Can We Meaningfully Speak of Changes in Price under the Regime of Changes in Techniques?

Abstract

This paper presents a simulation exercise on Sraffa's system under various types of technical changes to show that the direction of changes in prices of commodities is contingent on the choice of the numeraire. Thus, such a comparison of prices in two systems turns out to be meaningless. This result points to the arbitrary nature of the neoclassical supply functions, as they inevitably compare prices across several Sraffa systems on the basis of an arbitrarily chosen numeraire. We anticipated such a result from our reading of Sraffa as part of his ‘prelude to a critique of economic theory’.     

Location,location, location: currency effects and return predictability?

Most international financial market studies that compare across countries utilize the US dollar as the common numeraire. We explore the little studied question of the appropriate choice for the base currency and ask if currency choice can affect the final conclusion of whether predictability exists. We provide empirical results for stock return predictability that demonstrate the importance of the numeraire. For example, the existence (absence) of predictability for a US investor does not necessarily imply the existence (absence) of predictability for other foreign investors.     

Numeraire choice in agricultural supply analysis

Should the choice of numeraire price for modelling profit functions be arbitrary, or is more careful study needed? Here, the choice of numeraire is examined using tests for models specification and out-of-sample predictive accuracy based on the crop and livestock data obtained from Iowa. The results of this study indicate that, for this data set and functional form, it does indeed make a difference which numeraire you choose. This is in contrast to previous studies which, in general, indicated that the choice of numeraire equation is arbitrary or, more commonly, offered no justification for the netput chosen.     

ROBUST ESTIMATIONS OF EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATES WITHIN THE G20: A PANEL BEER APPROACH

This paper is concerned with the robustness of equilibrium exchange rate estimations based on the BEER approach for a set of both industrial and emerging countries. The robustness is studied in four directions, successively. First, we investigate the impact of using alternative proxies for relative productivity. Second, we analyze the impact of estimating the equilibrium equation on one single panel covering G20 countries, or separately for G7 and non-G7 countries. Third, we measure the influence of the choice of the numeraire on the derivation of bilateral equilibrium rates. Finally, we study the temporal robustness of the estimations by dropping one or 2 years from the estimation period. Our main conclusion is that BEER estimations are quite robust to these successive tests, although at one point of time misalignments can differ by several percentage points depending on the methodology. The choice of the productivity proxy is the most sensible one, followed by the country sample. In contrast, the choice of the numeraire and the time sample have a relatively limited impact on estimated misalignments.     

TWO POLITICIANS,A PAC,AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES*

Two sequential games of the interactions among a PAC and two politicians contesting the same office are developed, and their subgame perfect equilibria are characterized. The politicians have distinct ideal points in policy space, and this drives the result that the policy platforms they campaign on are not identical. The PAC always contributes only to the politician whose platform is closest to the PAC's ideal point, who is the politician whose ideal point is closest to the PAC's ideal point; as a result, both politicians’policy platforms are closer to the PAC's ideal point. The sequence of play does not qualitatively affect the outcome, but the PAC has a second mover advantage. Exogenous shocks to the probabilities of winning only modify the basic outcome.     

The choice of numeraire,capital intensity uniqueness,and the reswiritching of techniques

This paper examines the condition for capital-intensity uniqueness and the phenomenon of reswitching of techniques in a two-sector linear capital model when the prices and wages are measured in terms of the value of net output per man (the Sraffa numeraire). It is shown that when the Sraffa numeraire is used, a) the capital-intensity condition is not sufficient to ensure a unique relationship between the value of capital per man and the rate of profit; and b) reswitching of techniques is possible even if there is only one capital good in the system. The results arise only from the interaction between the price and composition effects in the model using the Sraffa numeraire.     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.     

A note on long-term contracts

The purpose of this paper is three-fold: (i) to interpret Townsend's (1982) long-term contract model as a labor contract model where a value of job matching for a worker is a private information, (ii) to contrast Townsend's long-term contract model with Holmstrom's (1983) long-term contract model in a common framework, and (iii) to explore the effect of workers' mobility on the contract configuration of the two models.Both Holmstrom and Townsend construct models in which a single-period contract is not viable, but a long-term contract is. However, reasons for this characteristic in the two models are quite different. This paper proposes a simple framework of labor contracts with illustrates the essential difference of the two models, and the role of mobility costs. Mobility costs in the two types of long-term contracts are shown to be beneficial for both workers and the firm. Results of comparative statics show how contract configurations in two models are influenced by changes in mobility costs.     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

A note on Eaton and Gersovitz's model of borrowing

Eaton and Gersovitz's model of borrowing with default risk was re-estimated using data from 1977 and 1981. The results of the re-estimation indicated that the developing countries were less credit constrained in the late seventies/early eighties than in the early dseventies. However, the model did not describe the later sample period as well as the earlier sample period. One reason for the reduced explanatory power of their model is that the model does not incorporate many of the changes that occured in the world economy after 1974 and does not reflect the current structure of indebtedness of the developing countries.     

