Politics of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Cooperation

This paper discusses the political motivations behind the evolution of economic cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from its founding to the measures agreed upon to integrate its economy. Those measures include the reduction and elimination of tariffs on and the removal of nontariff barriers to intra‐ASEAN trade, customs reform, the harmonization of product standards, the liberalization of trade in services, and the strengthening of transportation links. The paper analyzes the failure to fully carry out those commitments, ascribing it partly to domestic political obstacles. Finally, it discusses the efficacy of the ASEAN Charter in this regard and the prospects of achieving an ASEAN Community by 2015.     

Organizational reputation and constitutional constraints: An application to religious denominations

Constitutional economics may be defined as the study of constraints chosen by cooperative groups. In this paper, the scope of constitutional economics is extended by an examination of the constitutions and rules that govern seven of the eight largest U.S. Christian denominations. This examination of church constitutions reveals constitutional provisions and church rules that protect denominational reputation by preserving doctrinal integrity and constraining the behavior of local churches, clergy, and individual members. By protecting their reputations, religious denominations may increase their appeal to current or prospective members or both.     

Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

Several theories suggest that states?? choices of constitutional rules are at least partially a function of neighboring constitutions. This paper provides the first analysis of spatial dependence of specific provisions within state constitutions in the United States. The analysis effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, contributing to a relatively underdeveloped branch of constitutional economics. By employing a series of probit estimations of nineteen specific constitutional rules, I find evidence of spatial dependence in state constitutions. Specifically, the presence of specific constitutional constraints pertaining to term limits, supreme court justice selection, recall, home rule, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, line item veto, victims?? bill of rights, health and welfare, right to privacy, environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and official language all exhibit some evidence spatial dependence.     

Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?

Empirical constitutional economics has made a huge leap forward over the last decade. Interesting insights into the effects of constitutions have been discovered. Rather than summarizing the state of the art, this paper identifies some of the current shortcomings and proposes a number of extensions. It calls for recognizing additional constitutional institutions as explanatory variables, as well as the incorporation of additional dependent variables. Its major emphasis is, however, on calling for the next logical step in this field, namely to endogenize constitutions.     

Toward an early warning system at the United Nations

World problems have emerged in profusion in the recent years. Alternative futures have likewise been produced in great numbers through diverse world models and forecasts. Advance information on basic and critical trends is now a necessary condition of informed decision-making in the international arena. Such information can be potentially gathered and made available. It is suggested that it be based on an assessment of the ratio of basic human needs to the resources required to meet them, in the context of the development trends in each nation. Universal human needs, as well as needs which are diversified due to cultural and developmental factors, can be assessed and the resources required for their fulfilment computed. The extrapolation of the long-range evolution of needs/resources ratios yields a typology of national conditions which serves to identify areas of potential conflict as well as to develop criteria for multilateral planning and negotiation. Advance information on the long-range evolution of needs/resources is in the commonhuman interest and accords with the Charter of the United Nations. Its implementation within the United Nations system is both institutionally and operationally within the realm of possibility, and should constitute an item of high priority within the system.     

Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions

The newly emerging subdiscipline of constitutional economics is dominated by adherents to social contract theory although this approach has been severely criticized many a time. In recent years, an alternative approach in which constitutions are conceptualized as conventions has emerged. It is argued here that this alternative approach is a step in the right direction but still does not go far enough. The central hypothesis of the paper is that conceptualizing constitutions as based on spontaneously arisen institutions can help to solve some of the problems left unanswered by the constitutions-as-conventions view.     

Between the constitution and the deep blue sea: Contractual controls on opportunism aboard pirate vessels

When contracting is costly, members of a production team will seek assurance that the transaction-pecific investments they make will be protected. The institutional framework created by a firm in such a setting can be considered a constitution. Under some circumstances, firms will create explicit written constitutions. The constitutions of pre-1850 privateer and pirate vessels provide two examples of actual written constitutions. These constitutions were designed to resolve the problems of contractual opportunism created by the specific investments of the crewmembers. Privateering was a legal and state-sanctioned activity whereas pirates engaged in illegal activities; aside from this difference their activities were virtually identical. This contrast allows for the examination of an interesting question: specifically, what effect does the constitutional backup provided by the state have on the constitutional structure of the firm?     

