Intertemporal capital budgeting

This paper analyzes the optimal capital budgeting mechanism when divisional managers are privately informed about the arrival of future investment projects. Consistent with field study evidence, an optimal allocation mechanism can include a stipulation that a capital request for discretionary investment will be declined with positive probability in the period after a significant investment was made even though this is ex post suboptimal. The model derives a number of empirical predictions regarding capital budgeting and the investment of financially constrained firms.     

A theory of socialistic internal capital markets

We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the “strong” division has, on average, higher quality investment opportunities than the “weak” division. We show that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division. This leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. The selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions.     

Big elephants in small ponds: Do large traders make financial markets more aggressive?

Market participants often suspect that large traders have a disproportionate effect on financial markets, increasing the aggressiveness of market responses. Prior studies have shown that the impact of a large trader on a currency crisis depends positively on his “size” and informational position. By contrast, this article highlights the role that market sentiment has on the impact of a large trader. If the market believes that fundamentals are weak, then the probability of a crisis depends positively on the trader's size but negatively on the precision of his information, with these effects reversed in a generally optimistic market. A large player, therefore, need not make market responses more aggressive.     

Stock market speculation and managerial myopia

This paper extends the analysis of managerial share price concerns by allowing informed trading in the stock market. It is shown that because they decrease the manager's information advantage vis-à-vis the stock market, individual investors who trade on private information improve the efficiency of corporate investment. This improvement does, however, fall short of first-best efficiency. Moreover, a stronger managerial share-price concern increases the expected profit from informed trading. Hence, by encouraging individual investors to collect information about corporate decisions and trade on it, managerial myopia tends to automatically bring forth a partial solution to the problems that it causes.     

Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.     

Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge

This paper determines optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy in which firms pay limited attention to aggregate variables. Firms’ inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. This is shown to have strong implications for optimal nominal demand policy. In particular, if firms’ prices are strategic complements and economic shocks display little persistence, monetary policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Weak complementarities or sufficient shock persistence, however, cause price level stabilization to become increasingly optimal. With persistent shocks, optimal monetary policy shifts from output gap stabilization in initial periods following the shock to price level stabilization in later periods, potentially rationalizing the medium-term approach to price stability adopted by some central banks.     

Ambiguity aversion and the absence of wage indexation

This paper analyzes optimal wage contracting assuming agents are not subjective expected utility maximizers but are, instead, ambiguity (or uncertainty) averse decision makers who maximize Choquet expected utility. We show that such agents will choose not to include any indexation coverage in their wage contracts even when inflation is uncertain, unless the perceived inflation uncertainty is high enough. Significantly, the exercise does not presume any exogenous costs (e.g., transactions costs) of including indexation links.     

Insurance and opportunities: A welfare analysis of labor market risk

Using a model with constant relative risk-aversion preferences, endogenous labor supply and partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, this paper provides an analytical characterization of three welfare effects: (a) the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion, (b) the welfare gain from completing markets, and (c) the welfare effect from eliminating risk. The analysis reveals an important trade-off for these welfare calculations. On the one hand, higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing insurance markets. On the other hand, greater wage dispersion presents opportunities to raise aggregate productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers. Welfare effects can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk or, alternatively, in terms of changes in observable second moments of the joint distribution over individual wages, consumption and hours.     

Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

Human capital and earnings distribution dynamics

Earnings heterogeneity plays a crucial role in modern macroeconomics. We document that mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion and skewness all increase in US data over most of the working life-cycle for a typical cohort as the cohort ages. We show that (i) a human capital model can replicate these properties from the right distribution of initial human capital and learning ability, (ii) differences in learning ability are essential to produce an increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle and (iii) differences in learning ability account for the bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across agents. These findings emphasize the need to further understand the role and origins of initial conditions.     

Trader see,trader do: How do (small) FX traders react to large counterparties’ trades?

We show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future trading decisions of individual traders. The effect is such that traders tend to reverse their order flow in line with the better-informed counterparties. Informed traders primarily incorporate their own private as well as publicly available information into prices, whereas uninformed traders mainly magnify the effect of the informed. This pattern of interaction among traders extends to different order types: traders treat their own and others’ market orders as more informative than limit orders.     

