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We develop a model and characterize the differences between the investment policies of a rational CEO and an overconfident CEO. In the presence of risky outstanding debt, we show that an overconfident CEO has the incentive to overinvest more than that of a rational CEO. However, this incentive is mitigated by the discipline imposed by outside investors when an overconfident CEO seeks external financing. In contrast, when the firm has sufficient internal funds to meet its investment needs and outstanding debt is relatively safer, the overconfident CEO has no necessity to seek external funds and the overinvestment incentive persists. We examine bondholders’ and stockholders’ reaction around CEO turnover announcements and find evidence consistent with the over investment hypothesis. 相似文献
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Hongxia Wang Wallace N. Davidson Xiaoxin Wang 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2010,50(3):367-376
Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting. 相似文献
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《Human Resource Management Review》2018,28(1):56-67
Interpersonal relationships are an important factor in organizations, and a growing number of articles examine how such relationships affect why people stay or leave organizations. In this article, we investigate how affective attachment between actors influences the turnover and retention process of non-family CEOs in family firms. By employing a social exchange perspective, we reveal under which conditions affective attachment come into being. We focus on the relationship between a non-family CEO and two generations of the owner family. Conceptualizing their relationship as an exchange triad, we show how imbalances influence the affective attachment created in this triad and outline the implications for turnover. Our article contributes to the literature on family businesses and turnover by linking the affective side of interpersonal relationships to CEO retention and turnover. 相似文献
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This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry‐wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment. 相似文献
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Eric A. Fong 《Journal of Management Studies》2010,47(6):1095-1122
abstract Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager‐controlled organizations as compared to owner‐controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation. 相似文献
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