RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF NON-LIFE REINSURANCE MARKETING METHODS

Abstract: This paper extends the study of the relative cost efficiency of insurance delivery systems from the primary market to the market for non-life reinsurance services. As in the primary market for insurance services there are two predominant methods of marketing reinsurance services: reinsurers who rely on employees, termed direct writers, and those who rely on brokers.
An extensive literature relating to the primary market for non-life insurance consistently indicates that independent agency insurers have a cost disadvantage relative to exclusive agency insurers. This literature also suggests that independent agency insurers may supply superior service but a continuing erosion of the market share of independent agency insurers suggests that the perceived service differential is not valued sufficiently to offset the perceived cost differential.
The authors find evidence that, cet. par., broker supplied reinsurers operate with lower costs than direct reinsurers but we find less convincing evidence of a service differential favoring direct reinsurers. More significantly, we observe that the largest component of the traditional measure of the reinsurer's cost is the commission paid back to the primary insurer: the seemingly lower cost brokers provide a higher net cost product. Yet brokers thrive in the marketplace suggesting the existence of a product differentiated by service or quality. With the important caveat that measures of service are imperfect and data is limited, we find no evidence of a service differential.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

PROJECT HOLDING-PERIOD RATE OF RETURN AND THE MIRR

In this paper we examine the relationship between the Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) and a project's expected holding-period rate of return assuming that cash flows are reinvested at the cost of capital. When cash flows are uncertain, the MIRR overstates the expected holding-period rate of return. The relationship between the MIRR and a project's expected holding-period rate of return is shown to be a simple function of conventional project statistics like the coefficient of variation of the present value of random cash flows, the profitability index, the cost of capital, and the project's life.     

THE ACCURACY OF CAPM PROXIES FOR ESTIMATING A FIRM'S COST OF EQUITY

In estimating a firm's cost of equity with the CAPM the standard procedure is to proxy the market portfolio by a share index. Since this index is not the market portfolio this may give rise to a bias in estimating the firm's cost of equity. This paper investigates this bias and concludes that it will arise if the factor coefficients are not proportional to those of the index. Even moderate departures from this proportionality condition may produce significant bias.     

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND THE COST OF EQUITY FINANCING

We examine whether and how competitive pressure in the product market influences the cost of equity capital. Using a large panel of U.S. public firms, we find that intensification of product market competition results in lower equity financing costs. Our results are statistically significant and economically sizable. In line with the view of the disciplinary role of product market competition, we show that corporate governance, payout policy, and investment policy are channels through which competitive pressure influences the cost of equity capital.     

PROBABILITY OF PRICE REVERSAL AND RELATIVE NOISE IN STOCK AND OPTION MARKETS

In this paper we take a new approach to the study of the interrelation between stock and option markets by extending Stoll's (1989) model of cost components of the bid-ask spread to include an error component in prices. Building upon Stoll's estimates of the probability of price reversals, we determine which of the option or stock markets carries more noise. The empirical results indicate that option markets are noisier than stock markets. Such findings are consistent with the view that option markets serve as a testing ground for noisy new information because of their comparative advantage regarding transaction costs, liquidity, and potential leverage.     

THE DIVIDEND PAYOUTS OF PRIVATE FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM TAX COURT DECISIONS

To study the dividend payouts of private firms we extend the agency cost/external financing cost trade-off model of dividend payouts to include the accumulated earnings tax (AET). The firm's optimal dividend policy trades off the benefits from lower agency costs against external financing costs and the AET. Information from tax court records reveals that private firms' payouts are influenced by both agency costs and the AET.     

EFFECTS OF AGENCY AND TRANSACTION COSTS ON DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE AGENCY-TRANSACTION COST HYPOTHESIS

In this study we replicate and extend an agency-transaction cost model of dividend payout previously hypothesized and supported in the literature. We find no statistical difference between the estimated regression model obtained for the original seven-year sample period, 1974–80, and that obtained for our seven-year period, 1981–87. The latter period is characterized by significantly lower inflation, stronger economic growth, and lower taxes. The intertemporal stability of the model suggests that it is useful for predicting dividend payout at the individual firm level.     

