Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

THE ENDOGENEITY OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS

Firms endogenize the extent of information asymmetry by choosing the optimal level and channels of direct communication with the capital markets. Firms choose more communication when they have a greater potential demand for external financing (characterized by higher growth, less cash, and higher leverage). We demonstrate that a higher level of communication is associated with a higher probability of equity issuance. We further document that the previously observed negative market reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements is attributed only to low‐communication firms; high‐communication SEO firms experience no significant adverse market reaction.     

FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER?

We examine the determinants of foreign investors' participation in the privatization process of developing countries. First, we estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given country. We show that a favorable legal environment where investor protection is higher enhances foreign investors' participation. Foreigners also prefer large, strategic firms from high‐growth economies and socially stable countries with low political risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to privatized firms that foreign investors actually choose and show that the stakes foreigners hold are larger if the firms are privatized by private sales as opposed to public offerings.     

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This paper clarifies the nature of nonprofit accountability by distinguishing between the substantive and processual understandings of the public interest. The major theories of the nonprofit sector are shown to imply that this sector's activities correspond to the public interest only in its processual understanding, but not in the substantive one. Policy and management implications of this argument are discussed.     

NONPROFIT EMPLOYEES' MACHIAVELLIAN PROPENSITIES

Nonprofit organizations are held to high ethical standards due to their charitable missions serving the common good. Incidents of fiscal mismanagement within the nonprofit sector make it relevant to assay the ethical principles of employees. This study examines the level of Machiavellian propensities of US nonprofit employees. Results indicate Machiavellian propensities do exist in certain nonprofit employees and these employees agree with questionable behavior. Policy makers and oversight agencies may find these results useful in developing corporate governance and accountability measures for nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, board of director members may use these results to monitor employee actions and address management training.     

Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention

This study investigates how acquiring and target firm managers' preferences for control rights motivate the payment for corporate acquisitions. We expect that managers of target firms who value influence in combined firms will prefer to receive stock. One reason top managers desire influence is to enhance their chances of retaining jobs in the combined firm. Our analysis shows a strong, positive association between managerial ownership of target firms and the likelihood of acquisitions for stock. We also find that managers of target firms are more likely to retain jobs in combined firms when they receive stock rather than cash.     

EXTERNAL FINANCING,LIQUIDITY, AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

Using a large panel of industrial Compustat firms from 1971 to 1988, we find long-term external financing to be positively related to the period's capital expenditures on growth opportunities, but negatively related to beginning-of-the-period financial slack, broadly defined. These findings support the view that firms tend to match long-term sources of financing with long-lived assets, and short-term debt with short-lived assets. Our results also reinforce the belief that firms prefer internal to external financing. We find no evidence that firms favor financing capital expenditures with short-term debt, either permanently or temporarily.     

非公有制企业党组织与企业捐赠

与公有制企业党组织受到较多关注不同,非公有制企业党组织是否真正发挥影响力是同样重要但却被学术界忽略的待研究问题。本文基于手工收集的民营上市公司党组织的相关数据,从社会捐赠这一视角研究党组织影响力对其履行社会责任的影响。结果发现:民营上市公司党组织的影响力越大,企业的社会捐赠力度越大,且显著高于同行业和同地区的平均捐赠水平;这种影响力的促进作用在民营上市公司党组织基础更加稳固的企业、管理层对党组织重视程度更高的企业和党代会时期更加明显。上述结果在控制了可能的内生性问题后依然稳健。本文的发现意味着非公有制企业党组织有助于促进其履行社会责任,这有助于评估和促进非公有制企业党组织的建设及其作用的发挥。     

Managing employees in aged care: live the principles

Aged care services are a large recipient of public money in many developed countries and are primarily provided by nonprofit organizations in Australia. This paper reports on an investigation into the impacts of the psychological contract for nurses in nonprofit aged care. The results highlight the importance of nonprofit organizations fulfilling their obligations and living their principles. Aged care nurses who perceive breaches to their psychological contract are likely to de-identify from the organization.     

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL STRATEGY

Even if the value of the firm is unaffected by its capital structure, managers may have reasons to choose a particular structure. The prices of the firm's securities reflect the “market's” assessment of the value and riskiness of the firm. Should managers disagree with the market's assessment of the firm's risk or value, they will also disagree about the relative returns on the firm's securities. Concern about shareholder welfare may, therefore, lead them to prefer a specific capital structure. If managers believe the market has underestimated the firm's value, they will prefer debt financing; if the market has overestimated risk, they will prefer equity; and, if managers disagree about both risk and value, they may prefer to finance using both debt and equity.     

