Dynamics of international financial networks with risk management

In this paper, we develop an international financialnetwork model in which the sources of funds and the intermediaries are multicriteria decision-makers and are concerned with both net revenue maximization and risk minimization. The model allows for both physical as well as electronic transactions and considers three tiers of decision-makers who may be located in distinct countries and may conduct their transactions in different currencies. We describe the behaviour of the various decision-makers, along with their optimality conditions, and derive the variational inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions. We then propose a dynamic adjustment process which yields the evolution of the financial flows and prices and demonstrate that it can be formulated as a projected dynamical system. We also provide qualitative properties including stability analysis results. Finally, we discuss a discrete-time algorithm which can be applied to track the dynamic trajectories and yields the equilibrium financial flows and prices. We illustrate both the modelling framework as well as the computational procedure with several numerical international financial network examples.     

Finance and variational inequalities*

This article overviews applications of variational inequality theory to financial equilibrium problems. It provides a basic introduction to finite-dimensional variational inequality theory and then applies the theory to the formulation, qualitative analysis and computation of solutions to an international financial equilibrium problem in the presence of taxes, transaction costs as well as price regulations.     

Competition and market power in option demand markets

We call markets in which intermediaries sell networks of suppliers to consumers who are uncertain about their needs "option demand markets." In these markets, suppliers may grant the intermediaries discounts in order to be admitted to their networks. We derive a measure of each supplier's market power within the network; the measure is based on the additional ex ante expected utility consumers obtain from the supplier's inclusion. We empirically validate the WTP measure by considering managed care purchases of hospital services in the San Diego market. Finally, we present three applications, including an analysis of hospital mergers in San Diego.     

Financial Crises and Recapitalizations

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods‐producing firms. Since financial intermediaries are highly leveraged, we show that the welfare gains from their recapitalization in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating typical business cycle fluctuations. We also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss, are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector, and can be larger when lower idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage.     

The Integration Of Financial Services in Europe

Abstract

Changes over the last few decades in managing risk and investing money have been so radical that we can only describe them as being huge disruptions, maybe even revolutions. The boundaries that used to exist between the different financial activities have disappeared. Although things have accelerated rapidly over the last few decades, we should keep in mind that these developments are by no means new. The pawnbrokers and foreign exchange dealers of the Middle Ages, whose professions were separate and clearly identifiable, have seen their activities completely integrated into so-called universal banking services. More recently, merchant banks in France, who used to be the subject of specific regulation, have disappeared as separate legal entities. In the insurance field, it was barely 30 years ago, that some large businesses insured only against fire risks and others only casualty risks. The distinction between life and non-life, which is still maintained in the regulations, makes little sense in the everyday reality of insurance groups who transact these two activities together.

However, when we talk of the integration of financial services, we have in mind an even more recent phenomenon. Financial integration incorporates two developments, known in French as bancassurance and assurfinance. Today, under extremely diverse legal guises but following the same economic logic, banks sell insurance products and insurance networks sell banking products.

This movement can only be understood initially as the result of a need to diversify. Each one of these two large categories of financial intermediaries borrowed something from the other in order to increase its product range or bolster the know-how of its networks. It was simply about making sales organizations more cost effective by having them sell products outside of their traditional skills area, at more or less marginal cost. Today the expansion of offerings is done, approved, and even expounded on by theorists. And so now the next question is whether we should go further—turning our attention from distribution to manufacturing. This is where the current debate on the integration of financial services lies. Bluntly, if we allow banks to sell insurance policies and insurers to sell consumer credit, should we allow a joint organization to design such products and distribute them down both channels at the same time? More subtly, we might ask ourselves whether we should be exercising more specific control over these financial conglomerates that, while maintaining a formal legal separation between banking and insurance, constitute in fact a single decision-making center.

This article sets out to portray what is perhaps not the state of the law, but at least the state of the art, on this topic in the European Union. In the first part, it will show that while sales integration is an undeniable fact, with the customer seeing fewer and fewer differences, it still remains that banks and insurance carriers are separate entities from a legal perspective and that the European Union remains totally committed to controlling financial conglomerates. In practice, integration of financial services takes different forms. In part two, we examine cases involving problems between entities doing the same job, and cooperation between design facilities without any apparent desire to go further. In the long run, this integration will succeed only if it receives the public?s approval. Part three addresses what consumers and investors want. We observe that after decades of exposure to specialized networks, consumers are not necessarily as enthusiastic as proponents of integration would have hoped. As adult consumers, they are not prepared to buy just any financial service anywhere they can, and they still largely place their trust in the brands they know.     