Branching,scale economies,and banking costs

In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of bank costs based on a theory of the branch cost function. First, we show that convenient branch location is important to banking customers and implies that banks do not necessarily operate branches at minimum average cost. This theoretical result provides a rationale for including branch variables in the bank cost function. Second, we estimate a statistical cost equation derived explicitly from assumptions about the branch cost function and including branch output variables. Our empirical results suggest substantial economies of scale at the branch level, but no economies from expansion by branching. Finally, we show that the resulting cost structure of the banking industry does not imply that a highly concentrated banking structure is necessary for efficiency. Thus, economies of scale would not be expected to force small banks out of the market, even if current restrictions on interstate banking are liberalized.     

Cost efficiency in the European securities settlement and depository industry

We examine whether the European settlement and custody institutions operate in an efficient way. To do this, we start from an analytically founded discussion regarding the activities performed by the operators in this sector. Based on the insights obtained, we estimate both a translog cost function and a constant elasticity of substitution – quadratic cost function. From the results obtained, there clearly are economies of scale in this industry. Moreover, also economies of scope between the activities performed are present. These findings imply that probably further consolidation is ahead, and that separating certain activities from others can only be done at a cost in terms of efficiency.     

OPTIMAL TIMING AND TERMS IN A VERTICAL MERGER WITH TWO SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY

In this article we provide the optimal timing and equilibrium terms of a vertical merger with two sources of uncertainty in the production chain, namely, marginal cost of raw material and price level of final product. By eliminating monopoly power and transaction cost in the production process between upstream and downstream firms, a vertical merger can increase social welfare, which is consistent with the literature. The optimal threshold of a vertical merger is negatively correlated with transaction cost in the intermediate product market. Vertical mergers also accelerate when merging provides natural hedging for the postmerger firm, that is, when the correlation between the two uncertainties increases.     

不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费

在职消费与货币薪酬不同的适用条件,决定了两者作为激励的契约成本的差异。当市场化程度提高时,相比隐性的在职消费契约,货币薪酬契约成本可能减少得更多,因而在契约组合中会得到更多应用。本文使用市场化指数作为替代变量,对上述推论进行检验。结果发现,市场化指数越高的年份和地区,货币薪酬和在职消费绝对量均为更多,但货币薪酬契约更多地代替了在职消费契约;在相同年份和地区,被保护行业则会显著地抑制这一替代关系。本文将在职消费隐性契约的特点纳入到契约成本的分析中,为不同激励契约间关系的研究增添了新的重要证据;发现了市场化水平对不同激励构成的契约成本的影响,随着市场化进程的深入,在激励契约中,货币薪酬契约对在职消费契约呈边际替代的趋势。     

EVIDENCE THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE LOWERS THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL

The effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to both corporations and the investment community. However, the relationship between disclosure level and cost of capital is not well established and has proved difficult for researchers to quantify. As described in this article, the author's 1997 study (published in The Accounting Review) was the first to measure and detect a direct relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. After examining the annual reports of 122 manufacturing companies, the author concluded that companies providing more extensive disclosure had a lower (forward‐looking) cost of equity capital (measured using Value Line forecasts with an EBO valuation formula that derives from the dividend discount model). For companies with extensive analyst coverage, differences in disclosure do not appear to affect cost of capital. But for companies with small analyst followings, differences in disclosure do appear to matter. Among this group of companies, the firms judged to have the highest level of disclosure had a cost of equity capital that was nine‐percentage points lower than otherwise similar firms with a minimal level of disclosure. Closer analysis of some of the specific disclosure practices also suggests that, for small firms with limited analyst coverage, there are benefits to providing more forward‐looking information, such as forecasts of sales, profits, and capital expenditures, and enhanced disclosure of key non‐financial statistics, such as order backlogs, market share, and growth in units sold. In closing, the article also discusses an interesting new study (by Lang and Lundholm) that suggests there is an important distinction between effective corporate disclosure and “hyping the stock.” The findings of this study show that while higher levels of disclosures are associated with higher stock prices, sudden increases in the frequency of disclosure are viewed with skepticism.     

Does hedge disclosure influence cost of capital for European banks?

Upon extracting and quantifying relevant hedge information from the narrative section of European banks annual reports, this paper examines the impact of such information on cost of capital [as measured by weighted average cost of capital (WACC), cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD)]. Using a sample of 1885 bank-year observations from 19 countries, we find that textual hedge disclosure leads to a significant reduction in WACC, COE, and COD; thus explains a substantial portion of variation in cost of capital. Further, we find that these results are stronger in countries with high corruption and financial openness. Our results are robust to several controls and model specification. Collectively, our findings enrich prior evidence which examines the economic consequences of hedge disclosure.     