On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers

This paper provides a tightly written overview and modest extension of the constitutional exchange and evolution model developed in Perfecting Parliament and uses that approach to analyze the division of authority that one would expect to see in contemporary constitutional governments. The analysis suggests that constitutions tend to be written, based on the king and council template, and buttressed by a more or less independent court system. Moreover, it suggests that constitutions change at the margin through time as constitutional bargaining takes place. This suggests that a complete separation of power is unlikely to be observed in the long run. Empirical evidence developed from the IAEP data base is consistent with these predictions.     

The Nature of the State and the State of Nature: a Comment on Grady & McGuire's Paper

In 'The Nature of Constitutions', Mark Grady & Michael McGuire provide a model of the evolution and purposes of constitutions as arising to minimize appropriation by dominants of subordinates. This Comment builds on Grady & McGuire's article in three ways. First, it supplements their analysis by operationalizing a model of constitutional evolution that views constitutions as arising out of the conflict of competing high-ranking individuals to preserve their own authority. From this clash of self-interest of dominant individuals, constitutions are born. This predicts that constitutions will not simply tame all forms of appropriation, but will also hard-wire some forms of appropriation behavior into the permanent constitutional structure. Second, it examines the American constitution in light of this model to show how that constitution reflects the mixture of appropriation and appropriation-taming behavior. Third, this Comment argues that the breakdown of constitutionalism in the United States this century can be explained by a failure to fully appreciate the purposes of constitutionalism in a biological framework.     

Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform

This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it.     

The role of constitutions on poverty: A cross-national investigation

We construct and use a new historical data set on economics and social rights from the constitutions of 195 countries and an instrument variable strategy to answer two important questions. First, do economic and social rights provisions in constitutions reduce poverty, measured as headcount income and health outcomes? Second, does the strength of constitutional language of the economic and social rights matter? Constitutional provisions can be framed either more weakly as directive principles or more strongly as enforceable law. Our results suggest three findings. First, we do not find an association between constitutional rights generally framed and poverty. Second, we do not find an association between economic and social rights framed as directive principles and poverty. Third, we do find a strong negative association between economic and social rights framed as enforceable law and poverty when we use legal origins as our IV. These results persist for indices of constitutional rights and also when we restrict the sample to non-OECD countries. The policy implication is that constitutional provisions framed as enforceable law provide effective meta-rules with incentives for policymakers to initiate, fund, monitor and enforce poverty reduction policies.     

Climate Insecurity in (Post)Conflict Areas: The Biopolitics of United Nations Vulnerability Assessments

Within the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have all highlighted climate risks as relevant to their work in areas affected by conflict, endorsing human security approaches as valid for mapping the relationships between climate stresses and conflict-related harm. While this policy interest has limited operational presence, I discuss salient assessments of climate vulnerability in (post)conflict areas, arguing that these agencies have applied a natural disaster rather than conflict regulation inflection of humanitarian reason. The former entails a biopolitical paradigm of disaster risk reduction, prescribing technical-managerial measures to build the resilience of vulnerable populations. This framing supports a depoliticised stance reflecting UN norms of neutrality and impartiality. I claim that this position nevertheless disregards its own geopolitical conditions and effects, which dilute the scope for international humanitarian law to assign responsibility for conflict-related harm.     

Lessons from Constitutional Culture and the History of Constitutional Transfer: A Hope for Constitutionally Limited Government?