Capital markets,financial intermediaries,and liquidity supply

We study a dynamic economy endowed with a sequence of overlapping generations of consumers and production processes, and where productive assets are illiquid and consumption preferences are subject to uninsurable demand for liquidity. We characterize the steady states that can be achieved with alternative financial systems. We show that infinitely lived financial intermediaries offering a liability with age-dependent restrictions may implement a social optimum with full insurance. If, instead, they offer anonymous, unrestricted contracts, then only second-best consumption allocations with partial insurance obtain. We also examine the consumption allocations available when agents can trade shares in competitive stock markets. While allowing for trade across generations may or may not improve upon generational autarky, we show that this competitive equilibrium is not a social optimum, and is dominated by a system of infinitely lived, unrestricted intermediaries.     

Optimal and Simple,Nearly Optimal Rules for Minimizing the Probability Of Financial Ruin in Retirement

Abstract

The increasing risk of poverty in retirement has been well documented; it is projected that current and future retirees’ living expenses will significantly exceed their savings and income. In this paper, we consider a retiree who does not have sufficient wealth and income to fund her future expenses, and we seek the asset allocation that minimizes the probability of financial ruin during her lifetime. Building on the work of Young (2004) and Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006), under general mortality assumptions, we derive a variational inequality that governs the ruin probability and optimal asset allocation. We explore the qualitative properties of the ruin robability and optimal strategy, present a numerical method for their estimation, and examine their sensitivity to changes in model parameters for specific examples. We then present an easy-to-implement allocation rule and demonstrate via simulation that it yields nearly optimal ruin probability, even under discrete portfolio rebalancing.     

Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the largest market share. To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium of the coordination game played by consumers for given prices. The equilibrium allocation differs from the efficient one for two reasons. First, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to the networks is too balanced, because consumers fail to internalize network externalities. Second, if access to the networks is priced by strategic firms, then the product with the highest expected quality is also the most expensive. This further reduces the asymmetry between market shares and therefore social welfare.     

On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.     

Financial intermediation in the theory of the risk-free rate

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model of the interaction between financial intermediaries and financial markets that sheds some light on the short-term volatility of real interest rates. The main findings of the paper are as follows. When financial intermediaries issue contingent (non-contingent) liabilities, an increase in the consumers’ relative risk aversion coefficient decreases (increases) the interest rate. Also, the interest rate rises when capitalists are less risk-averse and financial intermediaries are hit by a liquidity shock.     

Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium

We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs. Workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest-bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns. Each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information. Moreover, restricting borrowers and lenders to use static (one-period) contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate economic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small. Finally, the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in U.S. data.     

Dealing with financial instability under a DSGE modeling approach with banking intermediation: A predictability analysis versus TVP-VARs

In the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature there has been an increasing awareness on the role that the banking sector can play in macroeconomic activity. We present a DSGE model with financial intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The estimation of shocks and of the structural parameters shows that time-variation should be crucial in any attempted empirical analysis. Since DSGE modelling usually fails to take into account inherent nonlinearities of the economy, we propose a novel time-varying parameter (TVP) state-space estimation method for VAR processes both for homoskedastic and heteroskedastic error structures. We conduct an exhaustive empirical exercise to compare the out-of-sample predictive performance of the estimated DSGE model with that of standard ARs, VARs, Bayesian VARs and TVP-VARs. We find that the TVP-VAR provides the best forecasting performance for the series of GDP and net worth of financial intermediaries for all steps-ahead, while the DSGE model outperforms the other specifications in forecasting inflation and the federal funds rate at shorter horizons.     

Circuit theory of banking and finance

Drawing on monetary circuit theory, this study develops an approach to analyze the integrated functions of banking and finance in a monetary production economy. The study proposes a micro-founded, circuit-sequenced model of a decentralized-decisions economy, where production, exchange, and investment from households and firms are integrated through money creation and funds allocation operated, respectively, by banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. The model is used to draw implications on: the special nature of banks and the role of non-bank financial intermediaries; the relationship between saving and investment; and the channels through which finance may cause the circuit process to break down. The study also discusses how the circuit approach can be used for an integrated analysis of economic and financial structural change.     

