共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Daniel Friedman 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1998,8(4):423-432
The Theory of Learning in Games by Fudenberg and Levine surveys a key branch of evolutionary economics from a mainstream perspective. Its publication provides
an opportunity to reassess the prospects and goals for evolutionary economics. 相似文献
3.
John Nightingale 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(2):147-167
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change , by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter continues to have great influence on evolutionary economic thought. While their modeling
techniques and the breadth of their vision for evolutionary theorising must be seen as seminal and effective innovation in
economic theory, they were not the first inventors of such a theory. Close examination reveals that much of the economic theory
was anticipated by Jack Downie whose book, The Competitive Process, was published in 1958. The extent of anticipation is remarkable, with not merely the two elements of population ecology,
selection and mutation, but the way in which they are theorised to work being replicated by Nelson and Winter. 相似文献
4.
Optimal freeware quality in the presence of network externalities: an evolutionary game theoretical approach 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
New software products often face difficulty in achieving market penetration. A potential remedy is to offer a freeware version
of the software to encourage initial adoption and establish a larger user base for the software, thereby increasing the commercial
version's value to adopters in future periods. However, to avoid complete cannibalization of the commercial version, the freeware
version's quality must be sufficiently low and the price of the commercial version must not be too high. We model the effect
of these two decision variables, price and freeware quality, on the adoption of software using static and evolutionary game
theory. 相似文献
5.
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. We provide an example with a Lyapunov stable limit state whose equivalent correlated equilibrium lies outside the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria. Finally, we prove that if the matching distribution is a product measure, a state satisfying any of the three conditions listed above is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
6.
A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that “mutants” are arbitrarily rare relative to “trembling” incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of evolutionary game theory to games with two distinct types of players where the type-specific payoff functions are nonlinear on the right—bi-player-type nonlinear (BNL) evolutionary games. That is, asymmetric games where the payoffs for pairwise interactions are influenced by the ambient frequencies of the pertinent strategies of both types of players.While this paper is motivated by my interest in inter- and intra-gender conflicts of interest in sexual reproduction, BNL games also arise just as naturally in most two-species interactions. Thus, the methodology may provide a novel approach to investigating such classical ecological phenomena as prey–predator/host–parasite interactions and interspecies competition for resources.Finally, given the growing tendency to utilize evolutionary games in economic modeling, a case can be made for the current paper being of interest to traditional game-theoretic modelers in connection with situations such as buyer/seller or employer/employee interaction. 相似文献
8.
Wolfgang Leininger 《Economic Theory》2006,29(3):713-719
The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between quasi-submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which – apart from being of independent interest – accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy of a quasi-submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. That is, if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can do so even lessThe author is grateful to Ana Ania and Carlos Alōs-Ferrer for comments on an earlier version 相似文献
9.
Burkhard Hehenkamp Cheng-Zhong Qin Charles Stuart 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1999,9(2):211-224
We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite
number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of
the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic
dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium. 相似文献
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11.
Bernard Walliser 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1998,8(1):67-87
In game theory, four dynamic processes converging towards an equilibrium are distinguished and ordered by way of agents'
decreasing cognitive capacities. In the eductive process, each player has enough information to simulate perfectly the others'
behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium. In epistemic learning, each player updates his beliefs about others' future
strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions. In behavioral learning, each player modifies his own strategies
according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past actions. In the evolutionary process, each agent has a fixed strategy
and reproduces in proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions. All along the spectrum, longer term
dynamics makes up for weaker rationality, and physical relations substitute for mental interactions. Convergence, if any,
is towards an always stronger equilibrium notion and selection of an equilibrium state becomes more sensitive to context and
history. The processes can be mixed if associated to different periods, agents or mechanisms and deepened if obtained by formal
reasoning principles. 相似文献
12.
Richard Baron Jacques Durieu Hans Haller Philippe Solal 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(5):563-575
We consider best response dynamics with endogenous noise based on a finite game in strategic form. A player can reduce the
noise level by expending an extra effort and incurring some disutility or control costs. We specify control costs that result
in logit adjustment rules. The stochastically stable states of the dynamic process are partial Nash configurations, that is,
states where at least one player plays a best response against the others. If the game has a potential, then the stochastically
stable states coincide with the Nash equilibria on which the potential is maximized.
RID="*"
ID="*" Instructive comments of a referee are gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to:H. Haller 相似文献
13.
Matthias Kelm 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(2):97-130
A general Darwinian framework is employed to arrive at an interpretation of Schumpeter's work that brings out clearly its
specific evolutionary aspects. Schumpeter's theory of economic evolution is seen to be still highly relevant to evolutionary
economics, because it sheds light on some fundamental issues: the relationship between evolutionary theory and equilibrium
analysis, the usefulness of Darwinian theory for economics, and the precise nature of the evolutionary forces at work in economic
systems. 相似文献
14.
Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude Carlos Hervés-Beloso Emma Moreno-García Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez 《Economic Theory》2009,38(2):321-330
In this paper we recast a differential information economy as a strategic game in which players propose net trades and prices.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria are strong and determine both consumption plans and commodity prices that coincide with the
Walrasian Expectations equilibria of the underlying economy.
The authors acknowledge support by research grants BEC2003-09067-C04-01 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER), PGIDT04XIC30001PN
(Xunta de Galicia) and SA070A05 (Junta de Castilla y León). JP Torres-Martínez is also grateful to CNPq-Brazil and University
of Vigo for financial support. We are indebted to N.C. Yannelis for helpful comments and insights. 相似文献
15.
In this paper, we aim to discuss whether Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth can accommodate Schumpeters vision of development through creative destruction. Taking a methodological approach, our focus is on individual decision-making, technology, general equilibrium and welfare, and steady state dynamics as the fundamental principles underlying endogenous growth theory. In particular, the Aghion-Howitt model of Schumpeterian growth in various extended versions is analyzed in the light of Schumpeters work. Therefore, we also try to root Schumpeters work in historical context. We find endogenous growth theory far from carrying Schumpeters idea of an evolutionary approach to change and development. Rather the emergence of numerous models of an evolutionary type can be observed to provide for the formal structure appropriate to keeping Schumpeters legacy alive.JEL Classification:
B1, B2, B4, O3, O4Corespondence to: Thomas Kuhn 相似文献
16.
Esben Sloth Andersen 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2001,11(1):143-164
This paper presents the problem of satiation of consumption and technology in relation to a model of evolutionary endogenous
growth. The model represents an attempt to provide an evolutionary economic micro foundation to Pasinetti's scheme of the
structural economic dynamics of an economy that is based on only labour and knowledge. The micro foundation is based on a
set of rules that makes endogenous the demand coefficients, the labour coefficients, and the number of available sectors.
Through process innovations firms increase their productivities with respect to individual goods, but a growth slowdown takes
place unless the benefits from specialisation are exploited at still higher levels. Another cause for slowdown is related
to an Engelian hierarchy of goods. As the standard of living grows, existing sectors and consumption goods satiate, so new
sectors need to be provided by product innovations in a sufficient pace to keep up with the labour that is displaced from
old sectors. 相似文献
17.
Thomas Riechmann 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1999,9(2):225-242
This article tries to connect two separate strands of literature concerning genetic algorithms. On the one hand, extensive
research took place in mathematics and closely related sciences in order to find out more about the properties of genetic
algorithms as stochastic processes. On the other hand, recent economic literature uses genetic algorithms as a metaphor for
social learning. This paper will face the question of what an economist can learn from the mathematical branch of research,
especially concerning the convergence and stability properties of the genetic algorithm.
It is shown that genetic algorithm learning is a compound of three different learning schemes. First, each particular scheme
is analyzed. Then it is shown that it is the combination of the three schemes that gives genetic algorithm learning its special
flair: A kind of stability somewhere in between asymptotic convergence and explosion. 相似文献
18.
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(2):131-145
In a recent paper, Matthias Kelm (1997) accepts that `Schumpeter's definition of evolution does not contain any Darwinian
mechanism such as natural selection or any other biological concept' and that Schumpeter `made no such attempt' to apply `Darwinian
theory to economic evolution'. However, Kelm goes on to argue that Schumpeter would have been a Darwinian if circumstances
were different. It is argued here that this contention is highly implausible because Schumpeter explicitly rejected biological
metaphors and analogies in economics. Furthermore, Schumpeter misunderstood Darwinism. In his attempt to `interpret' Schumpeter
as a Darwinian, Kelm himself misrepresents the three core principles of Darwinism. In addition Kelm's paper contains several
misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the assessment of Schumpeter made by Hodgson (1993). This present response concludes
that Schumpeter was indeed one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century and that he may legitimately be described
as an `evolutionary economist'. However, he cautioned strongly against the use of biological metaphors in economics and there
is no legitimate basis for describing his approach as Darwinian. 相似文献
19.
Sandra Tavares Silva 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2009,19(1):111-135
This paper proposes a discussion on evolutionary technological change and economic growth theory, using the Lakatosian Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes as an appraisal criterion. Since the persistence of some inflexibility in this approach made it difficult to capture fundamental features of the scientific undertaking at hand, an alternative hypothesis was explored, that developed by Hoover (Scientific research program or tribe? A joint appraisal of Lakatos and the new classical macroeconomics. In: de Marchi N, Blaug M (eds) Appraising economic theories: studies in the methodology of research programmes. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1991). This latter framework is used here not as a formal methodology but rather as a language to find patterns in these theories. This exercise evolved then towards a number of considerations on the confrontation between these evolutionary theories particularly in terms of that which can be seen (in a loose sense) as their “rival research programme”, the new neoclassical growth models. 相似文献
20.
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination
game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents
enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at
low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
Received: January 10, 2001; revised version: December 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank, without implicating in any way, George Mailath for helpful discussions. Some of the ideas in this paper were
developed during the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Ischia, Italy. The NSF provided
financial support.
Correspondence to: T. Temzelides 相似文献