A note on Johansen's cointegration procedure when trends are present

This note discusses some issues that arise when Johansen's (1991) framework is used to analyze cointegrating relationships among variables with deterministic linear time trends. We cistinguish “stochastic” and “deterministic” cointegration, arguing that stochastic cointegration is sufficient for the existence of an error correction representation and that it is often the hypothesis of interest in empirical applications. We show that Johansen's (1991) method, which includes only a constant term in the estimated regession system, does not allow for stochastic cointegration. We propose to modify Johansen's method by including a vector of deterministic linear trends in the estimated model. We present tabulated critical values of the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics appropriate for this case. We discuss the circumstances under which our modification may be useful.     

The Social Opportunity Cost of Foreign Exchange: A Partial Defence of Harberger et al.*

This paper clarifies the literature on shadow pricing foreign exchange by distinguishing between two different concepts of ‘the social opportunity cost’ of foreign exchange: (a) the increase in utility (divided by the marginal utility of income) due to the availability of an extra dollar of foreign aid receipts; and (b) the maximum amount of some numeraire good which can be used up by the public sector to produce an extra dollar of foreign exchange, without reducing welfare. Both these concepts can be measured by appropriate, but different, versions of the traditional ‘Harberger’ formula The difference disappears entirely under the assumptions which justify partial equilibrium analysis. All these points can be clarified using a single diagram     

A GENERALIZED GIBRAT'S LAW*

Many economic and non‐economic variables such as income, wealth, firm size, or city size often distribute Pareto in the upper tail. It is well established that Gibrat's law can explain this phenomenon, but Gibrat's law often does not hold. This note characterizes a class of processes, one that includes Gibrat's law as a special case, that can explain Pareto distributions. Of particular importance is a parsimonious generalization of Gibrat's law that allows size to affect the variance of the growth process but not its mean. This note also shows that under plausible conditions Zipf's law is equivalent to Gibrat's law.     

Keynes on the nature of capital: a note on the origin of The General Theory's chapter 16

In The General Theory, unlike Keynes's previous works, we find a chapter explicitly devoted to a discussion of capital. It's title, however, does not accurately reflect the actual content of the chapter itself; and the text, which contains a discussion of the concept of roundaboutness, may leave the reader uncertain about Keynes' attitude towards that concept and on the actual focus of the chapter. In this paper a study of the surviving drafts of The General Theory and of other sources relevant to the purpose of elucidating the process of composition of the chapter allows us to show how and why those peculiarities emerged and helps to cast light on their meaning.     

SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

We consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals. Assuming that the high‐quality seller insists on a price, we show that the low‐quality seller's surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers' knowledge about the demand state. If they are also uncertain about demand, then demand uncertainty increases the low‐quality seller's expected payoff, and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time. If buyers know the demand state, then demand uncertainty does not affect the low‐quality seller's payoff, but she must employ a sophisticated pricing strategy.     

Competition over Time-Inconsistent Consumers

How do firms respond to consumers' time inconsistency? This paper studies the optimal design of nonexclusive contracts under competition. It shows that nonexclusivity creates a stark asymmetry between immediate‐costs goods and immediate‐rewards goods. For immediate‐cost goods nonexclusivity does not affect the equilibrium and, when consumers are sophisticated, the efficient allocation is achieved. When consumers are partially naive, the optimal sales tax may be either positive or negative and depends on parameters that are hard to estimate. In the case of immediate‐rewards goods, however, the equilibrium features marginal‐cost pricing and is always inefficient. Moreover, the optimal tax does not depend on the consumers' degree of naiveté and is a function of parameters that are easy to assess.     

MONETARY POLICY REGIME SWITCHES AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS*

This article considers the determinacy and distributional consequences of regime switching in monetary policy. Although switching in the inflation target does not affect determinacy, switches in the inflation response can cause indeterminacy. Satisfying the Taylor principle period by period is neither necessary nor sufficient for determinacy when inflation responses switch; indeterminacy can arise if monetary policy responds too aggressively to inflation in the active regime. Inflation target switches primarily impact the level of inflation, whereas inflation response switches primarily impact the volatility. Expecting an inflation target switch has minor effects on volatility, whereas expecting an inflation response switch raises volatility more substantially.     

A note on the competitive search model of Azariadis and Pissarides

In this short note, I reinvestigate a recent paper of Azariadis and Pissarides (Unemployment dynamics with international capital mobility, European Economic Review, 2007(51), 27–48) where wages are determined in a competitive search setting. I show that their equation on the equilibrium wage rate is incorrect. I derive a correct wage equation and perform the numerical analysis. The correction does not change their result and high capital mobility still raises the variability of the unemployment rate.