Multimarket contact of US newspaper chains: circulation competition and market coordination

Post-war ownership consolidation and acquisition in the US newspaper industry has given rise to extensive market contact amid the remaining chains. This paper studies the impact of this industrial structure on local daily newspaper competition. It seeks to examine whether multimarket contact (MMC) between two newspaper chains can facilitate coordinating exclusive circulation areas for their respective newspapers in proximate circulation markets. Econometric results indicate a strong linkage between the MMC variable and reduced circulation competition for 218 papers in the midwest US. Advertising prices are found to be significantly higher with MMC newspapers.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET QUALITY ECONOMICS*

This study is based on my observation that high quality markets are indispensable for the healthy growth of a modern economy. Many problems surrounding markets are attributable to the lack of high quality markets. An industrial revolution creates extremely vibrant but unhealthy markets. This study introduces a concept of fairness in dealing and pricing (competitive fairness), which differs from efficiency, and defines market quality as a measure for the efficiency of allocation and the fairness of dealing and pricing. This study shows that competitive fairness is achieved by several market mechanisms that I constructed in my previous work.     

Trading platform,market volatility and pricing efficiency in the floor-traded and E-mini index futures markets

This study examines the pricing efficiency of E-mini and floor-traded index futures under electronic versus open-outcry trading platforms. By using OLS and quantile regressions to control for changes in market characteristics, we find that pricing errors are smaller in the E-mini markets than the floor-traded markets, thereby confirming that electronic trading has special attractions for arbitrageurs and informed traders. However, during periods of higher volatility, the advantages of speedier execution, anonymity and information efficiency may be offset by arbitrage risks; as a result, larger pricing errors are observed in the E-mini markets. We provide new evidence confirming the important roles in pricing efficiency played by both traditional open-outcry systems and electronic trading systems.     

Do expert reviews affect the decision to see motion pictures in movie theatres? An experimental approach

The positive correlation between favourable expert reviews and the economic success of motion pictures suggests that potential moviegoers are encouraged to see a particular movie by the good reviews it has received. Yet experimental evidence on actual consumers is mixed as to whether or not this is the case. Against this background, we examine the relationship between movie critics’ reviews and the decision to see motion pictures in movie theatres. Based on an experimental approach using four treatments – no review, a poor/OK minus review, an OK/OK plus review and a very good review – movie-seeing decisions for seven movie genres are examined. What we find is at odds with experimental studies, yielding as they do mixed results for the association between favourable reviews and movie preference. Seemingly unrelated regressions consistently show that the better the expert review of a movie, the more likely it is that people will see it. Yet the magnitude of the effects of expert reviews appears both somewhat genre specific and gender specific.     

Intermediaries,transport costs and interlinked transactions

Farmers in developing countries often encounter difficulties selling their products on local markets. Inadequate transport infrastructure in rural areas and large distances between areas of production and consumption mean that farmers find it costly to bring their produce to the market and this very often results in small net margins and poverty among farmers who are geographically isolated. Agriculture in developing countries is characterized by the presence of intermediaries that have a cost advantage over farmers. Because of their market power, these intermediaries are able to impose interlinked contracts and are free to choose the spatial pricing policy they use. In this paper, we develop a model of input–output interlinked contracts between an intermediary and geographically dispersed farmers. We establish when the intermediary uses either uniform or mill pricing policies, as opposed to spatial discriminatory pricing. For each pricing policy, we analyze what the welfare implications are in terms of an increase in farmers' income and a reduction in poverty in rural areas. We also establish how the choice of a spatial pricing policy impacts geographically isolated farmers and how it influences the participation by farmers.     

The Neuer Markt is Dead. Long Live the Neuer Markt!

News reports of the potential consolidation of financial markets in Europe and the United States invite an analysis of the economic impact of such mergers. Yet, most scholarly discussion of these issues has revolved around a view of markets as efficient providers of capital and has ignored the issue of information transmission which Hayek argues is more important. Germany's Neuer Markt closed at the end of 2002 and the resulting transfer of securities to the larger Frankfurt exchange provides a unique opportunity to examine the informational impact of market consolidation. The results suggest that the closure of the Neuer Markt has resulted in a loss in the pricing transparency of Neuer Markt securities which has implications for the current debate.The author acknowledges the College of Wooster's leave program for support of this research and wishes to thank Professors Holzmüller and Grünzweig of the Universität Dortmund for their encouragement during his time there. This paper has benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee whom the author also thanks.     

INCOME DISPERSION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Abstract.  This paper analyses the effects of inter-market and intra-market income heterogeneities on output and social welfare under uniform pricing and differential pricing regimes by considering a finite number of markets. We first derive the linear demand curve in each market under plausible conditions, and then show that more markets (and consumers) are excluded under uniform pricing the higher are the inter-market income differences. We also show that adding markets, even of lower income levels than those of existing markets, helps to decrease prices and thus cause more markets to be served. Implications of intra-market income dispersion are also explored.     

Can industry regulators learn collusion structures from information-efficient asset markets?

