On Environmental Taxation under Uncertain Environmental Damage

This paper addresses optimal taxation, when therelationship between the consumption of a`dirty' good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers. The main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty, measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable, affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good. Incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality, and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion, we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty. If, on the other hand, thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump-sum tax in addition to the commodity tax,it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty, evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion. A similarresult emerges, although for different reasons,if the lump-sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax.     

A Note on Progressive Taxation and Cooperation

This paper shows that marginally progressive taxation may help independent agents to sustain cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma setting. It is suggested that political support for progressive taxation schemes may be affected by the desire to promote more cooperation among individuals.     

Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach

The paper applies contingent claims analysis in a real option investment model in order to investigate taxation's influence on investor's decisions under uncertainty. The results show the distortion from realistic-type tax systems, allow to identify a tax-induced paradox in option valuation for specific settings and acknowledge the property of investment neutrality of well-known 'ideal' tax systems in the context of different degrees of irreversibility. Furthermore, it is clarified that the idea of risk-neutral valuation cannot be adopted by the real option approach in general.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials in Open Economies under Emissions Constraints

Is there a case for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We address the issue in a general equilibrium framework and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, the large country case and oligopoly. We identify the conditions under which preferential treatment of the exposed sector is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare. In addition, we demonstrate that in the case of oligopoly, instituting a more stringent environmental policy on the exposed sector might be profit-enhancing for this sector. This finding lends theoretical support to a specific interpretation of the Porter hypothesis.     

A Note on the Taxation of International Capital Income Flows

Seemingly persuasive arguments can be made to suggest that income from foreign-owned capital should be taxed by a small open economy and that it should not be taxed I show that the case for taxing foreign capital income as part of an 'optimal' tax scheme rests on the assumption that tax rates on other forms of income are not set optimally. In particular, if economic profit is not fully taxed, a tax on foreign capital income is desirable. If all tax rates are set optimally, foreign capital income should not be taxed by the capital-importing country.     

Taxation and Investment Decisions: A Real Options Approach

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the impact of the tax system on the firm's incentives to invest and disinvest in an uncertain environment. This paper follows the real options approach, which allows us to investigate the value to a firm of waiting to invest and/or disinvest, when payoffs are stochastic and investments partially reversible. The implications for the magnitude and directions of the effects of tax policy are studied; also the case of tax policy uncertainty is examined.     

Poverty Elasticity: A Note on a New Empirical Approach

This note proposes a non‐parametric estimation method controlled for endogeneity to calculate poverty elasticities for a panel of countries. Results show that usual linear estimates without control for endogeneity overestimate the growth elasticity of poverty.     

Unemployment and Labor–market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach

Why do many democracies fail to reform their labor–market institutions? To answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor–market regulations. Under asymmetric information, a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information. In this setting, unemployment may be constrained Pareto–efficient. Labor–market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters. We also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program. JEL classification: D70; E61; J68     

Environmental Management: A Non-Traditional Approach

India's wastelands have been classified as both over utilized and underutilized. Perplexingly, an apparent tragedy of the commons exists alongside extensive official management powers. In this paper, I argue that the complexity of governance structures may be inadvertently worsening the situation. Looking to recent work on contested property and the anticommons concept, I suggest that an anticommons amongst those officially controlling the lands is casting a long and unexpected shadow by encouraging the emergence of open-access de facto resource exploitation and discouraging de facto management. This extension of the anticommons concept implies that the effects of anticommons are not necessarily limited to under exploitation, as most commonly used in the developing anticommons literature. It points to a wider examination of the harmful effects of anticommons situations.     

Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance

This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.     

A Note on Environmental Awareness and Cross-Border Pollution

Considering a Nash equilibrium in which a developed country chooses the amount of foreign aid and a developing country sets the emission tax rate and the proportion of the received aid allocated to public abatement of pollution, it is shown that an increase in the recipient countrys environmental awareness will reduce the level of cross-border pollution and benefits the donor though its foreign aid is increased.     

A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

This note shows that per unit taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation in an oligopoly model, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high compared to the number of oligopolists. It aims to provide an alternative perspective to existing literature arguing instead the dominance of ad valorem over per unit taxation in oligopoly frameworks. Our result is obtained in a simple example which uses a strategic market game formulation to study strategic behavior at a general equilibrium level.     

环境库兹涅茨曲线的理论批评综论

环境库兹涅茨曲线(EKC)提出后,学术界从多方面探讨了环境—收入关系,批评者认为EKC具有内生缺陷以及适用的局限性,现实偏离了EKC轨迹,环境指标与收入指标不具有代表性,EKC解释力不足等,对EKC提出了异议,说明收入水平提高并不必然伴随着环境质量改善。推进和深化环境—收入关系的研究可以从改进指标选取、把握现实新问题对环境—收入关系的影响、强化偏离EKC的理论基础等方面突破。     

Green Throughput Taxation: Environmental and Economic Consequences

According to optimal taxation theory, raw materials should be taxed to capture the embedded scarcity rent in their value. To reduce both natural resource use and the corresponding emissions, or the throughput in the economic system, the best policy may be a tax on material inputs. As a first approach to throughput taxation, this paper considers a tax on intermediates in the framework of a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with environmental feedbacks. To balance the budget, payroll taxes are reduced. As a result, welfare indicators as material consumption and leisure time consumption are reduced, while on the other hand all the environmental indicators improve.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Freshman-Sophomore Learning Differentials: A Comment

Several principles of writing in different contexts are explained. Although the effect of writing on learning economics is yet to be established, students appreciate writing assignments because they see professional value in them.