垄断竞争、利益集团与贸易战

本文借助Grossman and Helpman（1995）提出的贸易战模型，研究了在垄断竞争情况下，大国双方在产业内贸易上所实施的均衡进出口政策。结论表明，利益集团的产生将使政府在“最优进出口关税”的基础上调整贸易政策安排，利益集团将在贸易政策上得到政府更大力度的支持；并且，政府偏向于将优势产品集中于本国消费，对差异化程度较高的产品实行高水平的进出口壁垒；同时，利益集团将引发两国之间的贸易战，政府对政治捐献偏好的增加、产品竞争力的增强将单方面地提升贸易战规模，产品差异化的扩大将带动贸易战的全面升级。     

印度利益集团对其贸易政策的影响

本文利用贸易政策形成的需求供给分析框架及利益集团影响贸易政策形成的机制，分析了印度利益集团对印度贸易政策确立与演变的影响。虽然印度各种利益集团的相互博弈在一定程度上影响了印度贸易政策的形成与发展，但利益集团发挥的作用是有限的，印度政党对利益集团的利用是充分的。印度历届政府经常利用利益集团之间的斗争，推进贸易自由化进程。     

关税结构的政治经济学解释-基于"保护待售"模型的博弈分析

根据有效保护率理论,由上游至下游逐级递增的梯形关税结构将提高一国最终商品的有效保护程度。但在以美国为代表的西方代议民主制国家,由于利益集团的游说影响,政府的贸易政策并非时刻遵循梯形关税结构的设置原则,甚至有时反其道而行之。对此,本文以GrossmanandHelpman(1994)的"保护待售"模型为基础,引入中间产品,研究了政府与上下游产业利益集团之间的博弈行为。结论表明,关税结构实为政治经济体系中的内生产物,其形式取决于上下游产业利益集团的组织情况以及最终商品产业之间的实力差异。     

美国对华贸易政策的政治经济学分析

中美贸易并不是普通的贸易,而是具有某种特殊性的"政治贸易".本文在回顾美国对华贸易政策的基础上,运用GH模型分析了美国贸易政策制定过程中,利益集团、政府、普通消费者的不同反应.认为美国贸易政策的制定实质上是利益集团通过政治程序来控制立法结果的过程.因此中国政府和企业应巧妙利用美国不同利益集团之间的制衡,重视美国农业利益集团及政治能力,加强与美国国内相关利益团体和在华投资跨国公司的沟通,积极培养游说队伍,使中美贸易向着更加有利于稳定双边经贸关系的方向发展.     

G-H贸易保护政治经济学模型对发展中国家的启示

传统贸易保护理论（重商主义、＂幼稚工业保护＂理论、＂中心-外围＂理论、新贸易保护主义）都没有考虑到政府的自利性、利益主体在政治形成过程中的能动性及政府与其他利益集团、利益集团与利益集团之间在政策选择中的冲突。因此,贸易理论基础的研究发生了由传统贸易理论到贸易保护政治经济学的转换。正是采用了贸易保护政治经济学的方法,分析国家之间的贸易政策的内生政治决定过程。     

战略性贸易政策的政治经济学评析——以美国为例

传统贸易理论通常把贸易政策当做"外生"变量予以忽视。但随着政治经济学的发展,人们日渐认识到作为"制度安排"贸易政策具有很强的"内生性",是各利益集团和政府部门在政治博弈中所形成的均衡决策。本文以战后美国实行的战略性贸易政策为例,从政治经济学视角对其进行重新的评价:战略性贸易政策是否成功不取决于受保护产业的成长,关键在于是否有助于整个经济增长;一国实施战略性贸易政策往往容易受到"非效率"因素的影响而产生无效率的政府干预、"非生产性寻租"、收入分配的扭曲以及他国的报复,从而使经济受损。     

