Liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks: The European Commission's Green Paper

This paper reviews Parts I and II of the European Commission's Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks. Part I is concerned with the basic principle and timetable to liberalization, and deals with the current regulatory situation and the expected benefits. The second part addresses particular issues arising out of infrastructure liberalization, le universal service, interconnection and interoperability, licensing procedures, conditions for fair competition, employment, and the information society.     

Competition and telecommunications infrastructure in Ireland: A regulatory view

Against the background of EU proposals for liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure, this paper considers the impact of liberalization on Ireland and other peripheral and small economies. Ireland is characterized as on the periphery, with a small open economy and rural nature, with a big, liberalized neighbour — the UK. This makes Telecom Eireann particularly vulnerable to competition, but there is no reason why effective and appropriate regulation should not allow a smooth transition to a competitive market.     

The Evolution of Competition Policy in Indonesia

This paper assesses the evolution of the new Indonesian competition law passed in 1999, and the creation of the Competition Commission. The first half of the paper traces the debate and process of deregulation and liberalization that preceded the introduction of the law. Whilst deregulation did lead to increased competition and efficiency, distortions to competition in the goods sector still persisted due to ad hoc and non transparent measures taken due to government interventions and vested interests. The services and infrastructure sectors were only partially liberalized. The second half of the paper evaluates the debate on competition law and assesses its introduction and implementation. In the brief period of implementation to date, the tension between a pro-competition and an anti-bigness interpretation of the Law is evident. The paper concludes that ambiguities in the law should be eliminated, that the competition agency focuses on advocacy and introducing transparent procedures rather than hastening towards concluding investigations, and that competition issues faced by independent regulatory agencies in the services and infrastructure sectors should be introduced carefully.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Network liberalization and developing countries: The case of Chile

The opening of Chile's telecommunications infrastructure to private and foreign investment has led to a rapid modernization of the network and to improvements in universal service. In 1994 all remaining regulatory entry barriers to the local, long-distance and international markets were removed for both service providers and network operators. Full digitization of switches and specific characteristics of the Chilean network structure have led to fierce price competition in the market. In spite of the small market size the strategic behaviour of the main market players is unlikely to succeed. As a result the market is likely to remain highly competitive. While the liberalization process has so far spurred the universal service goal, further improvements will mainly depend on whether entry takes place in the local market.     

Cereal marketing liberalization in Tanzania

There is considerable evidence that cereal market liberalization in Tanzania has been a success in spite of poor roads, shortage of capital and vehicles, and lack of market infrastructure and standardized measures. The legal status of the private sector is unclear, however, and public sector policies still favour a heavy official involvement in the marketing system. Farm-gate prices for maize fall off rapidly as one moves away from the primary marketing centres, but on-farm storage of maize poses farmers no insuperable difficulties. Successful implementation of liberalization calls for clarity and consistency in government policy, the reform of financial services, the sale of unused storage capacity to the private sector, the more active involvement of farmers in the liberalized system, the strengthening of extension services, and a policy for regulating interannual price variations.     

Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating welfare effects from broadband access competition

Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000–04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Trade liberalization and food security in Nepal

Among South Asian countries, Nepal liberalized most extensively during the 1980s and 1990s on both domestic and external fronts. In South Asia, Nepal has the lowest per capita income, highest dependence of population on agriculture and second highest poverty rate. At the same time, Nepal has the lowest average tariffs in South Asia and has taken several steps to downsize its public food distribution system and remove a host of agricultural subsidies. The outcomes from these policy reforms in Nepal are mixed. Aggregate indicators of food sufficiency and security (per capita food availability, extent of malnourishment) show improvement in Nepal since liberalization. Relative to other South Asian countries, Nepal is doing better on some indicators, like extent of undernourished population, while on other indicators, like stunting of children, Nepal is actually doing the worst. More importantly, the gains from liberalization across regions in Nepal have been uneven. The reason for such an uneven outcome is lack of complementary policies from the government that would lead to spatial integration of markets (e.g. the creation of physical and marketing infrastructure). Liberalization has in effect reinforced the ex-ante hierarchy across regions in Nepal. The paper then reviews the role and reform of the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) within this broader context.     

Telecommunications reforms in China: towards an analytical framework

This paper reviews and analyzes changing telecommunications policies in China since the inception of the so-called “Open Policy”. It is argued that these changes should be understood as the results of a delicate balance between (1) government considerations (including the state's desire to provide universal coverage, control the telecommunications industry and, more recently, improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises), (2) the call from foreigners (sometimes made through their governments) to open China's telecommunications industry and to seek profits, and (3) the overwhelming demand of the Chinese population and the business sector (including foreign firms operating in China) to have freer and more rapid movement of information. Over time, the interplay of these forces has led to the liberalization of China's telecommunications industry. These moves towards liberalization took place in four stages. During stages one (Pre-1994) and two (1994–1997), only half-hearted reforms were introduced to separate government administration from business enterprises and to foster very weak domestic competition. During stage three (1998–1999), there were reforms to the regulatory framework and measures towards liberalization. From 2000 onwards, a solid legal foundation was laid after nearly a decade of gradual reform. Moreover, there has been some remarkable organizational restructuring since June 2001.     

Assessing Finland's Wireless Valley: can the pioneering continue?

Internationally, the success of Finland's Wireless Valley, i.e., the Finnish telecom/mobile cluster, has often been credited to Finnish industry competitiveness, population dispersion, and pro-technology attitudes. Yet, the number of competitors has been low, while demographic dispersion and technology attitudes have not been that different from those in other Nordic countries. In effect, the cluster performance during the second-generation rivalry has been a function of geopolitics (Finland's special relationship with Tsarist Russia and Soviet Union), public strategies (Nordic cooperation, EU strategies and Finnish liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s), and first-mover advantages (firm-level strategies of Finnish mobile vendors and operators). In the emerging 3G competition, the importance of geopolitics and public strategies has become secondary to that of the marketplace. As a result, the Finnish success drivers are dissipating in the new environment.     

The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives

The paper reviews how the question of access pricing has been fully investigated by the theoretical literature in a static context. On the other hand, there is no developed analysis of the linkage between access pricing and incentives to invest. This paper argues that some useful literature in related areas can be brought to bear on the issue of “races” to build infrastructures, on the relationship between infrastructure and service competition, and on two-way network competition.     

中国在东亚地区的自由贸易区建设研究

目前,贸易自由化席卷全球,世界各国都在积极与贸易伙伴谈判缔结FTA／EPA。我国在自由贸易区建设方面起步较晚,而且伙伴国主要在东亚地区。我国在东亚地区的自由贸易区建设面临两难困境：加快自由贸易区建设会给国内部分产业带来冲击和影响;放慢自由贸易区建设叉会遭遇日本以及东盟自由贸易发展的竞争和挑战。我国的策略应该是积极应对竞争和挑战,提高相关产业的国际竞争力,制定明确的自由贸易区战略,争取东亚贸易自由化和东亚一体化的主导权。     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

欧盟第三阶段天然气市场自由化改革及其对俄欧天然气合作的影响

欧盟推动天然气市场自由化改革,既是为了鼓励竞争、限制垄断以提高供气效率和供气安全性,在欧盟内部建立统一、开放的天然气市场,也是为了联合欧盟各国一致对俄,在与俄罗斯的能源博弈中提高议价能力,因此欧盟天然气市场自由化改革对俄欧天然气合作具有巨大影响。1）俄罗斯根据长期合同向欧洲供气的传统机制将受到冲击;2）俄管道气面临来自LNG的激烈竞争,迫使俄方改变天然气价与油价挂钩的传统定价机制;3）共同能源政策的制定和实施将提高欧盟对外议价能力,使俄在对欧天然气谈判中的议价能力相对削弱。欧盟第三阶段天然气市场自由化改革使俄罗斯面临巨大压力,但同时却为中国发展对俄天然气合作提供了战略机遇,中国应抓住这一难得的机遇,争取在与俄天然气合作中取得实质性的突破。     

The impact of trade liberalization in telecommunications services: The case of APEC countries

This paper examines the impact of liberalizing the telecommunications services sector on investment and output in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries by estimating a system of four structural equations that takes into account the causal relationship between national income and telecommunications infrastructure. The degree of openness to trade in telecommunications is represented by a carefully constructed index that reflects a country’s trade and investment policy in terms of market access, national treatment and regulatory principles. One interesting finding from the empirical analysis is that the effects of trade liberalization depend on the risk rating of a country. In countries with relatively high risk ratings liberalization reduces investment in telecommunications.     