A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition

We model a competitive industry where managers choose quantities and costs to maximize a combination of firm profits and benefits from expropriation. Expropriation is possible because of corporate governance ‘slack’ permitted by the government. We show that corporate governance slack induces managers to choose levels of output and costs that are higher than would otherwise be optimal. This, in turn, benefits consumers - the equilibrium price is lower - and other stakeholders such as suppliers and employees. Depending on the government’s social welfare objective, less-than-perfect investor protection can be optimal. We show why some mechanisms suggested by the literature as improving investor protection - legal change, cross-listing, domestic mergers - may not be effective. We provide a theoretical argument showing the efficacy of cross-border mergers. The stronger corporate governance of a foreign acquirer, imposed on the domestic target firm, benefits merging shareholders and those of competing unmerged domestic firms.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

BALANCING ACTS: NPO-LEADERSHIP AND VOLUNTEERING

Volunteering is regarded as an increasingly important phenomenon and the 'employment' of volunteers as one of the typical traits of nonprofit organizations. However, the consequences of volunteering for everyday practices of NPO-leadership, i.e. the question of how non-paid employees are treated in settings where formal power is lacking, have so far not received the attention they deserve. Our paper discusses practices for leading without formal power by presenting findings from an empirical research project. Using a Grounded Theory approach, we identify five interrelated practices that question conventional notions of transformative or charismatic leadership.     

An Experimental Examination of US Individual Donors’ Information Needs and Use

This paper adopts an internet‐based experiment to investigate whether and how individual donors use nonprofit organizations’ financial and nonfinancial information when making their donation decisions. Using undergraduate students in the United States (US) to proxy for individual donors, our results indicate that individual donors are more likely to acquire nonfinancial information, such as nonprofit organizations’ goals, outcomes, programs and missions, than financial information. Donors integrate nonfinancial information into their decisions as their actual donations are significantly correlated with such information. Our results also indicate that while individual donors acquire financial efficiency measures, including the program expense ratio and fundraising expense ratio, they do not seem to integrate such information into their decisions as their actual donations are not significantly correlated with the efficiency information. This study contributes to the nonprofit literature and research domain focusing on charitable giving and donor preferences.     

Managerial Motives and Merger Financing

We examine how managerial motives influence the choice of financing for a sample of 209 completed mergers from 1981–1988. Our evidence indicates that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with cash when target firm ownership concentration is high, preventing the creation of an outside blockholder. This suggests bidding firm managers prefer to keep ownership structure widely diffused to reduce external monitoring. We also find that bidding firm management is more likely to finance mergers with stock when the variance of bidding firm's stock return is high. This suggests managers of risky firms prefer leverage‐reducing transactions to reduce their personal risk.     

Investor communication and the benefits of cross-listing

While studies have sought to explain the benefits of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of communication between managers and investors during this process. In this paper, I investigate whether managers change communication policies around U.S. cross-listings. I document significant increases in communication when firms cross-list. I then test whether these investor communication practices around cross-listing are associated with capital market benefits. I find that cross-listed firms that communicate more with investors experience greater and longer lasting cross-listing benefits. Lastly, I explore two potential reasons that may lead managers to choose higher levels of communication: to support an increase in investor recognition and to facilitate monitoring. I find results consistent with communication increasing visibility and scrutiny, suggesting that communication functions as a supporting tool to achieve managers’ cross-listing goals.     

A FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT THEORY OF THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

Certain unique operational and financial characteristics of nonprofit organizations prevent the transfer and successful application of orthodox economic and financial management theories to financial management decisions in the nonprofit context. These characteristics include a dual management structure composed of professional and financial managers, multiple objectives, legal restrictions on the disposition of earnings and assets, and the constant threat of illiquidity as the result of the uncoupling of organizational goals and cash flows. The financial management theory presented here separates the financial management goals from the professional goals and allows the finance practitioner to concentrate on keeping the nonprofit organization operating as a going concern. The theory is designed as a “partial” theory of the firm and is completely consonant with accepted economic orthodoxy. Hence, by employing financial decision rules based on the new theory, a nonprofit organization can survive financially through time while its professional manager pursues utility-denominated goals delineated by the organization's tax-exempt status.     

Free cash flow, debt-monitoring and managers' LIFO/FIFO policy choice

This paper explores the explanatory power of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis in managers' choice of LIFO versus FIFO. The association between FCF, and choice of inventory methods is based on the assumption that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when LIFO is the tax minimization method and that non-value-maximizing managers of firms with the FCF problem have incentives to choose FIFO, an income increasing method, in order to increase their compensation. However, since debt can act as a monitoring device and mitigate the agency problems of FCF, managers of firms with high FCF and high debt are less likely to choose FIFO than managers of firms with high FCF and low debt. The evidence is consistent with this expectation.     

'Nonprofits' need surplus too

By definition profit refers to the difference between revenue and expenses. In for-profit organizations profit or surplus gives a return to the owners of the company and serves as a source of financing for capital acquisitions and working capital. Nonprofit organizations, which are not allowed a surplus, don't suffer on the first count because they have no owners. But they do suffer on the second count because, if expected to grow, they need to finance asset replacement and growth. In these days when funds for long-term debt are becoming scarcer, this author asserts, the need for regulators to allow 'nonprofits' to keep a surplus is increasing. In this article, he argues for a surplus and then discusses how managers and regulators can determine how much a nonprofit organization should be allowed. He presents a combination of a modified version of the return-on-asset pricing model used in for-profit organizations and a model for assessing working capital needs associated with growth.