双重委托—代理视角下的金融中介、金融加速器与经济波动的研究

本文在BGG模型基础上,建立了包含企业、金融中介、投资者的双重委托—代理模型,将金融中介纳入信贷市场摩擦的分析框架内。分析了金融中介自身受信贷约束时,其资产净值变化对经济产生的金融加速器效应。得出在双重委托代理的信用契约下,企业外部融资溢价不但受自身资产净值的影响,还受金融中介资产净值的影响。各种外部冲击通过信贷市场中金融中介的传导对经济波动造成进一步放大的效应,经济波动的金融加速器效应在考虑金融中介资产净值的影响后得到了增强。     

双重委托-代理视角下的金融中介、金融加速器与经济波动的研究

本文在BGG模型基础上,建立了包含企业、金融中介、投资者的双重委托一代理模型,将金融中介纳入信贷市场摩擦的分析框架内。分析了金融中介自身受信贷约束时,其资产净值变化对经济产生的金融加速器效应。得出在双重委托代理的信用契约下,企业外部融资溢价不但受自身资产净值的影响,还受金融中介资产净值的影响。各种外部冲击通过信贷市场中金融中介的传导对经济波动造成进一步放大的效应,经济波动的金融加速器效应在考虑金融中介资产净值的影响后得到了增强。     

Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment

Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.     

Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account

This paper analyzes how the way emission permits are traded—their market microstructure—affects the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets. Market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting an ask price and a bid price. The possibility of bank permits is also introduced in our dynamic two‐period model. We consider two models whether the market makers are perfectly informed about the technology of the producers or not. When the market makers have complete information, the equilibrium price of permits is the same as if the market is walrasian. When they are imperfectly informed, they may set a positive spread between bid and ask permit prices, which creates some inefficiency as the marginal abatement costs of polluters do not equalize. By allowing more flexibility in the use of the permits, banking may reduce the spread. Moreover, it may introduce price rigidities due to intertemporal arbitrage. In this framework, the circumstances under which banking should be allowed or not depend crucially on the evolution of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.     

CROSS‐COUNTRY EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION SPILLOVERS TO FORMAL AND INFORMAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Using cross‐country data this paper examines the spillovers of corruption to formal and informal entrepreneurship in neighboring countries. Whereas research has shown that entrepreneurs move underground to escape corruption, we argue that entrepreneurs may also seek refuge in neighboring countries. Indeed, the empirical results show that in response to a ceteris paribus increase in corruption in neighboring countries formal entrepreneurship increases in the home country with no effect on informal entrepreneurship. This is consistent with entrepreneurs circumventing corrupt public officials by immigrating to countries with presumably less corruption. These results withstand a battery of robustness checks. (JEL D73, L26)     

Endogenous growth cycles with financial intermediaries and entrepreneurial innovation

This study analyzes the effects of financial intermediaries’ activities on economic fluctuations in a model of endogenous innovation cycles. In the model, I consider an economy in which entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries engage in their respective innovative activities. Entrepreneurs can invent new products and raise funds for their invention from financial intermediaries and if their invention is successful, they can produce new products. Only financial intermediaries can evaluate entrepreneurial ideas regarding their new products. Moreover, they can invest their capital to improve information about the entrepreneurial ideas and thus, meet successful entrepreneurs with a higher probability. I show that when an economy does not accumulate enough capital, and the level of financial innovation is not sufficiently high, the economy is trapped in a no-entrepreneurial innovation regime. I also show that when the financial innovation slightly develops, the economy fluctuates between the no-entrepreneurial innovation and entrepreneurial innovation regimes.     

税收、收入不平等和内生经济增长

企业家(通过金融中介)从家庭借贷来支撑创新。二者在企业家的努力不为外人所见的情形下双方签订信用合同分享创新带来的垄断利润(即蛋糕)。两个有代表性经济人(企业家和家庭)的存在允许人们在内生经济增长模型里研究收入不平等。本文研究发现,企业家分配份额的增加一开始会提升增长速度,但是过了一定值后会拉低增长速度;而该份额的增加一直拉大企业家和工人间的收入差距。所以降低企业家获得的蛋糕的份额的分配改革可缩小收入差距。提高企业家来自创新的收入的税率将降低他们的努力程度,从而降低增长速度,但是该税率的提高有助于降低收入不平等程度。存款收入的税率提高尽管不会改变企业家的努力程度,但是也会降低经济增长速度,而且不会降低收入不平等(如果工人有一定比例的存款)。对于劳动收入(工人工资)的税率增加会加剧工人和企业家间的收入不平等,但对经济增长速度没有影响。     

Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets.     

Monetary–fiscal interactions with endogenous liquidity frictions

I develop a tractable macro model with endogenous asset liquidity to understand monetary–fiscal interactions with liquidity frictions. Agents face idiosyncratic investment risks and meet financial intermediaries in competitive search markets. Asset liquidity is determined by the search friction and the cost of operating the financial intermediaries, and it drives the financing constraints of entrepreneurs (those who have investment projects) and their ability to invest. In contrast to private assets, government bonds are fully liquid and can be accumulated in anticipation of future opportunities to invest. A higher level of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs׳ portfolios and raises investment. However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures: a higher level of distortionary taxation and/or a higher real interest rate. A long-run optimal supply of government debt emerges. I also show that a proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies can avoid a deep financial recession.     

Asymmetry in Price Transmission in Agricultural Markets

This paper explores the asymmetries in price transmission from international to local markets. We expect the presence of large intermediaries in agricultural markets to lead to a stronger price transmission when international prices decline than when they rise. The empirical evidence confirms the presence of asymmetric price transmission consistent with the presence of large intermediaries with monopsony power.     

密封价格拍卖或招标中的有限腐败

本文研究了密封价格拍卖或招投标中的有限腐败问题,探讨了当行贿者通过行贿招标主持人获得多次出标机会,而其他竞标者不知道这种有限腐败行为时,对拍卖结果所产生的影响。在第二价格拍卖机制下,由于竞标者按真实估价报价总是弱占优策略,该有限腐败行为在此拍卖机制下不会产生影响。但对于密封的第一价格拍卖机制来说,由于行贿者的多个标价中的最高标价比其他竞标者的标价更强势(aggressive),导致其他竞标者获胜的概率减少,行贿者获胜的概率增加。而行贿者的其他出标机会所用的出标策略比其他竞标者的出标策略要弱势,所以在保证期望收益增加的情况下所付出的期望支付有可能比在没有腐败情形下的期望支付要低。特别地,当行贿者获得更多的出标机会时所采用的出标策略与我们的直觉是有差异的。有限腐败对于物品所有者来说是不利的,他的期望收益随着行贿者的特权的增强而减少。     

POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

Some effects of business environment on retail firms

This paper empirically tests how formal retail entrepreneurs’ perception about the business environment in Cameroon affects the performance of the retail sector. I use business owners’ responses from the 2009 Enterprise Survey to estimate an econometric model that corrects for heteroscedasticity. The results show that regulation costs, corruption, credit constraints, and lack of infrastructure negatively affect the gross margins of firms. In contrast, the competition of the informal sector – perceived by many formal entrepreneurs as a major constraint – is positively associated with the gross margins of formal firms. Policy implications are discussed.     

Entrepreneurial competition and its impact on the aggregate economy

This paper models entrepreneurship as the entrepreneur’s information processing activity in order to predict changes in demand and reallocate resources. The results show that allocative efficiency—and therefore aggregate productivity—increases through intensified competition by entrepreneurs grasping at opportunities. This fierce competition leads to price reductions that result in the improvement of measured aggregate productivity. The price reduction also forces relatively less able entrepreneurs to become workers. As resources are then dealt with only by relatively talented entrepreneurs, this selection effect also increases aggregate productivity. The paper also discusses how the selection effect influences the distribution of firm size.      

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

How to explain carbon price using market micro-behaviour?

In this article, we analyse the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies and financial intermediaries in the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) and their influence on carbon prices. Based on the full-sample community independent transaction log (CITL), the micro-behaviours can be observed in a closed system. The micro-behaviours of the emitting companies are divided into ‘compliance trading’ and ‘non-compliance trading’ based on the emitting companies’ trading motivations. The micro-behaviours of the financial intermediaries are measured by their influence on the total supply and demand in the market. Then, an AR-GARCH model is established to examine the dynamic relationships between carbon prices and the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies and financial intermediaries. The estimation results suggest that the prices–behaviours relationship is significant. Other important findings are as follows: (1) the mean value of carbon prices positively depends on the compliance trading of the emitting companies and the micro-behaviours of the financial intermediaries; (2) non-compliance buying increases the volatility of carbon prices, while the non-compliance selling stabilizes it and (3) the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies in the lower 50% in terms of emission levels have no significant influence on the mean carbon price, but their non-compliance buying stabilizes the carbon price.     

资源配置和产出效应:金融腐败的宏观经济成本

本文根据对Solow Swan模型和Ramsey模型的修订 ,把金融腐败引入生产函数和效用函数 ,研究金融腐败的宏观经济后果 ,提出四个基本结论。第一 ,金融机构通过寻租制造稀缺 ,从而扭曲了资源价格 ,导致了资源错误配置 ,由此造成金融资源使用效率的低下 ;第二 ,腐败程度与产出水平存在拉弗曲线关系 ,或者说 ,产出水平与融资腐败程度存在多重均衡 (multipleequilibria) ,融资腐败取决于经济发展中的资金需求程度和资金的稀缺性 ;第三 ,融资腐败是一种转移支付 ,是金融机构或监管部门直接或间接攫取实体经济部门的产出收益 ,这似乎是一个零和博弈 ,但是实际情况远较此复杂。由于这种转移支付的存在 ,资金市场面临进一步的短缺 ,出现“利率偏离实体经济需求的反常抬升”。因此 ,金融腐败是制造稀缺的行为 ;第四 ,我们证明了这样一个事实———由于金融腐败的存在 ,一般宏观经济学假定的从储蓄到投资的瞬间平滑过程是不符合实际情况的 ,由此才可以解释我国金融领域一个怪异而又为大家习以为常的现象 :一方面是储蓄存款余额的迅速攀升 ,另一方面是从城镇到农村持续存在的贷款难问题。     

Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions

In this paper we theoretically analyse effects of corruption in public procurements within a scoring-auction framework. A corrupt politician, who acts on behalf of the public sector, receives a kickback from the winning bidder. The politician selects the scoring rule. The paper shows that such corruption always leads to lower quality and lower price. Given a level of corruption, a higher bargaining power of the politician in extracting bribes does not affect the quality but leads to higher price.     

Credit Supply and Demand and Business Investment

Abstract
The article explores the lending behaviour of financial intermediaries over the business cycle in the light of theories emphasising agency costs. During a credit crunch loans from financial intermediaries are unobtainable at any price, and so credit may have a causal influence over economic activity. Tests of this do not find evidence of credit constraints following financial deregulation. However, since both loan supply and demand are driven by forward-looking variables, business credit is a useful leading indicator of nominal investment .