Historical financing of small- and medium-size enterprises

We focus on the economies of the North Atlantic Core during the 19th and early 20th centuries and find that an impressive variety of local financial institutions emerged to supply the needs of SMEs wherever there was sufficient demand for their services. Although these intermediaries had significant weaknesses, they were able to tap into local information networks and so extend credit to firms that were too young or small to secure funds from large regional or national institutions. In addition, by raising the return to savings for local households, they helped to mobilize significant new resources for economic development.     

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The American corporate financing system, unlike that of most other countries, has not been organized around a set of “universal banks” that perform a variety of functions for their clients. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of American financial history is the number and variety of financial intermediaries, and their relationships with corporations (and one another). Besides commercial banks, there are investment banks, insurance companies, venture capitalists, commercial paper dealers, mutual funds, and many others. The economic role of such intermediaries is to reduce market frictions such as “asymmetric information” and “agency problems” that otherwise raise the cost of outside capital for U.S. companies. This article views the changing menu of such intermediaries and their networks as the driving force behind the evolution of American corporate finance. U.S. financial history is seen as a series of institutional and financial innovations designed in large part to work around costly restrictions on relationships–particularly, limits on the scale and scope of U.S. banks–that do not exist in most other countries. In terms of its success in reducing the information and control costs of corporate finance, the history of the American financial system includes periods of significant progress as well as major reversals. Three relatively successful periods– the early 19th-century in New England, the “incipient” universal banking of the 1920s, and modernday financial capitalism–are separated by periods of drastic reductions in the menu of financial relationships– particularly the Great Depression and its 20-year aftermath. Besides new financial claims like preferred stock and new intermediaries such as venture capitalists, another important innovation is new forms of cooperation among intermediaries– especially among banks, venture capitalists, trusts, pensions, and investment banks–that have enabled the U.S. financial system to provide some of the key advantages of universal banking systems. Some of the largest U.S. commercial banks today can be viewed as positioning themselves to play a central coordinating role in these new coalitions of intermediaries. In so doing, they may become the platform for a distinctively American universal banking system.     

On the pricing of intermediated risks: Theory and application to catastrophe reinsurance

We model the equilibrium price and quantity of risk transfer between firms and financial intermediaries. Value-maximizing firms have downward sloping demands to cede risk, while intermediaries, who assume risk, provide less-than-fully-elastic supply. We show that equilibrium required returns will be “high” in the presence of financing imperfections that make intermediary capital costly. Moreover, financing imperfections can give rise to intermediary market power, so that small changes in financial imperfections can give rise to large changes in price.     

Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital

The imminent failure of prime brokers during the 2008 financial crisis caused a sudden decrease in the leverage afforded hedge funds. This decrease resulted from the asymmetrical payoff to rehypothecation lenders—the ultimate financiers, through prime brokers, to hedge funds. Seemingly long-term debt capital became short-term capital creating a duration mismatch between left-hand side arbitrage opportunities and right-hand side liabilities. Consequently, arbitrageurs became unable to maintain similar prices of similar assets. Mispricing magnitudes, and the time required to correct them, reflect the role of arbitrageurs in maintaining accurate prices during normal times and offer an estimate of discounts at which assets transact during crises.     

Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries Facing Credit and Funding Risk

This paper compares the optimal lending decisions of financial intermediaries that differ in their risk exposure. All intermediaries are assumed to face a loan demand described by a random applicant arrival process with each applicant offering a unique risk-adjusted rate of return; loan demand is therefore uncertain in both quantity and quality. The intermediaries differ in terms of their risk exposure because of disparate funding practices. Intermediaries functioning as brokers minimize their exposure by borrowing funds only as demand is realized, whereas those behaving as asset-transformers borrow in advance of realizing loan demand, thereby maintaining a loanable funds inventory and sustaining the related exposure. The optimal sequential lending policy is shown to involve setting a credit standard that becomes stricter with the length of the intermediary's planning horizon and the volume of loans outstanding. Most importantly, it is shown that brokers adopt stricter credit standards than asset-transformers and therby reduce their volume of lending.     

On the Perils of Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: The Mutual Fund Wild Card Option

Economic distortions can arise when financial claims trade at prices set by an intermediary rather than direct negotiation between principals. We demonstrate the problem in a specific context, the exchange of open-end mutual fund shares. Mutual funds typically set fund share price (NAV) using an algorithm that fails to account for nonsynchronous trading in the fund's underlying securities. This results in predictable changes in NAV, which lead to exploitable trading opportunities. A modification to the pricing algorithm that corrects for nonsynchronous trading eliminates much of the predictability. However, there are many other potential sources of distortion when intermediaries set prices.