Accounting for UK rail freight track charges: privatisation, politics and the pursuit of private sector vested interests

In 1996, the UK government privatised the railway industry based on a separation of rail infrastructure from train operations. Track, stations and signalling were transferred to a private sector infrastructure company, Railtrack plc. Separate passenger and freight train operators were required to pay track access charges to Railtrack for use of its rail infrastructure.

In 2001, in an attempt to meet the government’s plan to expand freight traffic, the government-appointed rail regulator substantially reduced the amount of track charges payable to Railtrack by the freight operators. The resulting shortfall in Railtrack’s revenue is met by public subsidy from another regulatory agency, the Strategic Rail Authority.

A failure by the regulators to insist on rail freight growth targets or to impose any claw-back of the subsidies for non-performance is a tribute to weak political and legislative control over regulatory mechanisms and, to a certain extent, reflects the ‘capture’ of the state regulatory process by the freight industry.

The net result has been a decline in rail freight traffic, an increase in public subsidy and a substantial increase in the earnings of the largest freight operator.     

'A Lot of Friction at the Interfaces': The Regulation of Britain's Privatised Railway System

This paper examines the regulation of privatised industries, especially the railways. It focuses on the regulation of the infrastructure company, Railtrack, which collapsed into insolvency less than six years after its flotation. It analyses in detail the establishment of a key interface in the railway system, the track access charges, and discusses the extent to which Railtrack's collapse was a failure of regulation. The paper concludes that the key problem was not the regulatory system, but the fundamentally flawed concept of the rail privatisation, and discusses the implications for the success of privatisation and of Railtrack's successor, Network Rail.     

Delivering Better Transport? An Evaluation of the Ten–Year Plan for the Railway Industry

In July 2000, the Government published Transport 2010, its ten–year plan to improve Britain's transport. This article reviews the proposals to improve the railway system, and examines their likely effects on investment by the railway companies and on passenger safety. The plan is analysed in the context of the structure of the privatized railway industry and its regulatory bodies, with particular reference to the performance of Railtrack (now in administration). The authors conclude that the Government was over–confident in believing that a defective privatized structure could deliver the expansion it wanted. The article shows that the Government has been relying on inadequate and under–performing instruments, over some of which it had little control. This will probably continue unless Railtrack is restructured and taken back into public ownership. Progress so far has been limited, and the prospects of success are not good.     

A “fresh start” or the “worst of all worlds”? A critical financial analysis of the performance and regulation of Network Rail in Britain’s privatised railway system

The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree to which Network Rail, the new not-for-profit infrastructure company owned by members, has provided a “fresh start” for Britain’s privatised railway system. Rail privatisation was predicated on the belief that surplus value could be created through redundancies and deskilling in a loss-making subsidy-dependent industry. Network Rail’s predecessor, Railtrack, followed a profit-maximising agenda and collapsed into insolvency in 2001, after several years of poor performance. Unlike Railtrack, Network Rail is not under pressure to pay dividends to shareholders, and so in theory can focus on the maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure. However, its reliance on debt rather than equity finance, combined with escalating infrastructure costs, means that its annual borrowing costs have reached £1 billion. Thus, the nominally private company is only viable because of substantial subsidy and explicit government support for its borrowing. Further, the bulk of its expenditure is on renewals work which is outsourced to contractors aiming to maximise surplus value. The paper uses critical financial analysis to show the extensive and continuing transfers from the taxpayers and passengers to the financial elite, highlighting distribution issues which have been largely missing from the policy debate over Network Rail’s creation.     

补“砖头”、补“床头”还是补“人头”——基于浙江省某县养老机构的个案调查

本文通过对浙江省某县1家公办养老机构和1家民办养老机构的个案调查,探讨政府养老机构补贴政策的实施效果,并提出进一步改进补贴政策的建议。调查发现,该公办养老机构收费标准较低,其经营收入不仅低于完全成本,而且低于经营成本,政府通过多种形式对其建设和经营进行了"隐性补贴",这部分补贴事实上由实际入住的老年人所享受,而大部分最终入住该公办养老机构的老年人并非最需要得到补贴的低收入失能老年人。近年来,浙江省对民办养老机构实行按床位补贴建设费用的支持政策。作者对1家在上述政策背景下新成立的民办养老机构的调查发现,床位补贴政策的确一定程度上提高了民间开办养老机构的热情,但也还存在床位空置率高等问题。基于上述调研上,作者提出对低收入失能老人实行养老服务需方补贴,同时逐步减少对公办养老机构的运营和建设补贴,对民办养老机构根据其收养的低收入失能老年人人数实行运营补贴等建议。     

The Distribution of Subsidies through Public Health Services in Indonesia, 1978-87

Indonesia has made great progress during the past fifteen yearsin enhancing the command of the poor over privately providedgoods, such as food, clothing, and housing. Has similar progressbeen made in improving their access to publicly provided socialservices? The article looks at how the use of health servicesand the incidence of subsidies in the health sector varied acrosssocioeconomic groups in Indonesia in 1987. It also examineshow the distributions of utilization and subsidies altered between1978 and 1987. The findings indicate that changes in utilizationpatterns and in the incidence of subsidies have been pro-poor.Disparities in access and utilization have diminished. However,public spending on health care is not yet well targeted.     

