Men, women, and competition: An experimental test of behavior

This study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). We test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards. In the winner-take-all (WTA) condition, only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment ($4.50). In the graduated tournament condition, the same payment ($4.50) was divided among the first, second, and third finishers in the tournament. In the WTA condition, men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women. In addition, a clear sorting effect occurs in the WTA condition. In early rounds of the WTA condition, male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants. However, the difference disappears over time. After controlling for forecasting skill, gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the WTA condition. However, lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry. In the graduated tournament, the situation was reversed. Men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates, even after controlling for skill. Forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament. While the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant, the men entered at much higher rates. As a consequence, men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

Does peer group size influence social preferences and risk taking?

This paper examines whether the ex post relative payoffs of peers as well as the size of the peer group impact an agent's willingness to take risks. For example, persons in a flood plain may be less likely to purchase flood insurance if their neighbors also refrain from purchasing. We generalize the Fehr‐Schmidt (1999) model to allow the intensity of the social preferences to vary with the size of the peer group. Our experiment tests whether subjects are more or less likely to choose a lottery over a fixed payment when others have been assigned either the same lottery or the fixed payment. Using both between and within subject designs, we find risk‐taking behaviour is not responsive to the risks faced by others regardless of the size of peer group.     

Payment choice in international trade: Theory and evidence from cross‐country firm‐level data

When trading across borders, firms choose between different payment contracts. Theoretically, this should allow firms to trade‐off differences in financing costs and enforcement across countries. This paper provides evidence for this hypothesis employing firm‐level data from a large number of developing countries. As predicted, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the theory and also show empirically that the more complex an industry is, the more important is contract enforcement and the less important are financing costs for the contract choice.     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Eliciting Individual Discount Rates

Controlled laboratory conditions using monetary incentives have been utilized in previous studies that examine individual discount rates, and researchers have found several apparently robust anomalies. We conjecture that subject behavior in these experiments may be affected by (uncontrolled) factors other than discount rates. We address some experimental design issues and report a new series of experiments designed to elicit individual discount rates. Our primary treatments include: (i) informing subjects of the annual and effective interest rates associated with alternative payment streams, and (ii) informing subjects of current market interest rates. We also test for the effect of real (vs. hypothetical) payments and for the effect of delaying both payment options (vs. offering an immediate payment option). The statistical analysis uses censored data techniques to account for the interactions between field and lab incentives. Each of the information treatments appears to reduce revealed discount rates. When both types of information are provided, annual rates in the interval of 15%–17.5% are revealed, whereas rates of 20%–25% are revealed in the control session. Each of the treatments also lowers the residual variance of subject responses.     

The optimality of nominal contracts

Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version: February 25, 1997     

Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size

I develop a model of credit rationing with effort unobservable by lenders where borrowers can choose among projects of different riskiness. In such a set-up rationing that can be relaxed if borrowers put up physical collateral arises. Group lending proves to be a possible means to relax rationing and improve efficiency when physical collateral is not available. The optimal size of groups is here analysed as a function of social factors. It turns out that groups can be neither too small nor too large because in both cases the effectiveness of social sanctions on behaviour is too low to offset the negative effect on effort due to profit sharing and free riding. Individual sensitivity to social sanctions is the crucial element determining whether groups can be formed or not.     

On the complementarity of money and credit

I propose a model where agents choose to conduct their business using two payment instruments, money and bilateral credit. A friction in the timing of transactions rationalizes the use of both instruments and makes it optimal for agents to use money as a means of settlement for credit. Money and credit complement each other. With anticipated inflation, complementarity implies that the credit to money ratio decreases with inflation.     

Selecting successful students? Undergraduate grades as an admission criterion

In Europe’s reformed education system, universities may be forced by law to consider undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) as the primary admission criterion in the selection of graduate students. In this article, we investigate whether UGPA predicts graduate student performance in order to discuss its usefulness as an admission criterion. In our theoretical framework, we show that undergraduate students may choose slower study progress in favour of receiving higher grades and conclude that UGPA is a relatively good (weak) predictor for graduate grade point average (study progress). Having data from a cohort of students whose selection was in clear conflict with the legal requirement, we empirically confirm our theoretical predictions by exploiting a unique opportunity for assessing educational policies. Discussion of our findings leads to some important conclusions concerning the Bologna reforms and the lawmakers’ idea of giving some independence to universities, but not too much of it.     

