Transparency in the Procurement of Public Works

The construction contract bonding system is used worldwide to protect the owner of a project against the risk of non-performance by the contractor. There is a close relationship between the construction contract bonding system and transparency in public works, which policy-makers and officials need to be more aware of. There are mainly three systems in use, which the authors have analysed in depth. Each of the three models has a different influence on transparency in public works: the 'high penalty conditional model' is considered the most functional model in improving transparency, the 'low penalty unconditional model' does not contribute very much to improving transparency, while the 'substitute contractor model' can lead to greater opportunities for corruption on the contractor's side.     

我国招投标和采购市场怪象扫描

我国《招标投标法》和《政府采购法》被人们称为“阳光法案”，自正式实施以来，对于整顿我国招投标市场和政府采购工作起到了积极作用，也取得了一定成效，但由于在项目建设和采购项目中最终的决定权仍被少数人所垄断，加上权力寻租、金钱交易、行政干预、人为操作、“红包”竞争、权色交换等，招投标和政府采购反而成为少数人合法腐败的外衣，工作中依然存在许多不规范的竞争和不规则的运作，人们期盼已久的用“阳光”驱逐“暗箱”的局面在某些地方和某些行业未能真正出现，使得我国政府采购和招标投标市场中怪象丛生，应当引起有关部门的高度重视。     

Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.     

Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement

The World Trade Organization's voluntary rules on governmentprocurement are a useful mechanism for ensuring that publicprocurement procedures are efficient. They also provide an opportunityto reduce the uncertainty of participants by increasing transparencyand accountability. Yet most developing countries have chosennot to subject their procurement policies to international disciiplinesand multilateral surveillance. Their reasons may include anunfamiliarity with the government procurement agreement (GPA);a perception that the potential payoffs are small; a desireto discriminate in favor of domestic firms; or the successfulopposition of groups that benefit from the current regimes.Although the economic rationales for abstaining from the GPAare not compelling, a quid pro quo for accession may be neededto overcome opposition by special interests. Developing countryprocurement markets are large enough that governments may beable to make accession to the GPA conditional on temporary exceptionsto multilateral disczplines or on better access to export markets.      

The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement

We examine how open procurement data affect the competitiveness of award procedures and the execution of government contracts. The European Union recently made its historical procurement notices available for bulk download in a cohesive and user-friendly database. Comparing government contracts above and below EU procurement size thresholds, we find that, after the open data initiative, procurement officials are more likely to award treated contracts through open bidding. In cross-sectional analyses, we document variation in the open bidding effect consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (1) increased scrutiny by NGOs and investigative journalists and (2) learning by national procurement regulators. However, treated contracts are also more likely to experience costly modifications because the shift to open bidding introduces rigidity that limits officials’ discretion in selecting suppliers based on private information. Overall, our evidence indicates that open procurement data promote competitive bidding but lead to contracts with weaker execution performance. These inferences also hold in an alternative open data setting.     

政府公共治理、财政透明与企业投资效率

近期的研究支持了转型经济条件下政府与企业之间的密切联系,但却少有研究关注政府公共治理效力对微观企业的影响。基于此,本文以地方政府财政透明度为对象,将政府公共治理因素纳入到企业行为的分析中,观察其对企业投资效率的影响。本文发现,与央企和民企相比,地方政府财政透明度的增加更有助于提高地方国有企业的投资效率;地方政府财政透明度的增加对地方国有企业的过度投资具有更强的抑制作用。本文的研究提供了政府公共治理影响企业价值的经验证据,丰富了转型经济条件下政府——企业的行为分析框架。并且本文对推进财政信息公开、加强社会主义民主制度和责任型政府建设,亦具有积极的实践指导价值。     

我国财政透明度的现状及其国际比较研究

财政透明度是优质公共财政管理的重要方面,它是促进效率、保障政府和官员负起责任的一种方法.财政透明度由此受到国际货币基金组织、世界银行和许多西方发达国家的高度关注.我国财政透明度建设起步较晚,目前来看虽然已有明显改观,但仍和国际上的规范性做法存在很大差距.立足国际视角,结合我国实际情况,提高我国财政透明度可从转变政府意识、修订有关法律、加强预算准备、改进政府收支分类系统、发展政府会计和政府财务报告系统、建设政府财政管理信息系统等方面着手.     

Transparency in the Mortgage Market

This paper studies the impact of transparency in the mortgage market on the underlying real estate market. We show that geographic transparency in the secondary mortgage market, which implies geographic risk based pricing in the primary market, can limit risk-sharing and make house prices more volatile. Ex ante, regions prefer opaque markets to enable insurance opportunities. We discuss the implications for risk based pricing and house price volatility more generally. In addition, we investigate the specific conditions under which competitive lenders would optimally choose to provide opaque lending, thus reducing volatility in the real estate market. We show that in general the opaque competitive equilibrium is not stable, and lenders have incentive to switch to transparent lending if one of the geographic regions has experienced a negative income shock. We propose market and regulatory mechanisms that make the opaque competitive equilibrium stable and insurance opportunities possible.     

Transparency in Hierarchies

We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (observability) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (precision). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.     

提高政府采购质量和效率打造健康统一的采购市场

政府采购制度是市场经济国家管理公共财政支出的一种基本手段，如何建立一个优质高效．健康统一的采购市场，实现政府采购的经济有效性目标，减少采购成本，提高政府采购效率，是当前政府采购工作应研究的重点。笔者认为，应从以下几方面进行加强和完善。[编者按]     

On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation

In this paper we study when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that management chooses to disclose. We show that in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation, the desirability of a fully transparent reporting regime hinges on the stewardship properties of the information in question. Specifically, information that is mainly useful for predicting future events and of little use for evaluating past actions should only be made available to the public through management's self‐interested disclosures. Only if the information is useful for making inference about managerial actions can it be optimal to have full corporate transparency, so that outsiders have independent access to the same information as management.     