关税结构的政治经济学解释——基于“保护待售”模型的博弈分析

根据有效保护率理论，由上游至下游逐级递增的梯形关税结构将提高一国最终商品的有效保护程度。但在以美国为代表的西方代议民主制国家，由于利益集团的游说影响，政府的贸易政策并非时刻遵循梯形关税结构的设置原则，甚至有时反其道而行之。对此，本文以Grossman and Helpman（1994）的“保护待售”模型为基础，引入中问产品，研究了政府与上下游产业利益集团之间的博弈行为。结论表明，关税结构实为政治经济体系中的内生产物，其形式取决于上下游产业利益集团的组织情况以及最终商品产业之间的实力差异。     

中国反倾销政策的内生性分析

贸易政策的"内生"性理论分析都是基于西方民主代议制的政治框架下,对中国这种非民主代议制的发展中国家是否适用,还不得而知.本文通过对1997-2006年中国对外反倾销案件的实证检验,证明中国对外反倾销政策也具有内生性,它的形成同样受到利益集团的影响,只不过影响方式不同于民主代议制国家的政治捐献和专业游说,而是政府通过关注其目标函数中权重较大的特定利益集团的福利状况而形成的,最后提出需要改革中国目前的贸易政策决策机制.     

人民币汇率变动对我国高新技术产品进出口贸易的影响

本文利用2005年8月至2009年12月间的月度数据,对我国高新技术产品进出口贸易与人民币汇率间的关系进行分析。实证结果表明,人民币汇率变动对我国高新技术产品进出口贸易的影响不是很明显,且马歇尔-勒纳条件在我国高新技术产品进出口贸易领域并不适用。最后,提出相关的政策建议。     

美国贸易政策制定的结构特征

美国贸易政策制定的过程,可以分为两个层面:一是国会与总统之间的互动,二是利益集团对贸易政策的影响。此外,行政部门对贸易政策的执行情况,也会在国会引起新的反应。 1.国会把制定关税细节的权力交给总统,国会就可以不必受到利益集团的直接压力。在美国的政治制度下,利益集团在政治事务中占据很     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs

Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports.     

Trade taxes and international investment

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that international investment disturbs the conventionally understood equivalence between import tariffs and export taxes. Fundamentally, remittances to foreigners introduce an additional pecuniary channel between countries so that two-good Lerner Symmetry generally will not hold. Moreover, because tariffs subsidize investors in the local import competing sector while export taxes can extract rent from foreign investors in the export sector, the pattern of international investment will influence government preferences over trade policy  instruments  as well as levels. Notably, trade tax symmetry is restored by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on international remittances.     

Domestic political competition and pro‐cyclical import protection

Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical when high‐tariff interests (e.g. import‐competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low‐tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat.     

Heterogeneous impacts of the Section 301 tariffs: Evidence from the revision of product lists

In each of the three waves of the Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports, the US government exempted some products on the originally proposed list from additional duties. Using these exempted products as the counterfactual, we identify modest but heterogeneous impacts of the tariffs on the value of US imports from China. We find a complete pass-through for the first and second waves of tariffs. However, unlike in previous studies, we estimate a very limited tariff pass-through of the third wave of tariffs. Finally, we find little import diversion for the US and significant export diversion for China.     

Do inward looking trade policies affect poverty and income inequality? Evidence from Indonesia's recent wave of rising protectionism

Unlike previous studies which often focus on trade liberalisation, this paper examines the impact of protectionism in the form of import tariffs and mineral export taxes on rural and urban poverty and income inequality for the first time. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model on Indonesia, mineral export taxes were found to adversely affect urban and rural poverty but income inequality hardly changed as the decline in income in the higher income group is not significantly different to the decline in low income groups. However, if smelters for mineral ore are developed, then there is not only a fall in poverty, more so for the rural than urban, but there is some decline in income inequality. On the other hand, although the current imposed import tariffs do not affect poverty or income inequality, any further increases from the current low average MFN applied rates, will see a rise in rural and urban poverty and income inequality. By and large, any small improvements in the trade balance brought upon by the mineral tax and import tariffs are more than outweighed by the substantial decline in real household consumption expenditure due to falls in employment and wages, thereby leading to a fall in GDP growth.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

Trade taxes and the current account

We show that, under some conditions, a temporary import tariff improves the current account, whereas a temporary export tax deteriorates it. Permanent import tariffs and export taxes have an identical, although ambiguous, effect on the current account.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.