世界奇景撷趣

——“城中城”。伦敦是英国的首都,是世界十大都市之一,总面积1 500多平方公里。伦敦城位于大伦敦市的中心地区,全城面积只有1．6平方公里,居民仅有4 000多人。英国中心银行英格兰银行位于城中心,另有外国银行300多家,所以伦敦城是英国的     

国外企业定价技巧撷趣

对商品或劳务的定价既是一门科学,更是一种技巧。定价技巧运用是否得当,直接关系到企业营销目标的实现。因而大凡在现代商战中有所作为的企业,都十分重视对定价技巧的运用。国外众多企业各自从自身的实际出发,使定价技巧内容日趋丰富,精彩纷呈。笔者在此拾其荦荦大端,以飨读者。 [原价定价] 岛村芳雄是日本     

古树小撷

被誉为“植物王国”的云南，气候和地形复杂多样，植物资源丰富。在“王国”的重要子民—树的芸芸众生中，出类拔萃者不少。筇竹寺的“孔雀杉”，玉龙雪山的“万朵山茶”，昆明黑龙潭的“唐梅”“宋柏”，这些都是树中的明星，它们年逾数百年，芳名家喻户晓。而在这块神奇的土地上，除了这些“明星树”外，还有许多鲜为人知的古树，时时给人惊喜。走进剑川满山苍松翠柏的“蟒歇岭”，一棵奇异的树倚山而立，树干笔直。它从山脚拔地而起，高度赛过了山腰的几座庙宇而直冲山顶，那样直，那样高，那样苍翠，非常引人注目。据风景区的管理人员介…     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

丹麦 丹麦的商务礼俗,随时宜穿保守式西装,最好随手携带一件防雨风衣。拜会公私单位都得先订约会。虽然丹麦人已经是斯堪的纳维亚人中最轻松的,但是,丹麦商人在工作时间内仍然十分严肃,态度保守、认真。进出其办公室时,勿忘握手为礼。销售态度最好采取较温和的姿态。 应邀到对方家中做客,一定要带花去,最好先遣人送去。务必准时赴约。 在北欧三国,流传着这么一句话:‘挪威人先思考,接着,瑞典人加以制造,然后,丹麦人负责推销。’的确,挪威人是着重理论,善于理出体系,而富于创造性的。瑞典人则善于应用,而精于产业化。至于丹麦人则善于推销,在商业方面表现出色。     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

埃及按照埃及的商务礼俗,宜随时穿着保守式样西装。拜访需先订约会。埃及人对专访的客人甚表重视,即使是不速之客,他们也会予以迎迓。一笔生意洽谈,往往需要很长的时间。在埃及,持用有阿拉伯文对照之名片,颇有帮助。当地两、三天内即可印妥。 埃及商人时间观念较差,常常不依照所约定的时间行事。但埃及人很勤劳。     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

秘鲁按照秘鲁的商务习惯和礼俗,随时宜穿保守式样西装。访问公、私机构均须先订约会,并且不要迟到。     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

沙特阿拉伯 沙特阿拉伯王国是政教合一的君主制国家。伊斯兰教教规在沙特的实施比其他任何阿拉伯国家都要严格,沙特社会的风俗习惯也突出地表明这个国家宗教信仰的程度。 一、沙特阿拉伯人崇尚白色(象征纯洁),绿色(象征生命),忌用黄色(象征死亡)。 二、沙特没有旅游业。境内不准开设酒吧、舞厅、夜总会或其他娱乐     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

挪威位于北欧斯堪的纳维亚半岛的西北部,是一个风光旖旎的国家,每年都吸引了大量的外国游客。 挪威全国面积三十八万六千九百七十五平方公里,全国人口四百二十万,百分之九十八为挪威人,属日耳曼族。官方语言为挪威语,英语也可以通行。居民百分之九十四信奉基督教。首都奥斯陆(Oslo),是挪威最大的港口,进口商品的半数都经由此地。     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

希腊按照希腊的商务礼俗,宜穿着保守式样夏季薄料西装。只有在造访政府机关或工厂时,才需要先订约会。希腊商人富有幽默感,爱说笑。在当地谈生意,免不了得陪着喝浓厚的希腊咖啡以及希腊烈酒。如果贸然拒绝,会被视为对对方的羞辱。希腊人习惯吃酒餐,喜清淡口味,不爱油腻。他们往往爱吃干炸的食品,如:干炸鸡、鸭、鱼、虾等。也爱吃带甜浇汁的菜肴,如:糖醋鱼、糖醋排骨、糖醋里脊、古老肉等。一年四季都十分喜爱饮冰水。 希腊人对其多彩多姿的历史、古遗迹,以及哲学、艺术、政治对人类的影响,深以为傲。对于同样有着悠久历史的中国,希腊人颇有好感。但是,少谈希腊今天的国内政治,以及希腊和塞浦路斯的关系,以免使自己陷入失言的困境。 按希腊的商业习惯,夏季(5月—10月)期间,很多     