The literature shows a clear correlation between sound constitutional environments and human flourishing. However, the path to adoption of sound constitutions is much less clear. This paper turns to the history of constitutional transfer to propose an alternative to taxonomies offered in the literature, which typically classify constitutions either by governmental structure (presidential v. parliamentary, or centralized v. federalist) or by source of influence (e.g. US 1787, Spain 1812, France 1958). These classifications are found wanting; instead, this paper proposes a new taxonomy based on the origin of the constitutional ideas and adoption. Formal constitutional parchment must match informal constitutional culture, so a constitution’s likelihood of success is greatest when the ideas are indigenous; the source of adoption is ultimately secondary. The paper closes with four case studies of constitutional transfer and adoption.     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector

This paper reconsiders the exchange paradigm of constitutional economics from the perspective of the theory of the division of labor. According to this theory, human wants can be satisfied by two basic mechanisms—exchange and self-sufficiency. The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics emphasizes the former mechanism while neglecting the latter. Building on major economic theories of the third sector, it is argued that the latter mechanism is more helpful than the former in explaining the existence of third sector organizations. The paper concludes by discussing implications of this argument for the further development of constitutional economics.      

Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war. I wish to thank Beat Blankart, Ludger Schuknecht and Barry Weingast for helpful comments.     

Club governments versus representative governments

The paper compares the legal rules for private clubs with the constitutions of representative governments. Though both institutions are designed to provide public goods for their members they are organized quite differently. In clubs the power to grant power must not be delegated to the agents, while in representative governments it usually is. The design of representative governments is shown to be inconsistent with a contractarian view of the constitution. A nearly perfect laboratory case for a club government can be found in the example of Switzerland. In this country citizens are absolute sovereigns over their constitution. The Swiss do not have a constitutional court, but have developed instead a system of popular voting rights serving as a substitute for a judicial review by a constitutional court. Though this system does not work perfectly, it has relative advantages compared to a constitutional court which often tends to become a political decisionmaker. The author is indebted to Pio Baake, Peter Moser, and Richard E. Wagner for helpful comments.     

A proposal for a more objective measure of de facto constitutional constraints

In this paper we propose two new indicators of de facto constitutional constraints. The indicators are based on the presence or the absence of easily observable political events. This makes the proposed measures relatively objective and easy to verify relative to the most widely used indicators of de jure and de facto constitutions. This paper describes the indicators and demonstrates their usefulness for research on economic development.     

Institutions and prosperity: A review of Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson,Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters,Princeton University Press,Princeton, 2011, pp. 375 and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson,Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,Prosperity and Poverty,Profile Books,London 2012, pp. 529

This article reviews ‘Pillars of Prosperity’ by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson and ‘Why Nations Fail’ by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. Both books are focussed on the role of institutions in determining the wealth of nations and the review compares and contrasts the different approaches contained in the two texts. The review also attempts to locate the texts within the broader literature in development and political economics and to link them to other recent work in these areas.     

Constitutional stability

Political scientists in the pluralist tradition disagree sharply with public and social choice theorists about the importance of institutions and with William Riker in particular, who argues inLiberalism against Populism that the liberal institutions of indirect democracy ought to be preferred to those of populism. This essay reconsiders this dispute in light of two ideas unavailable to Riker at the time. The first, offered by Russell Hardin, is that if we conceptualize constitutions as coordinating devices rather than as social contracts, then we can develop a more satisfying view of the way in which constitutions become self-enforcing. The second idea derives from the various applications of concepts such as the uncovered set. Briefly, although institutions such as the direct election of president are subject to the usual instabilities that concern social choice theorists, those instabilities do not imply that “anything can happen” —instead, final outcomes will be constrained, where the severity of those constraints depends on institutional details. We maintain that these ideas strengthen Riker's argument about the importance of such constitutional devices as the separation of powers, bicameralism, the executive veto, and scheduled elections, as well as the view that federalism is an important component of the institutions that stabilize the American political system. We conclude with the proposition that the American Civil War should not be regarded as a constitutional failure, but rather as a success. I have benefitted from the comments of a number of people on earlier drafts of this essay, especially William Riker, Emerson Niou, Kenneth Shepsle, Gordon Tullock, Thomas Schwartz, and Matthew Spitzer.