Strategic choice and broadband divergence in the transition to next generation networks: Evidence from Canada and the U.S.

This article investigates how infrastructure competition among broadband network infrastructure operators in Canada and the U.S. has influenced their incentives to increase fixed broadband connection speeds and invest in next generation fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) technologies. The evolution of measured broadband speeds since the late 2000s documents growing differences in the incentives of dominant broadband operators to respond to demand for higher speed connectivity by increasing connectivity speeds they deliver to their customers. Dominant network operators in Canada have shown relatively stronger incentives than their counterparts in the U.S. to invest in and increase the capacity of legacy platforms. In the U.S. FTTP deployment incentives have been somewhat stronger, but network operators have been more reluctant to upgrade legacy technologies to deliver higher speeds. Diversity of strategic choices by large operators helps explain increasing regional and local broadband infrastructure gaps within the two countries. A high dividend payout financial strategy and increasing vertical integration appear to enhance the potential for overinvestment and inefficient duplication in legacy platforms by competing infrastructure providers.     

Functional separation in Swedish broadband market: Next step of improving competition

Technological development together with liberalization policy has led to competition in the telecommunications market. Broadband has been recognized as a driving force in the social and economic development of nations, and many countries have introduced policies and/or regulatory frameworks to improve competition in broadband markets. An evolution can be seen from the 1980s until the present day through open access to local loop unbundling to several degrees of separation including functional separation. There are several countries implementing functional separation such as the UK, Italy, Sweden and, recently the EU. It has been suggested that functional separation can be an effective policy for increasing competition in broadband markets under certain circumstances. Sweden has implemented functional separation by amending the Swedish Telecommunications Act in 2008 to include mandatory functional separation as one of the powers of the PTS, the Swedish telecommunications regulator. Although TeliaSonera, the incumbent fixed line operator decided to voluntarily separate part of their business, the amendments to the law were debated with arguments similar to the debates in the EU following the new regulatory framework implemented in 2009. Against this background, this paper provides an overview of the development of functional separation in the EU and European countries such as Sweden and the UK. The paper also provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implementation of functional separation. The evolution of functional separation in Sweden is explained and ends with a discussion of the implementation of functional separation in the Swedish broadband market.     

An assessment of the liberalization and the evolution of competition in the Moroccan mobile market

This paper analyses the liberalization process of the Moroccan mobile market since the beginning of the 21 st century. Our database ranges from 2004 to the end of 2020. First, operators’ market shares are presented and analysed. Second, we build concentration indexes and other indicators of competitiveness. Finally, we conduct an econometric analysis to determine the extent to which regulatory measures, privatization, market structure and the population dimension determine market shares. Overall, we can argue that, although concentration remains high, the market has become more competitive since the liberalization process began. The statistical analysis and the econometric assessment show that the entrance of the third operator made the market more competitive. Indeed, there is evidence that operator companies competed to capture customers from each other during the period under study. These features suggest that mobile operators did not follow anticompetitive practices in order to restrain competition.     

Liberalization and the growth of business‐led R&D: the case of India

Firms and organizations in India have responded to market reforms, liberalization and globalization by improving efficiency, importing technology and by increasing in‐house R&D. This paper highlights some of the evolutionary changes that have occurred since India undertook sweeping reforms in July 1991 to open its economy to foreign participation and competition. Although some authors, such as Forbes (1999), have looked at the impact of the liberalization on India's R&D and innovation, they missed a number of dimensions that have far‐reaching implications for the process of technological capability development in India. Using the concept of technological capability, this paper makes a contribution to the discourse on the changing R&D and innovation scenario in the face of on‐going liberalization in India. It concludes with three case studies, which illustrate some of the recent changes made by industrial organisations.