信息不对称条件下供应链订单融资利率研究

在订单融资和零售商预付款模式都存在的情况下,从利率的角度解释了银行无法提供订单融资的现象。通过分析预付款模式下供应商与零售商在信息不对称条件下的博弈,结果发现预付模式下的订货量与供应商资金不受限时相同,零售商会夸大其资金时价以获得额外利润。在两种融资模式同时存在时,供应商的融资选择取决于零售商和银行的资金时价的比较。如果零售商的资金时价高于无风险利率,那么银行利率将介于两者之间,使供应商选择订单融资;反之,零售商会宣称资金时价高于真实值而低于无风险利率,使供应商接受预付款。     

克服农业保险中的信息不对称问题研究

当前,农业保险市场中存在着严重的信息不对称问题。究其原因,主要是农业生产、农业保险、投保人与保险人四方面都存在着自身的特殊性。为了有效克服信息不对称,就必须健全农业保险市场体系、拓展农业生产消息渠道、提升地方政府介入效果。     

信息不对称与风险投资的合约安排

信息不对称即非对称信息,它必将造成投资各方的高风险。本对这一现象提出了通过特定的合约规范创业、风险投资家和外部投资的解决办法,以期保证各方的利益。     

我国农业保险不对称信息实证研究

近年来,我国自然灾害频发、风险日趋多样,农业保险作为对农业风险损失进行补偿的制度,是维护一国农业可持续运行的稳定器。国内外农业保险的实践经验表明,信息不对称问题对农业保险发展的阻碍不容小觑,不对称信息问题也伴随着我国农业保险的发展渐渐凸显。文章采用国内10家产险公司2007~2014年共8年的177份地区承保汇总数据,运用二项回归模型和条件相关模型对我国农业保险中是否存在信息不对称问题进行了实证分析,发现我国农业保险市场上存在着一定程度的道德风险和逆向选择。在此基础上,从缓解农业保险信息不对称问题的角度提出了相关建议,以促进我国农业保险市场的健康持续发展。     

信息不对称条件下的装备采办合同订立研究

本文旨在分析装备采办合同订立过程中存在的信息不对称问题,针对装备采办合同订立过程中有关信息不对称的一系列问题,提出了的几点建议和对策。首先介绍了装备采办中买卖双方的信息不对称及装备采办适用信息不对称的条件。提出现行装备采办合同订立过程中的一系列问题,用信息角度分析了问题产生的原因,针对这些问题提出了相应的解决措施。     

农业保险对农户福利影响分析--基于信息不对称的视角

作为一个农业大国,农业保险对抵御我国自然灾害有着非常重要的作用。但是,我国农业保险并不发达,农业保险风险管理难度较大,很大程度上是因为农业保险存在较大的信息不对称问题。因此,研究信息不对称情形下的农业保险福利问题,对农业保险的发展有着深远的意义。那么,农业保险是否会影响农户的福利呢？如果有影响,那么影响又有多大呢？应该采取怎样的措施进行解决呢？本文借鉴张跃华等（2007）提出的效用最大化福利分析方法研究得出：农业保险确实会影响农户福利,而且在信息不对称条件下影响更大。     

信息不对称条件下农业保险补贴的效率与策略分析

农业保险的高风险性、高赔付率、高亏损率特征及其准公共物品的属性,决定了政府支持是农业保险发展的必要条件。而政府、保险公司和投保农户之间的信息不对称问题,会引发道德风险而降低政府补贴的使用效率。本文构建了Stackelberg博弈模型分析这种效率损失,并应用Kreps模型分析了博弈双方预期补贴政策变动时的策略性反应,进而提出了降低这种效率损失的对策,即政府补贴政策的设计与运行应力求克服信息不对称性。     

信息不对称下的中小企业融资困境

改革开放以来,中小企业在我国国民经济和社会中扮演着越来越重要的角色。但是,当前中小企业的发展却受到了严重的金融制约,融资难已成为制约其发展的"瓶颈"。本文试从信息不对称角度对中小企业融资困境进行分析。     

论信息非对称下债权契约的优化设计

由于信息的非对称,作为债券投资者的债权人与作为负债方的股东或经理就必然存在利益冲突。优化设计债权契约可以避免企业经理或股东对债权人的财富进行掠夺,或把债权人的财富损失减小到最小程度。债权契约的创新性设计主要是在债权契约中加入可赎回条款和可转换条款等内容,而所有这些设计都是为了解决信息不对称问题,即让债务人说真话。     

信息传递成本和预测能力不足对信贷契约的影响

信息传递成本和预测能力不足是影响信贷融资交易成本的主要因素。二者直接影响信贷融资具体方式的选择和融资过程的治理。治理这些问题的机制通常在利好情况下能够约束借款人恪守诚信,但是在利空情况下会导致低效率。能够缓解信息不对称和契约不完全问题的其他方式包括签订自我履行的信贷契约、构建关系性融资、提高契约法规的执法力度、营造诚信的商业环境和规范企业财务信息披露。     

Target Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Price

This study investigates the effects of target information asymmetry in a takeover transaction. We find that a target with more information asymmetry receives a larger bid premium from the acquirer. We examine the response of the acquirer's investors to the bid to clarify whether the larger bid premium is an overpayment by the acquirer. We observe that the acquirer's investors respond more positively to the acquisition of an opaque target, indicating that the market recognizes the acquirer's valuation of the opaque target and agrees with the offer price. Our results indicate that corporate takeovers help to resolve asymmetric information in the capital market.     

Universal Banking Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

The Gramm–Leach–Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 repealed many provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act that curtailed competition between banks and commercial firms. Significantly, however, the GLB Act did not repeal the constraint on banks from owning equity in commercial firms (“universal banking”). Should banks be allowed to hold equity in corporate borrowers? If allowed, would banks optimally choose to do so? Despite its relevance from a policy perspective, there are surprisingly few theoretical analyses of this issue of “universal banking”. We develop a model in which the bank's advisory role as an “inside” shareholder hinges on its equity stake. The optimal capital structure and the bank's and entrepreneur's equity stakes are endogenously determined in a world with potential double-sided moral hazard. In certain scenarios, the bank may prefer not to hold any equity. Our analysis indicates that allowing optimal bank equity participation may foster improved corporate performance. This benefit of universal banking should be considered in policy debates.     

Information Asymmetry Around Earnings Announcements

This study examines bid-ask spreads to determine how the anticipation and release of earnings announcements affect information asymmetry in the stock market. I use regression analysis and find that bid-ask spreads are negatively related to public information availability and positively related to earnings variability and the market reaction to prior unexpected earnings. The results suggest that firms for which earnings is expected to yield a relatively larger stock market reaction have greater information asymmetry than firms for which earnings are expected to yield a smaller market reaction.I also find that bid-ask spreads gradually increase in the four days prior to earnings announcements, and increase sharply the day prior to, the day of and the day after the earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads seven to ten days after earnings announcements are not significantly different from bid-ask spreads seven to ten days prior to earnings announcements.     

Information Asymmetry and Bidders' Gains

Abstract:  Undervalued firms with high information asymmetry may announce takeover bids to attract the attention of investors with a view to increasing the share price through revaluation. Announcement period returns to such bidders should include both revaluation and synergy gains although the revaluation gains should be confined to early bids and decline with the number of bids announced within a reasonable period. Our results offer strong support to these predictions. Undervalued firms with high pre-bid information asymmetry gain the most from early bids and the gains decline with the number of bids announced. These findings are robust to methods of payment, relative size of deals, target status, relatedness of businesses, domicile of target, M&A activities and alternative measures of information asymmetry, and confirm that gains from early bids include revaluation as well as synergy gains, especially in the cases of undervalued firms with high information asymmetry.     

Information Asymmetry and Corporate Cash Holdings

This study analyzes the effect of information asymmetry on corporate cash holdings. Using various measures of information asymmetry, this study shows that companies that operate in environments with higher information asymmetry have smaller cash holdings. This study continues to find a negative relationship between information asymmetry and corporate cash holdings from a battery of sensitivity analyses, including the tests using different regression methods and the difference‐in‐difference tests employing brokerage‐firm merger and closure events. On the whole, the results support the monitoring cost hypothesis of cash holdings over the investment opportunities hypothesis.     

交叉上市、信息不对称与风险特征

本文以"A+H"交叉上市公司价格差异为研究对象,对A股、H股股票价格之间差异及其变化进行研究。根据对36家A+H股上市公司近期9个月溢价水平的分析发现,信息不对称理论能够解释AH股溢价扩大的现象,投资者与公司之间信息不对称问题得到缓解的趋势不明显,反而有所强化;国有股特征导致AH溢价缩小,海外投资者对国有股份的认同度提升;流动性理论、不同风险偏好理论不能解释AH溢价变化,数据分析支持信息不对称理论、风险特征理论和需求理论。     

信息不对称与小额信贷创新

面向落后群体或遭受信贷歧视的经济主体开展的“小额信贷”(Microcredit,或称“微贷”),是对信贷市场失灵的一种补充,然而其本身也同样面临着信息不对称问题.从导致金融市场失灵最核心的因素即信息不对称出发,讨论在过去几十年间,小额贷款技术创新在修正这一市场失灵上所取得的进展,并对其中涉及的主流小额贷款技术进行评价,以期对我国的小额信贷产业发展起到借鉴作用.     

Information Asymmetry about Investment Risk and Financing Choice

Though it is generally accepted that information asymmetry has an impact on capital structure policy, the nature of the information asymmetry is not well understood. Recent theoretical work and empirical evidence suggests that financing choice depends upon the information asymmetry associated with the investment risk of the particular use of proceeds. Consistent with this view, using the sources and uses of funds framework, we find that equity is used to fund projects with greater information asymmetry about their risk such as research and development expenditure, while debt is used to fund investments with lower information asymmetry about their risk such as liquidity enhancement.