the Federal Reserve System, the crisis of 1914 provides an example of a banking panic avoided. We investigate how this outcome was achieved by examining data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates to New York City institutions that identify the borrower and the quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. The extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was, in our opinion, essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Empirical results indicate an important role for clearing house loan certificates that is distinct from the influence of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency issues.     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

The fed and the term structure: Addressing simultaneity within a structural VAR model

This paper applies a new identification approach to estimate the contemporaneous relation between the term structure and monetary policy within a VAR framework. To achieve identification, we combine high-frequency Treasury futures and fed funds futures data with the VAR methodology. Results indicate that policy actions have a slope effect in the yield curve. We also find that the Fed responds to Treasury yields and that this response is stronger for the short and intermediate rates and less aggressive for long-yields. All estimated parameters are significant and robust to various model specifications.     

Housing markets and the financial crisis of 2007–2009: Lessons for the future

An unsustainable weakening of credit standards induced a US mortgage lending and housing bubble, whose consumption impact was amplified by innovations altering the collateral role of housing. In countries with more stable credit standards, any overshooting of construction and house prices owed more to traditional housing supply and demand factors. Housing collateral effects on consumption also varied, depending on the liquidity of housing wealth. Lessons for the future include recognizing the importance of financial innovation, regulation, housing policies, and global financial imbalances for fueling credit, construction, house price and consumption cycles that vary across countries.     

Private benefits of control and firm leverage: An analysis of Korean firms

This paper investigates the leverage choices of an entrenched controlling party. If debt effectively curbs the private benefits of control, the controlling shareholder is given incentives to avoid debt. Using estimates of the private benefits of control and financial statement data from selected Korean firms, we find that a controlling party with large private benefits tends to lower debt. This relationship was concentrated after the Asian financial crisis. However, before the crisis, firms that affiliated with Korean conglomerates, chaebols, used more debt as private benefits increased. A financial reform program triggered by the crisis seems to have actuated the disciplining role of debt. JEL Classification G32, G34     

地方政府行为与金融体系效率：以长三角经济区为例

本文在构建金融体系效率指标体系的基础上,衡量了长三角经济区的金融体系效率,并通过建立效率影响因素模型,分别分析了地方政府干预对金融体系动员效率和配置效率的影响。在此基础上,本文提出了规范地方政府行为、提高金融体系效率的政策建议。