Robust monopoly pricing

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty.     

Capacity expansion and dynamic monopoly pricing

We substitute to the plant size problem, as investigated by Chenery [Chenery, H., 1952. Overcapacity and the acceleration principle. Econometrica], a new version in which a profit-maximizing monopolist may combine its investment policy with a price policy adjusting demand upwards or downwards over time. We characterize the optimal price and investment policies. The optimal price policy determines an investment pattern either with constant increments of capacity over time, or becoming constant after a finite time. The existing capacity is either fully used at each instant between two investment dates; or the monopolist first quotes the instantaneous monopoly price and, thereafter, the price dampening instantaneous demand at the optimal installed capacity level.     

Comparative statics of monopoly pricing

Summary. When consumers' willingness-to-pay increases by a uniform amount, the change in the resulting monopoly price is generally indeterminate. Our analysis identifies sufficient conditions on the underlying demand curve which predict both the sign and the magnitude of the resulting price change.     

Mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly

We analyze price competition between two brands. Buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty. We identify a unique symmetric mixed-strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers.     

A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities

We analyze dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities, focusing on pricing under negative externalities. We also attempt to generalize models in the previous literature, which encompass both negative and positive externalities, by incorporating a consumer’s discount factor for past sales as a parameter. Analyzing our model reveals oscillation as the optimal price path in the presence of negative externalities.     

Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect

This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand, in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context, the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’ contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’.     

Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information

Summary This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with differential information about the realizations of a stochastic process which determines demand. We study the sequential equilibria in stationary strategies of the stochastic game between a seller and buyer. The seller has zero cost of producing one unit of a non-durable good in all market periods. The buyer's value for the good is a random variable governed by a simple Markov process. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by nature and is privately revealed to the buyer. The seller posts a single price offer each period, which the buyer either accepts or rejects. Only two types of price paths emerge in equilibrium: either prices are constant, or they have persistent cycles between a low and a high value. In both cases, however, prices are sticky in the sense that changes in price are less frequent than changes in the economy's fundamentals.We thank John Rust and Asher Wolinsky for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF grant SES 89-09242.     

流通产业组织结构优化中的自然垄断趋势

流通产业的组织结构是产业经济学关注的重要理论问题之一,人们或是根据产业组织学理论从商品流通企业的市场关系对其进行分析,或是从流通产业内部的资源配置结构及关联对其展开考察,或是在"结构、行为、绩效"框架下对其进行研究.其实,产业的组织结构涉及的层面很复杂,它与自然垄断之间有可能存在的关联尚未引起学者们应有的关注.本文认为,依据产业经济学对自然垄断的理解或定义,流通产业组织结构的优化与自然垄断之间存在着关联,这种关联可以通过流通产业运行的内部性和外部性予以揭示,对这种关联的分析,可以发现在流通产业组织结构的优化中蕴含着自然垄断的趋势.     

Insurance monopoly and renegotiation

Summary The mechanism design problem of a monopoly insurer — faced with privately informed insurees — is considered. It is assumed that the insurer cannot commit not to renegotiate (by using the information that customer separation reveals) before contracts are put into force. A solution is offered by modeling renegotiation-proofness in a framework inspired by Greenberg's theory of social situations. Maximizing profit within the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes always leads to a semi-separating outcome (i.e. neither full pooling nor full separation can occur) and may leave all low-risks as well as some of the high-risks self-insured.This work originated with Asheim and Nilssen (1991). The authors thank Paul Beaudry, Mathias Dewatripont, John Hillas, Terje Lensberg, Georg Nöldeke, Trond Olsen, Michel Poitevin, Eric van Damme, and especially Joseph Greenberg, as well as participants at seminars in Bergen, Cambridge, Florence, Helsinki, London, Mons, Montreal, Oslo, Stony Brook, and Tilburg for helpful comments and discussions. Asheim thanks Tilburg (CentER), McGill and Humboldt Universities for their hospitality and acknowledges support from the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management and the Norwegian Research Council. Nilssen acknowledges support from Norges Bank and the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities.     