The retirement wealth of the baby boom generation

The paper compares the well-being of the baby boom generation (ages 40-55) in 2001 with the same age group in 1983. I find little evidence that their relative position deteriorated over the period. By some indicators, this generation has seen an improvement. In terms of income, the 40-55 age group was at about the same relative position in 2001 as in 1983. In terms of conventional wealth, there was some slippage over the period. In terms of mean augmented wealth (net worth plus pension and Social Security wealth), their relative position improved somewhat but in terms of median augmented wealth there was again some slippage.     

The Analysis of Poverty Data with Endogenous Transitions*

It is common to analyse poverty data broken down by household or economic status. Implicitly, it is assumed that people change state (for example, single, married, children, no children) for exogenous reasons. If we bring economic behaviour into the problem, then such transitions become endogenous. The data are then insufficient to identify the claims made from them. The distribution of the characteristics of the individuals in the states will be endogenous, and the state average poverty rate will depend on the composition of the individuals in the state as well as on the economic impact of being in that state per se. In this paper, we set out a simple model with endogenous transitions to make our point, and apply this to Family Expenditure Survey data for Britain. We show that our argument has empirical content for Britain.     

Financial constraints and entrepreneurial investment

There is a well documented interdependence between the investment and saving decisions of entrepreneurial households. I study this interdependence in a dynamic, general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice. The simulated economy replicates U.S. data on the distribution of wealth and income, and the shares of wealth and income for each occupation. The dominant incentive behind the high level of savings of business households is the desire to relax a wealth constraint in financing entrepreneurial projects in order to operate their firms at an optimal size. Because successful firms grow over time, entrepreneurs enter business despite lower initial earnings than they would receive in paid employment.     

Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment

We study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, in which speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise.     

Effects of Family Policy Reforms in Norway: Results from a Joint Labour Supply and Childcare Choice Microsimulation Analysis*

Mothers of pre‐school children represent one part of the population that might be able to increase its labour supply. We discuss the effects of family policy changes that encourage the labour supply of these mothers, such as childcare fee reductions and increased availability of centre‐based care. The effects of policy changes are described by using a joint labour supply and childcare choice decision model. Detailed empirical results are provided with respect to mothers' labour supply, families' childcare choices, public expenditures, and distributions of income and money metric utility.     

Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Bank Debt

I propose a simple model with complete and perfect information on the relation between managerial incentive compensation and choice between public and bank debt. The empirical analysis offers considerable support to the model's predictions. I find that managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance prefer bank to public debt. Further, I find a positive relation between cost of public debt and managerial incentive compensation and no relation between loan spreads and incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the CEO's compensation is tied to firm performance.     

Are elite universities losing their competitive edge?

We study the location-specific component of research productivity for economics and finance faculty over the last three decades. We find that there was a positive effect of being affiliated with a top 25 university in the 1970s; this effect weakened in the 1980s and disappeared in the 1990s. The decline in elite university fixed effect is due to the reduced importance of physical access to productive research colleagues, which in turn seems due to innovations in communication technology. One implication is that knowledge-based organizations should find it more difficult to capture rents vis-à-vis workers. We find that faculty salaries increased the most where the estimated spillover dropped the most. Despite the loss in local spillovers, elite universities still enjoy an edge in average productivity because of agglomeration of top researchers in prestigious institutions with high long-term research reputations.     

The timing of pay

There exists large and persistent variation in not only how, but when employees are paid, a fact unexplained by existing theory. This paper develops a simple model of optimal pay timing for firms. When workers have self-control problems, they under-save and experience volatile consumption between paychecks. Thus, pay whose delivery matches the timing of workers' consumption needs will reduce wage costs. The model also explains why pay timing should be regulated (as it is in practice): although the worker benefits from a timing profile that smoothes her consumption, her lack of self-control induces her to attempt to undo the arrangement, either by renegotiating with her employer or by taking out payday loans. Regulation of pay timing and consumer borrowing is required to counter these efforts, helping the worker help herself.     

Convenient prices, currency, and nominal rigidity: Theory with evidence from newspaper prices

Certain items’ prices are often set to simplify and expedite transactions, by coinciding with available monetary units, requiring few pieces of money, or requiring little change. In this sense, these prices are more convenient than other proximate prices. This paper models a firm that explicitly incorporates convenience into its pricing decisions—where convenience is quantified by the number of currency units in a transaction—and illustrates the theoretical behaviors that can arise. Newspaper cover price data empirically support the theory. Across a broader range of goods and services, convenience appears to play a role in effecting above-average nominal price rigidity.