Public Information Arrival and the Fisher Effect in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Stock and Bond Markets in Turkey

We examine the impact of inflation on nominal stock returns and interest rates in Turkey's emerging economy, which has a moderately high, persistent, and volatile inflation rate. Empirical evidence indicates that Turkey's inflation increased more than nominal stock returns and interest rates, implying that real returns to investors declined during our sample period. Among the different sector indexes we study, the financials sector serves as the best hedge against expected inflation, and the Fisher effect appears to hold only for this sector. We also find that public information arrival plays an important role, especially in the stock market.     

The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study

A complete understanding of security markets requires a simultaneous explanation of price behavior, trading volume, portfolio composition (ie., asset allocation), and bid-ask spreads. In this paper, these variables are observed in a controlled setting—a computerized double auction market, similar to NASDAQ. Our laboratory allows experimental control of information arrival—whether simultaneously or sequentially received, and whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We compare the price, volume, and share allocations of three market equilibrium models: telepathic rational expectations, which assumes that traders can read each others minds (strong-form market efficiency); ordinary rational expectations, which assumes traders can use (some) market price information, (a type of semi-strong form efficiency); and private information, where traders use no market information. We conclude 1) that stronger-form market models predict equilibrium prices better than weaker-form models, 2) that there were fewer misallocation forecasts in simultaneous information arrival (SIM) environments, 3) that trading volume was significantly higher in SIM environments, 4) and that bid-ask spreads widen significantly when traders are exposed to price uncertainty resulting from information heterogeneity.     

我国上市银行信息披露现状及改进

现有信息披露规范的执行情况 目前，我国境内上市银行已达4家，其信息披露工作已经形成了初步的规范框架。该规范框架除了所有境内上市公司信息披露均要遵循的《公司法》、《证券法》、《会计法》、《股票发行与交易管理暂行条例》、《企业会计准则》、《企业会计制……     

银行业的信息公开披露

加强银行业中的信息公开披露,是目前国际银行监管中出现的重要趋势。近年来,权威的国际银行监管组织——巴塞尔委员会发布了若干指导性文件,从制度建设方面为监管当局和银行业提出了详细的建议,对银行业监管具有深远的影响。     

公民申请财政信息公开行动评析

法律人在申请财政信息公开行动中走在前头,起了先导作用,法律人理应成为公民行动的主导者。同时,通过公民行动,法律由纸上的东西变成社会生活中活的力量;公民申请财政信息公开,有力地促进了政府依法行政和执政党依法执政,因此,在现有法律制度内,财政信息公开是推动中国走向宪政的软突破口。     

Analysts' Weighting of Private and Public Information

Using both a linear regression method and a probability-basedmethod, we find that on average, analysts place larger thanefficient weights on (i.e., they overweight) their private informationwhen they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analystsoverweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than theconsensus, and overweight less, and may even underweight, privateinformation when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus.Further, the deviation from efficient weighting increases whenthe benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doingso are low. These results suggest that analysts’ incentivesplay a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases.     

公共信用信息归集制度的理论探析

公共信用信息是公共信用体系的核心要素,而信用信息归集是建立信用体系的基础.目前,我国公共信用信息归集制度陷于信息归集的边界不清晰这一困境.从限制公权力、保护私权益这个角度出发,借鉴两分法的信义关系来分析公权力机关对信息主体所负有的义务,并围绕公共信用信息的属性和价值展开讨论,通过贯彻最小够用原则和健全信息主体的知情权来为公共信用信息归集制度的构建夯实理论基础.     

Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on coordination failure. Information precision is operationalized in terms of “granularity” (level of detail). We found that (1) granular public disclosure, which is disaggregated and precise, increases the likelihood of coordination failure and decreases coordination efficiency when public information is pessimistic about future economic prospects; (2) the deleterious effect of granular disclosure is stronger when strategic complementarity is high; and (3) higher levels of strategic complementarity decrease coordination efficiency. Overall, the observed likelihood of coordination failure is higher and coordination efficiency is lower than predicted by theory. Our findings have implications for the Federal Reserve's decision to publicly disclose detailed stress test results for distressed banks, and the debate on whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should publicly release reports on firm‐specific quality‐control deficiencies of audit firms.     

The Impact of Public Information on the Stock Market

We study the relation between the number of news announcements reported daily by Dow Jones & Company and aggregate measures of securities market activity including trading volume and market returns. We find that the number of Dow Jones announcements and market activity are directly related and that the results are robust to the addition of factors previously found to influence financial markets such as day-of-the-week dummy variables, news importance as proxied by large New York Times headlines and major macroeconomic announcements, and noninformation sources of market activity as measured by dividend capture and triple witching trading. However, the observed relation between news and market activity is not particularly strong and the patterns in news announcements do not explain the day-of-the-week seasonalities in market activity. Our analysis of the Dow Jones database confirms the difficulty of linking volume and volatility to observed measures of information.     

Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades

We propose a dynamic econometric microstructure model of trading,and we investigate how the dynamics of trades and trade compositioninteract with the evolution of market liquidity, market depth,and order flow. We estimate a bivariate generalized autoregressiveintensity process for the arrival rates of informed and uninformedtrades for 16 actively traded stocks over 15 years of transactiondata. Our results show that both informed and uninformed tradesare highly persistent, but that the uninformed arrival forecastsrespond negatively to past forecasts of the informed intensity.Our estimation generates daily conditional arrival rates ofinformed and uninformed trades, which we use to construct forecastsof the probability of information-based trade (PIN). These forecastsare used in turn to forecast market liquidity as measured bybid-ask spreads and the price impact of orders. We observe thatPINs vary across assets and over time, and most importantlythat they are correlated across assets. Our analysis shows thatone principal component explains much of the daily variationin PINs and that this systemic liquidity factor may be importantfor asset pricing. We also find that PINs tend to rise beforeearnings announcement days and decline afterwards.     

