THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.     

DEBT REFUNDING AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE PRICE EFFECTS OF DEBT-FOR-DEBT EXCHANGE OFFER ANNOUNCEMENTS

This study examines the impact of debt refunding on common stock prices for a sample of 48 exchange offers announced from 1970 through 1981. Exchange offer announcements do not have a significant impact on average common stock returns but appear to produce idiosyncratic share price effects. Refunding-induced price effects were unrelated to several exchange offer characteristics including tax shield increases, exchange offer premia, and transaction costs of refunding. Common stock excess returns were negatively related to reductions in debt service payments and relaxation of dividend payment constraints. Thus, the evidence is consistent with theories predicting that certain debt refundings generate negative information-signaling price effects.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF TRACKING STOCK RESTRUCTURINGS

We provide a comprehensive examination of the post‐issue wealth effects of 29 completed tracking stock restructurings. We document that for the parent stock and for the combined firm, tracking stock restructurings lead to insignificant long‐term excess returns. However, we find that shareholders of tracking stocks realize significant post‐issue wealth losses. Unlike spin‐offs and carve‐outs, announcements of tracking stock restructurings are preceded by negative one‐year excess returns, and unlike the positive post‐issue long‐term excess returns to spin‐off stocks and the insignificant long‐term excess returns to carve‐out stocks, tracking stocks experience negative long‐term excess returns.     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GREENMAIL

In this study, the abnormal return dynamics of firms undertaking premium targeted block share repurchases are examined empirically. The positive returns accruing to nonparticipating shareholders for the period encompassing the buy-in and repurchase announcements are attributable to the expectation of subsequent acquisition activity. Firms that are not acquired realize, on average, a zero abnormal return. The probability of subsequent acquisition is not related to the targeted repurchase. Managers who engage in targeted block share repurchases frequently are expelled from corporate ranks. Firms that are acquired exhibit abnormal returns only similar to those of other merger and tender offer targets.     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF CALPERS' FOCUS LIST

Shareholder activism can help to protect shareholder value by promoting sound corporate governance practices. As an active institutional investor, CalPERS takes its role in the corporate governance process very seriously. In addition to many other initiatives, CalPERS publishes each year a list of six to twelve public companies with poor corporate governance principles and poor financial performance—its well-known "Focus List"—in the hope that the managements of these companies will be motivated to improve their performance and increase shareholder value for CalPERS and their other equity owners.
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively.     

ON THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE SUPERVISORY GOODWILL CONTROVERSY

We provide evidence on the potential wealth effects of the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision that the U.S. government had violated contractual obligations when, in 1989, it passed legislation prohibiting savings and loan associations from counting “supervisory goodwill” as capital. The Supreme Court decision produced large wealth gains for the savings and loan plaintiffs, as did prior court decisions in favor of these savings and loans. However, little evidence exists to suggest negative market responses to important events surrounding the 1989 legislation.     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION DECISIONS

This paper presents an analysis of the policy of the UK's Monopolies and Mergers Commission using stock market data. Stock price reactions to regula-tory intervention by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission might be expected to reflect two sorts of factors. Firstly, the impact of the intervention on the possibility of bidders extracting monopoly profits from consumers. Secondly, the possibility that the subsequent investigation of the bid by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission will raise the cost of a bid, which may not necessarily be in the shareholder's interests, and so cause such bids to be abandoned. Studying a sample of some 53 bids, investigated by the Commission in the period 1976–90, little evidence was found that the Commission halts bids that are likely to result in monopoly profits to the bidder but there was some weak evidence that non-shareholder wealth maximising bids are abandoned as a result of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission intervention.     

SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF MANAGEMENT CHANGES

This paper analyzes the direction and magnitude of changes in stock prices resulting from the announcement of various types of changes in senior corporate management over a twelve-year period. We find support for the view that instability resulting from executive succession adversely affects organizational performance. Furthermore, our results imply a clear preference by the market for a change in composition of the previous management team over its further entrenchment and a perception by the market that senior corporate executives and the board of directors may not be solely motivated by considerations of shareholder wealth maximization.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF VOLUNTARY SELLOFFS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIVESTING AND ACQUIRING FIRMS

Previous research examining the wealth effects of voluntary selloffs has shown positive stock price movements around the announcement date for divesting firms. Shareholders realize positive economic gains from selloffs. One recent study indicates that shareholders of acquiring firms also realize economic gains. This study examines the division of economic gains between divesting and acquiring firms and the impact of the firm's financial condition and relative selloff size on the level of economic gains. Significant positive price movements are observed for divesting firms immediately prior to and on the announcement date. Some evidence of positive, although not significant, price movements is found for acquiring firms. These results suggest shareholders of divesting firms realize economic gains from selloffs while shareholders of acquiring firms neither gain nor lose. Also, as divesting firms sell off larger portions of their total assets, their shareholders realize greater economic gains; the division of economic gains becomes more one-sided (in favor of divesting firms) as the relative size of the selloff increases.     

ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWN SECURITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE ON THE WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION HYPOTHESIS

This paper employs the comparison period returns approach to examine issuance and withdrawal announcement effects for stock portfolios of firms announcing equity or debt issues that are subsequently withdrawn. In contrast to previous literature, which generally attributes financing announcement effects to capital structure changes, the conclusion of this paper is that security price changes at the time an issue is announced or withdrawn prevent wealth redistributions between insiders and outsiders. Empirical findings are inconsistent with the interpretation of announcement effects as capital structure effects.     

WEALTH EFFECTS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED BANKS

We examine the stock price reaction for a sample of commercial banks to the signing of cease-and-desist orders, written agreements, and formal agreements with bank regulators. These agreements restrict financially distressed institutions from certain activities that may be perceived by the capital markets as favorable or unfavorable. Our finding of a significantly negative mean signing-day abnormal return suggests that these enforcement actions are not fully anticipated by the market and that, on average, these enforcement actions are perceived as being unfavorable for bank shareholders. Our cross-sectional analysis suggests that at least part of the negative market reaction is caused by a reduction in the moral hazard problem associated with financially distressed federally insured commercial banks. Although these actions are beneficial to both the federal deposit insurer and ultimately taxpayers, we interpret the cross-sectional findings as implying that regulators are not acting in a timely fashion to restore the financial health of these distressed “banks. Even though equity values fall, on average, when banks are faced with an enforcement action, our findings do not support the pre-FIRREA policy not to publicly disclose the signing of enforcement actions because the enforcement action itself is not the source but is merely a reflection of the bank's problems.     

ON THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUM REVISIONS ON LARGE,PUBLICLY TRADED COMMERCIAL BANKS

Evidence is provided from changes in deposit insurance premiums in the early 1990s on the validity of the premium absorption hypothesis and the premium shifting hypothesis. Analysis of abnormal market returns associated with deposit insurance events using a market‐model event‐study methodology suggests that reductions in deposit insurance premiums are associated with increases in the market value of banking organizations; conversely, increases in deposit insurance premiums are associated with decreases in market wealth. The largest banks in the sample and banks with low equity capital (and low risk‐based capital ratios) appear to be most affected. These results are generally consistent with the premium absorption hypothesis but inconsistent with the premium shifting hypothesis.     

THE IMPACT OF TARGETED SHARE REPURCHASES ON THE WEALTH OF NON-PARTICIPATING SHAREHOLDERS

This paper examines empirically whether management is acting in the best interests of non-participating shareholders when it engages in a targeted share repurchase. Over the full purchase-to-repurchase period, non-participating shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns, providing additional evidence that shareholders benefit from the initial investment that leads to the share repurchase. On the repurchase date, however, shareholders experience a significant decrease in their wealth position that cannot be attributed solely to a wealth transfer from the non-participating to the participating shareholders. Consequently, one cannot generalize about management's intentions for a targeted share repurchase.     

THE EFFECT OF TRADED OPTION INTRODUCTION ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

Several authors suggest that the opening of a market in traded options constitutes a “feasibility-expanding” change. In this paper evidence on changes in the price of underlying stocks at the time of option listing is examined to determine whether option listing constitutes such a change. Evidence supports the hypothesis that call option listing is feasibility expanding, that put option listing is not feasibility expanding, and that call listings closer to the initiation of organized option trading have a larger impact relative to later listings.     

RETURN OF CAPITAL: CASH FLOW,WEALTH TRANSFER AND INFORMATION SIGNALLING EFFECTS

This paper examines the price effects of an announcement to distribute cash to shareholders via the return of capital procedure currently applying under Australian company law. The impact of such announcements on the market value of ordinary shares is analysed in terms of three hypothesised effects: the cash flow effect, the wealth transfer effect and the information signalling effect. Using data from 17 companies which announced a return of capital between 1970–1978, and applying the “comparison period” methodology, significant positive returns were observed at the time of the announcement of a return of capital. Possible explanations for this result are considered.