Intertemporal pricing in laboratory posted offer markets with differential information

Summary. This paper analyzes intertemporal seller pricing and buyer purchasing behavior in a laboratory retail market with differential information. A seller posts one price each period that a buyer either accepts or rejects. Trade occurs over a sequence of "market periods" with a random termination date. The buyer and seller are differentially informed: The seller's cost of producing a unit of a fictitious good is known and constant in all periods, but the buyer's value for the good (demand) is a random variable governed by a Markov Process whose structure is common knowledge. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by "nature" and is privately revealed only to the buyer. The market termination rule is a binary random variable. We conduct 32 laboratory experiments designed to study intertemporal pricing by human subjects in the Posted Offer Institution when demand follows a stochastic process. There are four series of experiments: 8 with simulated buyers, 8 with inexperienced subjects, 8 with once experienced subjects, and 8 with twice experienced subjects.     

Planned obsolescence and monopoly undersupply

This paper examines the welfare implications of planned obsolescence in situations where the traditional monopoly undersupply exists. We find that the monopolist’s introduction of incompatibility between successive generations of products alleviates the monopoly undersupply problem and may therefore generate higher social welfare than compatibility. Paradoxically, the stronger the network effects, the more likely welfare will increase as a result of incompatibility. Our result also extends to two-sided markets characterized by indirect network effects.     

Corporate monopoly power and risk

The relationship between monopoly power and concentration may be influenced by the ‘riskiness’ of the firm. Two related issues are considered in this paper: the impact of market structure and conduct on the risk of the firm and the impact of risk upon the relationship between profitability and concentration. An a priori relationship between risk, market structure and profitability is derived within the mean-variance framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.     

Regulating monopoly price discrimination

There is a substantial literature assessing the impact of entry restrictions created by state certificate-of-need (CON) programs on hospital and nursing home markets, but comparatively little research has focused on CON for home health agencies (HHAs). We assessed the impact of state CON programs for HHAs, and for potential substitute service providers, on quality ratings for HHAs. HHA quality ratings were obtained from the Home Health Compare database developed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the last quarter of 2010 through the last quarter of 2013. The HHA-level data were augmented with county-level area characteristics for each HHA in the CMS database. An ordered logit model was used to estimate the association between state CON restrictions and Low, Medium, and High quality categories, adjusted for HHA and area characteristics. The results indicated that HHAs in states with CON for HHAs were less likely to have High quality ratings, and more likely to have Medium quality ratings, compared to agencies in states without CON for home health. Additional research is needed to assess whether the apparent adverse impact of CON on HHA quality is related to diminished competition among HHAs in states with CON.     

Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.     

Second degree price discrimination and natural monopoly

This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. The paper shows that a “no‐distortion‐at‐the‐top” result, which is standard in models with restricted entry, may also appear in a contestable market. Depending on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can also be a sustainable equilibrium. However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is not guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable “distortion‐at‐the‐top” result is possible.     

Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.     

An alternative to natural monopoly

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We consider a shared ownership arrangement among consumers/owners as a means to organize production with an underlying decreasing average cost function typical of...     

Special offers and clustering under symmetric monopoly

A monopolist offerings variants on a Salop circle is analyzed with respect to his choice of product variants and prices. Although we assume a uniform distribution of tastes, the profit-maximizing pattern is not equidistant in variants and prices are not the same for all variants.Instead, under fairly general circumstances, there exists at least one cheap variant (special offer) around which the more expensive ones are clustered. This result depends on the assumption that the market size is not fixed as in most other models of this sort, but depends on prices in a straightforward manner.     

Derived factor demand under monopoly

Summary. We generalize the formula provided by Maurice and Ferguson (1973) for derived factor demand in a monopoly by extending it to cross-price effects and taking into account other variables which may, within an general-equilibrium framework, affect demand, such as income. Hopefully, both features increase the applicability of this formula in general-equilibrium analyses. Received: April 5, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001