诺莫网络视角下产学研主体间知识共享与知识隐匿关系研究

以诺莫网络为主导逻辑,分析了产学研主体间知识共享与知识隐匿的关系,从知识、主体和环境3个层面选取6个前因变量,用知识粘性代表知识层,主体层包括自我效能、组织自尊和元胜任力,环境层包括组织心理所有权和差序氛围,用产学研知识溢出作为近果变量。采用Projection Pursuit和多元层次回归对构建的诺莫网络理论框架进行了实证分析,运用Mackinnon、Sobel检验和Multivariate Delta Method验证了多重中介效应。结果表明,知识共享与知识隐匿是两个相互独立的构念,知识共享与知识隐匿在前因变量与近果变量间有多重中介效应。     

地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究

地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行十年来的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为：事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移,地方政府级次过多与”倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移,转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此,我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。     

地方政府投资中的冲动与拖延——中国经济过热的一个行为经济学解释

我国地方政府由于任期制等原因而形成"短视"认知偏差,过分注重项目的短期收益状况,从而会表现出对能带来大量即期收益的"政绩工程"类项目的投资冲动和对需要大量即期成本支付的环保类项目的投资拖延。以此可以部分地解析地方政府过度投资在我国历次经济过热中的作用机制。绿色GDP的提倡和一票否决制度作为中央政府对地方政府投资的反偏差干预手段,也可在此框架内得到统一的逻辑解释。     

转移支付的类型、资金分配结构与财政均等化绩效——来自我国的省际经验分析

笔者通过对中国3大类转移支付:税收返还、财力性转移支付和专项转移支付的财政均等化绩效进行分析,指出不同类型的转移支付由于政策设计初衷和运作机理不同,实现财政均等化的绩效也有所不同。而且,地区分配结构也是影响转移支付财政均等化绩效的重要因素。因此,构建合理的转移支付制度,不仅需要对现有的转移支付的类型结构进行调整,而且还有必要进一步完善各类补助资金的地区分配结构。     

Insurance,self-control,and contract flexibility

We study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures. When contracts are long-term and inflexible, such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low-risk consumers. The competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs. Sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low-risks. Naive consumers choose the same tariff, but later switch to full insurance, and become high-risks. If there are sufficiently many naive consumers, they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers (so that high-risks subsidize low-risks). In contrast, there are no such transfers when contracts are short-term. The model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements.     

中国养老金隐性债务规模估算

随着我国养老保险体制的转轨,现收现付制下形成的隐性债务开始显性化,形成了庞大的统筹资金缺口.而解决养老金隐性债务的基本前提是要准确测算债务规模.本文在分析隐性债务来源的基础上,将我国参保职工分为五类,采取个体成本法精算出2008年初的养老金隐性债务规模.     

高校校风中应高扬“健康消费”之旗——以广州高校为中心

当代大学生消费出现新特征：电子结算成为新宠;消费多元化;理性消费占主流;时尚和名牌是永恒的话题与追求。同时出现消费偏颇：储蓄观念淡薄;＂财商＂水平低下;消费结构欠妥,女生更为突出;消费差距拉大,出现两极分化;过分追求名牌与时尚,存在攀比心理等。健康消费习惯一旦养成,有利于形成文明校风,更利于大学生今后的事业与人生。     

财政均等化:模式选择与真实度量

财政均等化一般有水平公平均等化与财政能力均等化两种模式,而中国在特殊国情约束下应选择财政能力均等化作为财政均等化的模式。以此为基础,度量中国财政均等化的真实水平,发现省际间与上下级政府间财力分配不均衡显著,主要原因是转移支付的财力均等化效果不理想。据此,提升财政均等化水平,促进公共服务均等化的政策建议为:改革现行转移支付的类型结构和地区分配结构;明确各级政府的均等化公共服务责任;构建各级政府的均等化财力分配格局。     

Distributional role of monetary policy under limited credit access

The paper explores the redistributive effects of a monetary policy shock in a limited participation framework with limited credit access. Expansionary monetary policy redistributes consumption from traders to non-traders. This redistribution is the largest when only financial market participants have a choice between multiple means of payments while non-participants do not. Welfare analysis reveals that the effectiveness of monetary policy on the economy is the greatest when all agents (financial market participants and nonparticipants) can choose from alternative means of payment in a financially segmented model. The model is calibrated to the US economy for quantitative analysis.     

Urban Crime and Labor Mobility

Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high‐cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low‐cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided.