The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.     

Credible delegation

We show that the vertical delegation of decision-making authority to agent firms can act as a credible strategic commitment even when contracts are unobservable (or renegotiable) if and only if multilateral delegation is combined with decentralized ownership of the agent firms. In this case, the possibility of renegotiation of other agents’ contracts constrains the set of contracts acceptable to each agent. Delegation may induce more or less aggressive behavior, depending on the nature of within-structure competition among the agent firms. Thus, delegation may be a valuable, credible strategic commitment mechanism when strategies are either substitutes or complements.     

Do the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s and Gibrat’s laws?

We examine whether the size distribution and the growth process of the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law. The parametric results of the size distribution analysis reject Zipf’s law for all sample sizes and also show the Zipf exponent systematically declines as the sample size increases. The growth process analysis confirms Gibrat’s law and yields a local Zipf exponent of one for cities with a normalized population less than 0.53%, which includes about 95% of the total observations. The deviations from Zipf’s law occur at the extreme upper tail and are likely a result of restricted mobility of population across countries. However, given that Gibrat’s law holds, we can expect the size distribution to converge to Zipf’s law with a decline in the barriers to immigration.     

A systems approach to policy analysis and development planning: Construction sector in the Turkish 5-year development plans

In this study, we propose a new model for systems analysis ‘of’ policy and systems analysis ‘for’ policy with the example of construction sector in the Turkish 5-year development plans.Our proposed model—integrated development management model (IDMM)—is conceptually based on the principles of systems thinking and integrated management approach.We present and discuss the results of our work in which we extracted all construction-related policies and strategies from eight 5-year development plans and analyzed them using the IDMM. In the light of the analyses, we give several answers to the question: “Why did the development plans fail to meet their targets in Turkey?” We propose that any development plan has to have claritas-unitas-integritas-consonantia between the management levels (normative, strategic, and operational) and components (goals, structures, and behavior) of IDMM.The paper is the first work that brings the concepts of development planning and foresight together. In a complementary stance, the time of integrating foresight and development planning has come.     

Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo; the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.     

Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents’ individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents’ contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.     

Response Strategies and Learning in Discrete Choice Experiments

This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments. Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent induce strategic behaviour. We find evidence that strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents affect choice decisions (strategic response). The results suggest, however, that respondents may solely respond to high cost rather than low cost inconsistencies. That is, respondents are more cost sensitive, and thus have a lower willingness to pay (WTP), if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a lower cost than if it was not. Yet, the cost sensitivity, and thus WTP, remains unaffected if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a higher cost. Our findings further indicate that cost sensitivity increases (and thus WTP decreases), when respondents progress through the choice task, with this increase (decrease) lessening as more choice questions are answered. Possible explanations are value learning and strategic learning.     

Exports,capabilities, and industrial policy in India

An extensive literature argues that India’s manufacturing sector has underperformed, and that the country has failed to industrialize; in particular, it has failed to take advantage of its labor–abundant comparative advantage. India’s manufacturing sector is smaller as a share of GDP than that of East Asian countries, even after controlling for GDP per capita. Hence, its contribution to overall GDP growth is modest. Without greater participation of the secondary sector, the argument goes, the country will not be able to develop and become a modern economy. Standard arguments blame the “license-permit raj”, the small-scale industrial policy, and the labor laws. All these were part of the industrial policy regime instituted after independence. This regime favored the heavy-machinery subsector. We argue that despite its shortcomings and misallocations, the bias towards machinery, metals, chemicals, and other capital- and skilled labor-intensive products allowed Indian manufacturing to accumulate a wide range of capabilities. We show that India’s manufacturing sector is more diversified and sophisticated than one would expect given the country’s income per capita. This positions India well to continue expanding its exports of other sophisticated products. India’s failure, however, lies in not being able to diversify into labor-intensive sectors and generate the type of structural transformation seen in China.     

Time inconsistency and retirement planning

We quantify the welfare gains from better retirement planning using a model in which retirement planning is time inconsistent. A modest increase in a household’s planning horizon by just a few years generates large aggregate and individual welfare gains.     

Persuasion,binary choice,and the costs of dishonesty

We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert’s preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

Shopping hours and price competition

This paper develops an argument why retail prices may rise in response to the deregulation of opening hours. We make this point in a model of imperfect duopolistic competition. In a deregulated market retailers view the choice of opening hours as a means to increase the degree of perceived product differentiation thus relaxing price competition. If the consumers’ preference intensity for time is sufficiently high the equilibrium configuration has asymmetric shopping hours where one retailer stays open for longer than the other. Both retailers charge higher prices than under regulation, and both are strictly better off.     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games

We present a theory of rationality in dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents’ utility functions. The theory is based upon the following three principles: (1) the players’ initial beliefs about the opponents’ utilities should agree on some profile u of utility functions, (2) every player should believe, at each of his information sets, that his opponents are carrying out optimal strategies and (3) a player at information set h should not change his belief about an opponent's ranking of strategies a and b if both a and b could have led to h. Scenarios with these properties are called preference conjecture equilibria for the profile u of utility functions. We show that every normal form proper equilibrium for u induces a preference conjecture equilibrium for u, thus implying existence of preference conjecture equilibrium.     

A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.     

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved. This optimality, however, comes at the expense of plausibility: (i) the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders' beliefs about each other's value/cost; (ii) a trader may suffer a loss ex post; (iii) the mechanism may run a surplus/deficit ex post. We compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism.     

Collectively foreseeing future issues: Prospective strategy contributes to the Agriculture and Food Systems' ‘Futures Studies’ Club

The Agriculture and Food Systems' ‘Futures Studies’ Club, created in 1995 and spearheaded by BASF Agro France is in its 15th year. The Club has become a regular meeting place for the players of the agricultural and agri-food systems from the farmer to the consumer and a place to debate about their societal issues. It has addressed a dozen subjects of futures studies since it was created in 1995.BASF Agro France and the Club's members, mainly the company's clients, aim to understand and anticipate the changes that might in the future affect the agricultural world and the players of the agribusiness sector: suppliers, distributors, agri-food business, and retailers.To that end, free dialogue and debate between members in an atmosphere of mutual trust were strongly encouraged, which guaranteed the richness of the discussions and the pertinence of the wrap-ups and the conclusions drawn from them. Appropriate tools from what can be called prospective strategy or strategic prospective (coming from the French school of stratégie prospective) are used to reach a valid conclusion through a crystal clear group process.Members of the Club bear witness to the input and benefits gained by participating in the Club: prioritising issues, confronting and validating ideas, possible response leads, operational added value, whether to consider strategy or management. BASF Agro France follows through on the direct and operational conclusions, feeding its strategy, projects and programs, for example by contributing to a corporate vision which fully integrates sustained development.     

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents’ types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ?>0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are nearly truthful.     

Information and strategic voting

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the preference distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.