THE COST OF CAPITAL OF A COMPANY UNDER AN IMPUTATION TAX SYSTEM

One of the issues arising out of the introduction of an imputation tax for companies in Australia is the effect it is likely to have on the definition and measurement of a company's cost of capital. Insofar as there is a difference between the value of a dollar of franked relative to unfranked dividends, conventional definitions for the cost of capital are inappropriate and new definitions are required. This has implications for the measurement of a company's cost of capital and for the definition of net cash flows that are used in conjunction with the cost of capital. This paper sets out these definitions and an approach for measuring the cost of capital. The new definition of the cost of capital replaces the effective company tax rate T with T(l - γ) where γ is the value of personal tax credits. Further, the definition of the risk premium in the capital asset pricing model requires an adjustment for the capitalized value of personal tax credits to maintain consistency between the cost of capital and cash flows which are defined on an after-company tax but before-personal tax basis.     

ON THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEMATIC RISK AND PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND

The linkage between financial valuation and the product and factor markets faced by the firm is an area that is rapidly developing in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the theoretical bridge between systematic risk and price elasticity of demand for a firm's output. The primary theoretical result indicates that price elasticity of demand, the certainty equivalents of the random demand parameter and variable cost, and their respective covariances with the cash flow of the market portfolio are key determinants of systematic risk and thus a firms's cost of capital.     

Asymmetric Cost Behavior and Dividend Policy

Costs are sticky on average, that is, they fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases. We examine the effect of this asymmetric cost behavior on a firm's dividend policy. Given investors’ aversion to dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Further, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits variation in labor adjustment costs generated by close-call union elections, we provide evidence suggesting that the negative relation between cost stickiness and dividend payouts is driven by resource adjustment costs. Our paper sheds new light on the determinants of dividend policy and demonstrates the role of cost behavior in corporate decisions.     

CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, EQUITY VALUATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES

Previous theoretical research on voluntary disclosures has commonly viewed accounting information as a simple signalling device, for example indicating «good news» or «bad news». In this paper, voluntary disclosures are considered to provide complementary information in fundamental valuation analysis, as broadly outlined in Ohlson (1989), Brief & Lawson (1992) and Bernard (1993). The research questions are concerned with the importance of voluntary disclosures in a valuation framework of this kind and the expected content and context of such disclosures. The results imply that voluntary disclosures for typical operating companies are expected to be concerned with the prediction of net income for the next period, the long-run future development of the book return on owners» equity, and the accounting cost matching bias of owners» equity. The cost matching bias is caused by conservative valuation principles, and a specific linkage between the book return and the cost matching bias of owners» equity is recognized in the analysis.     

The Cost Efficiency of Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Analysis with a Bayesian Stochastic Frontier Model

Using a stochastic frontier methodology that incorporates Bayesian statistics, this paper analyzes the cost efficiency of real estate investment trusts (REITs) by observing the deviations of the measured costs of individual REITs from a defined efficient cost frontier. Using 1995–1997 data, we extend the previous research in this area and measure REIT efficiency more precisely by isolating random measurement error from the overall deviations from the efficient cost frontier. We calculate the magnitude of each REIT's managerial inefficiency, the industry inefficiency, and returns to scale. In addition, we assess specific characteristics of REITs for their contribution to inefficiency by calculating the odds ratio that a REIT with a specific characteristic is more efficient than a REIT with an alternative characteristic. The results show that, for the years studied, REITs are relatively cost efficient with most REITs facing increasing returns to scale. Additionally, the REIT's use of debt and the REIT's management style significantly affect the cost performance of REITs during the aforementioned time period. Finally, diversification across property types, as measured, does not seem to influence REIT cost efficiency.     

Does adopting good corporate governance impact the cost of intermediated and non‐intermediated debt?

This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non‐intermediated debt ( Sengupta, 1998 ; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 ; Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2006 ). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non‐intermediated debt sub‐samples, we find this result only holds for the non‐intermediated debt sub‐sample. Furthermore, we find that small companies that adopt better corporate governance practices do not benefit through lower cost of debt. This raises questions about the merits of universal adoption of costly governance practices.