Market Transparency and the Accounting Regime

We model the interaction of financial market transparency and different accounting regimes. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the recently proposed shift in accounting standards from historic cost accounting to marking to market. The paper shows that marking to market can provide investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives management a “veil” under which they can potentially mask a firm's true economic performance. The model provides new explanations for several empirical findings and has some novel implications. We show that greater opacity in financial markets leads to more frequent and more severe crashes in asset prices (under a historic‐cost‐accounting regime). Moreover, our model indicates that historic cost accounting can make the financial market more rather than less volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The mechanism shown in the model also sheds light on the cause of many financial scandals in recent years.     

Transparency trade-offs in the operation of national Public Private Partnership units: The case of Ireland’s National Development Finance Agency

Since 2002, the Irish National Development Finance Agency [NDFA] has played a leading role in the procurement of Public Private Partnership [PPP] projects in Ireland (UNECE, 2008). It has procured 9 PPP projects bundles, which are currently listed on its website, between 2002 and 2022 ¹ in addition to Primary Care, Justice, OPW and Education bundles not currently listed on its website. Ireland follows a global pattern where national or provincial PPP units, frequently organised as arm’s-length bodies, play a central role in managing the partnership-based procurement of infrastructure projects (Burger, 2009). This paper examines how the NDFA, acting as Ireland’s PPP unit, has affected the transparency and accountability of Irish PPP procurement. Our analysis indicates that the expanding role played by the NDFA has been depoliticisation and agencification. Our analysis deviates from some previous critical studies of PPP agency governance (Sześciło, 2020) in that we argue that agencification can adversely affect some aspects of PPP transparency while strengthening others, such as selection process transparency. Nonetheless, we suggest the approach to PPP procurement could harm the long-term sustainability of Irish PPP. Using the example of Ireland, our paper contributes to an understanding of the impact of such institutional arrangements on transparency and accountability of PPP procurement.     

政府采购资金支付中应注意的几个问题

几年来，唐山市丰南区政府采购工作在实践中不断完善，政府采购范围不断拓展。政府采购规模不断扩大，规范了各预算单位财政资金支出行为。有效地防止了腐败行为的发生，提高了财政资金使用效益。维护了国家利益和社会公共利益。但是政府采购资金支付中存在许多问题值得探讨。     

维护政府采购秩序的重器——浅析《处罚处分条例》对《政府采购法》相关内容的发展与完善

2002年6月29日九届人大常委会第28次会议通过的《中华人民共和国政府采购法》（以下简称《政府采购法》）和2005年2月国务院颁布实施的《财政违法行为处罚处分条例”（以下简称《处罚处分条例》）是我国财政法制建设史上具有里程碑意义的两件大事。对此各地普遍比较重视，宣传贯彻活动丰富多彩。但能够把两部法律法规有机结合，系统开展宣传贯彻活动的尚属空白。本文旨在从《处罚处分条例》对《政府采购法》相关内容的发展与完善角度，浅析二昔的相互关系，揭示它们的内在联系，从而为全面准确的适用《处罚处分条例》和《政府采购法》提供技术支持。     

深化政府采购制度改革背景下加强采购管理的思考

政府采购制度是现代财政制度的重要组成部分,随着国家治理体系和治理能力现代化建设的深入推进,政府采购制度改革逐渐走到深化改革的前沿,2018年中央深改委审议通过了《深化政府采购制度改革方案》,明确了深化政府采购制度改革的指导思想、基本原则和改革任务,本文系统梳理了深化政府采购制度改革的新要求,深入分析了当前人民银行集中采...     

实行定点采购管理之浅见

山西省运城市从2002年开始实行定点采购管理，三年来，本着“先易后难，稳健发展”的原则，依法组织政府采购活动，并在具体工作中，通过完善制度，强化管理等改革措施，较好地履行了政府赋予的集采职责。笔者现结合近几年工作实践，通过分析定点采购模式存在的问题与对策建议，与各地政府采购工作同仁商讨。     

锐意进取 再提政府采购工作新水平 全面开拓 再创政府采购工作新局面——河北省政府采购工作座谈会报道

为深入了解各市、县政府采购工作状况，交流工作经验，进一步做好2006年政府采购工作，4月7日～9日，省政府采购办公室组织11个省辖市和部分扩权县（市）财政局政府采购办公室主任，在石家庄召开了全省政府采购工作座淡会。这也是一次不拘一格，采取把大家请上来集中调研的座谈会。     

论相关性与透明性在中国的定位

相关性和透明性是"决策有用"会计目标模式下的两个重要的会计信息质量特征.在发展中国家构建概念框架时,如何借鉴国际惯例,定位这两个会计信息质量特征,值得深思.     

规范管理 依法采购 推进政府采购工作的完善和提高

廊坊市政府采购工作在市委、市政府和省财政厅领导下，始终把推行政府采购制度作为构建公共财政体系，加强财政支出管理，从源头上预防和治理腐败行为的一项重要举措来抓。通过完善制度建设，规范运行程序，扩大政府采购规模，使这项工作不断得到深化、加强和发展，初步构建了具有廊坊特色的政府采购运行框架。[编者按]