信息过载是否影响投资者对公开信息的使用——来自季度盈余的实证证据

首季季报之所以可能导致投资者的信息过载原因有二 :一是许多公司在同一天披露其季报 ;二是公司的年报和季报有可能同时披露。我们的结果说明了信息的集中披露本身并不妨碍投资者对信息的及时利用 ,这些发现对我国资本市场上信息披露监管机构有着直接的政策性含义。     

Public Disclosure of Forward Contracts and Revelation of Proprietary Information

Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed producer enters the forward market prior to production. In choosing its forward position, the firm considers the effects of that position on the forward price and second stage product market competition with its rival. Two regimes are considered: mandated disclosure and no disclosure. Under the former, the contracting firm faces a tension between exploiting its information advantage in the forward market and attempting to influence the production decision of its rival. On average, in equilibrium, the contracting firm gains a first-mover advantage, but at the cost of revealing its private information to its rival and extracting less expected gains from uninformed forward market participants. In contrast, with no disclosure, the contracting firm cannot influence rival firm beliefs, but extracts more expected gains from its private information in both the forward and product markets. On balance, the contracting firm prefers no disclosure. Moreover, parameterizations exist such that the rival also prefers that regime. These findings explain the opposition of respondents to draft proposals of Statement of Financial Standards No. 133.     

Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.     

非上市国有企业信息公开披露:逻辑与事实

本文基于产权经济学和制度经济学理论,阐释了公有产权与治理效率、垄断与公信力、非上市与管制三组关系,得出充分、及时、公开、持续的信息披露才是提高非上市国有企业治理有效性之关键的推论。通过对107家非上市央企样本进行的研究发现,我国非上市国有企业信息披露存在社会责任披露多、财务数据披露少且有选择性、高管薪酬零披露、正负面重大事项区别对待、及时性明显不够等诸多问题。为寻找逻辑推论与事实差异的原因,本文进一步考察了披露渠道和行业特征与制度安排的关系,佐证了制度缺失是非上市国有企业信息公开披露种种问题之根源的论点。     

Public Reports, Information Acquisition by Investors, and Management Incentives

This paper initially provides a general characterization of the relative weight assigned to two performance measures in an optimal linear compensation contract in a two-task principal/agent setting. This characterization is applied to a setting in which the measures are a public report about the firm's performance (e.g., accounting earnings) and its market price. The latter reflects the public report and non-contractible investor information, whose costly acquisition is endogenously determined. The analysis considers both the gross observed price and the filtered price, which excludes the effect of the public report and represents a contractible noisy measure of the investors' non-contractible information.     

Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of Private and Public Debt Claims

This article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990. We find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding. For firms with a single bank relationship, the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities. In contrast, among firms borrowing from multiple banks, the relationship is positive.     

Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills

We show theoretically that the responsiveness of a fund manager's portfolio allocations to changes in public information decreases in the manager's skill. We go on to estimate this sensitivity (RPI) as the R² of the regression of changes in a manager's portfolio holdings on changes in public information using a panel of U.S. equity funds. Consistent with RPI containing information related to managerial skills, we find a strong inverse relationship between RPI and various existing measures of performance, and between RPI and fund flows. We also document that both fund‐ and manager‐specific attributes affect RPI.     

Simultaneous Public and Private Provision of Services, Asymmetric Information and Innovation

Public and private provision of a service coexist. There is asymmetric information between the government and the agency providing the public service with respect to the costs, the quality of the service and the innovation effort of the agency. We examine the optimal government design of the funding contracts to induce the agency to reveal its costs and exert high innovation effort. The optimizing behaviour of consumers and private firms generates observable information, which can be used by the government to reduce its information problem. In the optimal contracts, the informational rents of the agency increase with the level of innovation effort that the government induces from the agency. Correlation between public and the private sector costs results in a trade-off in the government's policy between inducing innovation and extracting the informational rent of the agency. To increase the redistribution inherent in the public provision of the service, the government will manipulate the expected profits of the private firms to induce higher innovation effort.     

高校网络信息平台对大学生的舆论导向探究

随着网络技术和网络传媒在我国的迅速发展,贴吧、博客、博文、网络空间等自媒体得到了广泛的应用,大学生参与信息传播的热情度越来越高,高校学生群体中的政治舆论导向就显得越来越重要.本文从中日钓鱼岛争端中的网络舆论引出加强校园网络平台建设的必要性,并解读了大学生校园舆论的特点,最后提出了引导学生舆论走向的举措.     

公募REITs信息披露责任配置制度研究

中国证监会发布基础设施领域不动产信托基金相关的通知和指引标志着公募REITs试点阶段的开始.公募REITs制度特别强调信息披露,并在发行期和存续期都规定了较为详细的信息披露要求.但是现有公募REITs信息披露制度并未规定相关主体之间的信息披露协同和衔接,不同主体之间的信息披露责任划分也不明确.我国公募REITs复杂的交易结构、双重委托代理困境而产生的信息不对称及利益冲突,需要我国公募REITs进一步明确不同主体信息披露责任配置.公募REITs信息披露制度,应当以信息生成和传递过程中不同主体产生的法律关系为分析基础,具体化项目管理人及其主要负责人信息披露责任、加强基金托管人的监督职能,在公募REITs年度报告责任主体中应当包含专项计划管理人等其他管理人.