George Hudson's financial reporting practices: putting the Eastern Counties Railway in context

George Hudson was the most important railway promoter of his time. He had a particular aptitude for visualizing and arranging spectacular company and line amalgamations and his activities helped to bring about the beginnings of a more modern railway network. In 1849 he exercised effective control over nearly 30 per cent of the rail track then operating in the UK, most of it owned by four railway groups, the Eastern Counties Railway, the Midland, the York, Newcastle and Berwick, and the York and North Midland, before a series of scandalous revelations forced him out of office. The economic, railway and accounting literatures have treated George Hudson as an important figure in railway history, although concentrating largely on the financial reporting malpractices of the Eastern Counties Railway, while Hudson was its chairman, which were incorporated into the influential Monteagle Committee Report of 1849. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to events at Hudson's other major companies. This paper analyzes the available evidence, particularly that produced by the Committees of Investigation established at all four railway groups, in order to provide a more balanced assessment of George Hudson's approach to financial reporting and thereby place events at the Eastern Counties Railway in a broader context.     

Will Private Health Insurance Make the Distribution of Public Health Subsidies More Equal? The Case of India

This paper assesses the impact of the entry of private players in the health insurance market on the size of the insurance market and the distribution of public health subsidies on health care provision in India. Simulation results presented in the paper suggest that the redistributive effect is small when richer groups have privileged access to public facilities.     

氢能全产业链支持政策:欧盟的实践与启示

全球经济进入低碳转型轨道,清洁氢能是全球去碳化三大支柱之一,是清洁能源转型的关键产业.欧盟作为全球氢能技术领袖之一,以其技术优势跻身全球氢能产业的佼佼者.近年来,欧盟持续完善氢能支持政策体系,对内加强关键技术研发,对外以国际合作强化标准输出,在制订补贴政策支持氢能全产业链发展方面积累了较为丰富的经验.文章认为欧盟对氢能的全产业链的顶层设计、立法保障和财税补贴等支持政策值得重视,欧盟长期支持关键技术研发和精准补贴产业链的做法值得我国参考和借鉴.     

Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit‐maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated. We discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on‐ and off‐net price discrimination.     

Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending

We use a quasi‐experimental research design to examine the effect of model‐based capital regulation on the procyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model‐based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that microprudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects.     

Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.     

产能利用不足和通胀压力并存的悖论——从产能角度思考中国经济的深层次问题及对策

从中国经济运行的实证轨迹来看,产能过剩存在于以钢铁等为代表的中上游工业制造业和以部分机械制造行业为代表的中下游工业制造业,近年来在以高速公路、高速铁路和轨道交通为代表的基础设施行业也有所体现.在产能过剩的同时,中国的通胀压力尤其是生产资料价格上涨压力却难以消减.产能利用不足与通胀压力并存的根源值得深入分析.生产要素价格...     

Privatisation and Franchising of British Train Operations

The Railways Act 1993 privatised the British railways industry resulting in the separation of ownership and control of the railway infrastructure (track, signals and stations) from that of passenger train operations. The Great North Eastern Railway (GNER), a major train operator, was unable to meet its contractual obligations shortly after successfully re‐tendering for its second franchise. By referring to the organisational form and structure of the franchising process, this paper discusses the main financial and operational problems that specifically contributed to the collapse of GNER. In particular, the paper argues that the fragmented structure of privatised train operations, the lack of industry coordination and the inherent problems of franchising an essential transport service explain the demise of GNER and have undermined the general objectives of railway privatisation. Overall, the paper highlights that privatisation of train services has failed to deliver both travelling benefits for the public and financial benefits to the state.     

THE MODERNISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE UK'S TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

This paper focuses on the creation of new organisational structures under New Labour's modernisation approach in three related areas: the creation of Network Rail as a replacement for the failed company, Railtrack, in the privatised rail industry; the part privatisation of National Air Traffic Services; and the part privatisation of the London Underground. In each case, the arguments of the Government and its critics will be examined. The analysis demonstrates that for each new structure the key objectives of risk transfer and value for money have not been achieved, and concludes with implications of the modernisation agenda for public policy.     

The Role of Tax Subsidies in the Market for Health Insurance

This paper investigates the role of tax subsidies in linking the market for health insurance to the employment relationship. Using both American and Canadian data, it investigates how these subsidies influence whether health insurance coverage is offered in different sized firms and whether it is offered through an employer versus the individual private market. The findings indicate that tax subsidies encourage the provision of insurance in smaller firms. Removal of the subsidies would cause the level of insurance in small firms to decline significantly, but would not cause a large change in the level of insurance in larger firms. Part of this decline would be offset by increases in the market for individually purchased insurance.     

基于市场分割的地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的影响

选取2002年到2015年14年间中国30个省（直辖市、自治区）数据,采用系统GMM模型,考量中国地方政府补贴对中国地方贸易出口量的影响。结果发现：地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的影响主要是通过市场分割实现,但FDI会弱化地方政府补贴对地区贸易出口的正向效应。     

纳税信用管理与财政补贴效率

基于新纳税信用管理的实施,采用双重差分法实证研究我国纳税信用管理对财政补贴效率的影响。结果发现：纳税信用管理能促进信用良好的企业获得财政补贴,并改善企业运用财政补贴的效果,有助于提高财政补贴的效率。机制分析显示,纳税信用管理通过信号传递机制和奖惩机制减少信息不对称,从而提高财政补贴的效率。此外,纳税信用管理对信用良好的中小企业、非国有企业获取财政补贴、运用财政补贴的效率有更大的积极作用,反映纳税信用管理通过改善财政补贴的效率也有助于提高财政补贴的公平性。     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

The decreasing value of non‐SOEs’ political connections during China’s anti‐corruption campaign: evidence and mechanism

In this paper, we find that China’s anti‐corruption campaign since 2012 significantly reduces the value of political connections for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We provide evidence showing that the decline of the value of political connections for non‐SOEs is attributed mainly to the decreasing return from political connections, instead of increasing political risk. We further find that the decreasing return of the politically connected firms is driven mainly by the disappearance of the ‘resource effect’ of political connection in facilitating access to bank credit and government subsidies, but not due to the increasing cost of maintaining political connections.