This note combines a dynamic industrial organization model, in which an industry is subject to exogenous processes of market-size and collusion structure, with a consumption-based asset pricing model for the shares in the industry’s firms. Three main findings emerge for our model under the assumption of information-efficient asset markets. First, the volatility of a firm’s share price is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s market-size. Second, the volatility of a firm’s price-dividend ratio is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s collusion structure whereby high (resp. low) ratios indicate less (resp. more) collusion. Third, for non-volatile collusion structures the price-dividend ratio is constant across different collusion structures.     

Art in Africa: Hedonic price analysis of the South African fine art auction market, 2009–2014

Real asset markets are characterized by illiquidity and heterogeneous assets, presenting challenges to price estimators. Use of a new dataset of 7,553 auction fine art lots brought to market in South Africa, for 2009–14, allows us to examine the full sales hedonic price estimator over a wide set of characteristics. Results validate full sale hedonic pricing: Identities of artists, medium and genre, dating characteristics, and physical characteristics of artwork are significant. External validity of hedonic pricing is supported by out-of-sample price prediction for 40 individual artists. Auction house catalogue presentation of art work also proves correlated with realized auction prices. Art as an asset finds support: art prices move countercyclically with GDP and domestic equity markets, pro-cyclically with off-shore equity markets, implying a risk diversification role. JEL Codes: D1, L8. Keywords: hedonic price equation, art market, South Africa Word Count: 9467 (including all Tables, Figures, References).     

Multimarket contact and export entry

Despite a well-developed literature on implications of multimarket contact among firms for performance in domestic markets, only recently has theoretical and empirical work turned to similar issues in international trade. In this paper, I consider the possibility that exporters meeting rivals in multiple markets will be reluctant to enter (via exports) the home markets of those rivals. Empirical results using trade data (during 2007–2010) for the fats and oils industry support this hypothesis.     

TO REGULATE OR TO DEREGULATE? THE ROLE OF DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION IN UPSTREAM MONOPOLY VERTICALLY LINKED MARKETS

This paper attempts to cast light to the effect of monopoly regulation in Cournot markets compared to its effect in Bertrand markets. To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream regulated natural monopoly is trading via two‐part tariff contracts with a downstream duopoly. Combining our results to those of the existing literature on deregulated markets, we argue that when the downstream competition is in prices, efficiency dictates regulating the monopoly with a marginal cost based pricing scheme. However, this type of regulation leads to significant welfare loss, when the downstream market is characterized by Cournot competition.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

Vertical distribution, parallel trade, and price divergence in integrated markets

We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). The manufacturing firm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing interests: restricting competition in the PI-recipient market, avoiding resource wastes due to actual trade, and reducing the double-markup problem in the PI-source nation. These tradeoffs imply the counterintuitive result that retail prices could diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even as the volume of PI increases. Thus, in some circumstances it may be misleading to think that permitting PI is an unambiguous force for price integration.     

EARTHQUAKE RISKS AND LAND PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO METROPOLITAN AREA*

The current paper empirically addresses risk aversion of households and firms toward earthquake risks using a hazard map compiled for the entire region by the Tokyo metropolitan government in 1998. It finds strong evidence for the impact of earthquake risks on land pricing; land prices have been substantially lower in risky areas than in safe areas. That impact became more evident in the 1990s than in the 1980s, indicating that households and firms were becoming more sensitive to earthquake risks. In addition, this paper carefully examines the consistency of the estimated magnitude of earthquake risk premiums within a framework of the expected utility hypothesis.     

Supply and quality choices in private child care markets: Evidence from São Paulo

Many developing countries have adopted the market approach for expanding the supply of child care, but little is known about the economic behavior of independent providers. Drawing on uniquely rich census data on child care providers from São Paulo, we document three main facts: (1) the stock of private suppliers is considerably larger in high-income city districts; (2) the quality of private provision – as measured by teachers' schooling, group size and equipment – is highly heterogeneous across space and increases systematically with local household income; and (3) a considerable share of centers operates below recommended (but not regulated) quality standards, especially in low-income districts. These findings are consistent with a model of endogenous entry and quality choices by heterogeneous providers. Market-driven heterogeneity in the quality of provision across space is an important consideration for the design of regulations in child care markets.     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry

Abstract. This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize merchandizing surplus. Moreover, we show that a rule of non‐discriminatory pricing would not remedy any of these problems. Hence, to secure the efficiency gains of deregulation, the re‐regulation of the remaining monopolistic core – the electric grid – cannot rely on simple rules like cost‐based non‐discriminatory pricing.     

人民币在岸市场已经是一个 非完全定价中心*

本文的研究结果表明在岸市场依然具有人民币汇率定价中心的性质,主要体现在在岸即期和远期汇率都会对离岸远期汇率的变动有显著的均值溢出效应。而离岸即期市场对在岸即期市场存在较小幅度的均值溢出效应以及三大市场之间已经存在着一定波动和冲击溢出效应,则表明在岸市场已经不是一个完全定价中心。从溢出效应的程度和传递方向来看,稳定在岸人民币汇率定价预期仍然是降低汇率过度波动的关键。