各国商务礼俗撷萃

阿根廷 阿根廷为南美第二大国。按照该国的礼俗,从事商务活动时,男士必须穿保守式样西装。阿根廷人经常以服装观人,如果你穿得衣履不整,他们就认为你这个人并不正派。因此,外国人因商务到阿根廷的公司或机关访问,私事到客商家庭拜访,甚至到餐厅吃晚饭,男士都必须西装革履,整整齐     

Transparency and special interests

In this paper opposing lobbies influence a politician via contributions. Society may grant access to decision relevant information. Transparency maximizes welfare if the lobbies have a similar size. Secrecy is optimal if their size is comparable, but not too similar.     

Chinese interests in the global investment regime

China is rising as a major source of outward direct investment (ODI), but barriers to and protectionism against Chinese investment have been strengthened as well. This situation reflects inherent flaws in the architecture governing international investment. This article identifies three of China’s key interests in the global investment regime: (1) to reduce investment barriers and depoliticize foreign regulatory review processes; (2) to ensure better protection of its overseas investment; and (3) to secure international recognition of its unique identity in terms of institutional characteristics and development strategy. As China shows more and more interest in building the architecture governing international investment, we suggest that improving investment governance at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels is the best strategy for China to adopt. Strategies that China should pursue include (1) accelerating the negotiation and revision of bilateral investment treaties (BITs); (2) promoting regional and sub-regional cooperation; and (3) contributing to the architecture governing global investment.     

Signaling and mediation in games with common interests

Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a means of correlation.Different information structures induce different outcomes. An information structure is better than another, with respect to a certain solution concept, if the highest solution payoff it induces is at least that induced by the other structure. This paper characterizes the situation where one information structure is better than another with respect to various solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, strategic-normal-form correlated equilibrium, agent-normal-form correlated equilibrium and belief-invariant Bayesian solution. These solution concepts differ from one another in the scope of communication allowed between the players. The characterizations use maps that stochastically translate signals of one structure to signals of another.     

Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets

This paper reviews and synthesizes some of what is now known about what I will call two-sided matching markets. A number of such models, which arise naturally in the study of certain labor markets, have been shown to have surprising implications about the common and conflicting interests of the agents and about the incentives they face.     

论经济的利益本质

经济概念已经跨越了原来的物质财富层面,财富、制度、权力、荣誉、地位、能力、知识、符号、象征等等,都扭合在了一起,被赋予了经济的意义.这些被赋予了的经济意义的存在,其共同点就在于它们都是以利益为本质的对象性的存在;同时这种存在又必须放在人类实践活动的过程中来理解.这样我们才能对稀缺、最大化、效率以及选择性等问题有一个真切的理解.     

The self and its interests in classical political economy

Because economic affairs involve individual action, they must be understood on the basis of a theory which is both subjective, depending on a conception of individual decision-making and especially private interest, and objective, demonstrating how the objective forces of a system of interaction including a system of production and reproduction shape outcomes of individual action. Economic theory, then, requires a conception of the individual agent or subject of economic activity. In this essay, I explore this conception as it develops in the classical theory exemplified by the work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx.     

我国失地农民利益受损的制度逻辑

如何通过完善农地制度来保障失地农民的利益事关我国失地农民的生存发展和社会稳定.通过对失地农民利益受损的机理进行剖析发现,集体土地产权模糊、产权缺乏排他性、委托代理问题以及征地制度中存在的公益性用地界限不清等制度性因素共同促成了失地农民利益受损.因此,有效保障我国失地农民的合法权益就要从我国农地制度进一步改革入手,明晰集体土地产权、赋予农民长期的承包经营权、严格区分公益性和经营性用地的界限、构建多层次的失地农民社会保障体系等措施.     

Vested interests, population ageing and technology adoption

Technologies that are used differ vastly across and within countries. It is commonly observed that technologies that would improve productivity are not adopted. This paper explains the failure to adopt new technologies through costs of adoption for people of different age. We set out an overlapping generations model with majority voting that predicts a relationship between the age composition of an economy and economic growth. We also consider the effects of more intense competition on technology adoption.     

Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one. This contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature.