Rationality of inflation–output forecasts of MMS survey: international evidence

We analyse the individual rationality of inflation and output forecasts from Money Market Survey (MMS) for a group of G7 countries and EU under asymmetric univariate Linlin and Linex loss functions. We also test for joint rationality of inflation–output forecasts using the forecast rationality test under multivariate asymmetric loss functions proposed by Ulu (2013). Our results indicate that rationality is often rejected under symmetric loss, and results improve towards rationality when asymmetric loss functions are assumed. The assumption of multivariate asymmetric loss compared to univariate asymmetric loss provides further evidence towards rationality. We also analyse directional forecast accuracy of the inflation and output forecasts and find that the inflation–output forecasts of MMS are valuable when considered both jointly and separately.     

Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas

Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. These findings resemble the high productivity in long-lasting irrigation systems based on self-governance. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group selection that shows that the patterns observed in the field experiments can be evolved in cases where agents participate regularly in less challenging symmetric public good dilemmas. These results indicate that cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can evolve and persist when the agents contend with other social dilemmas than the asymmetric dilemmas.     

Asymmetric reimbursement system in an environmental conflict

This article explores how a fair-minded regulator has to set policy through an asymmetric reimbursement. The lawyer for a citizen group works on a contingent-fee basis, whereas a polluting firm has either in-house legal advice or lawyers on retainer. Under an asymmetric reimbursement rule we show: (i) the case goes to settlement if the objective merits of the case favour the citizen group; (ii) whereas it goes to trial, the probability winning the citizen group has is less than 50%, and the reimbursement policy incurs the total effort in trial to increase if the merits of the case favour the firm.     

发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析

本文构建一个简单的非对称信息模型,分析发展中国家特定的普遍服务问题。在模型中,政府与垄断企业的非对称信息产生于在农村提供服务的边际成本,最优普遍服务政策可以用两种规制手段即资费和网络投资来实现。本文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析,得出的结论是：在实施区别定价时,与完全信息相比,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且减小相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但这是以网络覆盖面积的减小为代价。模型结果还表明,合谋的成胁会弱化企业的激励。有意思的是,在这两种定价机制下,企业和纳税人这两种不同的利益集团均有同规制者合谋的动机。实际上,纳税人利益集团的存在,强化了规制者和企业之间的防止合谋约束,并且为了减少规制者同纳税人利益集团的合谋收益,即使规制者具有高成本信息,也会使配置结果扭曲。     

Effort and performance in group contests

We study contest performance by focusing on the per capita payoffs of the contestants in an important class of asymmetric two-group contests. The group with the higher valuation has a greater chance of winning the contest whenever the rent-seeking technology is increasing and concave. We note that equilibrium efforts and payoffs per capita are uniquely defined and can be subjected to a comparative statics analysis. We show that payoff per capita for a group increases with its own valuation but decreases with the valuation of the opposing group. Per capita payoff for a group increases with its population.     

Can Social Cohesion be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence from Group Lending in Guatemala

The success of group lending in developing countries has been attributed to the ability of the institution to mitigate asymmetric information problems in credit markets. Previous research has offered a number of explanations for this phenomenon: social ties between borrowing group members, internal group pressure to repay loans, and peer monitoring. This research presents empirical tests on borrowing group data from Guatemala which indicate that peer monitoring significantly effects borrowing group performance through stimulating intra-group insurance. Group pressure is found to have a small effect in deterring moral hazard, while the effect of social ties among members is statistically insignificant.     

Group membership,team preferences,and expectations

Group membership is a powerful determinant of social behaviour in a variety of experimental games. Its effect may be channelled primarily via the beliefs of group members, or directly change their social preferences. We report an experiment with a prisoner's dilemma with multiple actions, in which we manipulate players’ beliefs and show that group identity has a consistent positive effect on cooperation only when there is common knowledge of group affiliation. We also test the robustness of the minimal group effect using three different manipulations: one manipulation fails to induce group identity, and we observe an unsystematic effect of group membership when knowledge of affiliation is asymmetric.     

Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (1) asymmetric communication and (2) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously establish communication channels even though they would earn higher payoffs if jointly they chose to restrict within-group communication.     

Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly,efficient outcomes

We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires. We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices. The same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.     

Is the US Consumer Credit Asymmetric?

We investigate the existence of any asymmetric effects in the US consumer credit. In doing so, we utilize the asymmetric cointegration methods proposed by Breitung (2001, 2002) and Enders and Siklos (2001). Furthermore, we tend to explore two additional dimensions in this literature. First, whether asymmetries (if any) are persistent over‐time in the credit demand model. Second, whether the Great recession contributed to any asymmetric impacts on the credit demand. Our results revealed that the long‐run relationship of consumer credit (credit, income, wealth and interest rate on personal loans) is asymmetric. While it is difficult to identify the direct sources of this asymmetric result, our intuition is that it is linked to the structural breaks in the rate of personal loans encountered in the early 1980s. Moreover, we find no strong evidence that much of the asymmetric impacts in consumer credit were experienced in the Great recession. Neither have we attained evidence that asymmetric impacts on credit demand are persistent over‐time.     

Asymmetric J-curve: evidence from industry trade between U.S. and U.K.

ABSTRACT

Previous research that assessed the impact of exchange rate changes on the trade balance between the U.S. and U.K. assumed the effects are symmetric. In this paper, we add to the literature on the asymmetric J-curve phenomenon by considering the trade balance of 68 two-digit industries that trade between the two countries. We find short-run asymmetric effects of the real dollar-pound rate in almost all industries. However, short-run asymmetric effects were translated into significant long-run asymmetric effects in 25 industries. Indeed, the asymmetric J-curve hypothesis was supported in 18 industries.     

Membership in citizen groups

We analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group. However, in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously (returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members), we show that, in the ex-ante optimal contract, offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group, despite the heterogeneity in valuations created.     

我国区域经济非协调发展的内在机理——非平衡发展战略模型的设计与比较

从经济学理论来看,非平衡发展战略取向符合群体福利实现在时间上的先后性和地域上的非均质性.但是,根据非平衡战略主旨设计的非平衡发展战略模型显示:对称补偿型非平衡发展战略能够实现不同阶段社会福利的增加;而非对称补偿型非平衡战略由于补偿环节和转化环节存在内在困境将造成社会福利的降低.因此,由非协调发展向协调发展的路径优化方向是实施以对称补偿和高效财富转化机制为基础的平衡发展战略.     

Political economy,information and incentives

This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups. First, treating politicians as informed supervisors to whom economic policy is delegated we show the usefulness of the separation of powers to increase the transaction costs of collusion, the relevance of asymmetric control for avoiding reciprocal favors. The incompleteness of the constitutional contract leaves discretion to politicians who become residual decision makers. We study the trade-offs between greater efficiency obtained by allowing powerful instruments to politicians and less discretion by restricting on the contrary those instruments. Determinants of those trade-offs are the variability of the environment, the extent of asymmetric information about tastes and technologies and the size of majorities. Finally, we show the new theory of incentives for group behavior can be used to determine the transaction costs of collusion under asymmetric information and to which extent these costs relax the constraints imposed on government by collusive behavior.     

Tail dependence risk exposure and diversification potential of Islamic and conventional banks

This paper undertakes a rolling window comparative analysis of risks for portfolios consisting of GCC Islamic and conventional bank indices. We draw our empirical results by employing canonical, drawable and regular vine copula models, as well as by implementing a portfolio optimization method with a conditional Value-at-Risk constraint. We find evidence of higher riskiness in the group of Islamic banks relative to the group of conventional banks across each of the financial rolling window scenarios under consideration. Specifically, a greater negative (nonlinear) tail asymmetric dependence is observed in the pairs of Islamic banks’ relationships. The results also show that the optimal portfolio model supports a clear preference towards the group of conventional banks in regard to risk minimization and diversification benefits.     

Can asymmetric conditional volatility imply asymmetric tail dependence?

In this article, we investigate two types of asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of conditional volatility and the asymmetry of tail dependence in the crude oil markets. We employ the two different sample datasets in which each dataset covers the time period of stable and unstable oil prices, individually. A variety of different copulas and three asymmetric GARCH regression models are used in order to capture the two types of asymmetries. In particular, we extend the TBL-GARCH model proposed by Choi et al. (2012) to the asymmetric GARCH regression type model. The findings from the two different approaches are congruent, in that there is no asymmetry of tail dependence and no asymmetric conditional volatility in crude oil returns over the two different sample periods. Our study reconfirms the findings of Aboura and Wagner (2016) by showing that asymmetric conditional volatility relates to asymmetric tail dependence.     

A nonlinear approach to the U.S.–Australia commodity trade and the J‐curve: Evidence from 123 industries

The application of nonlinear models and asymmetric analysis have recently proven to yield results that are superior to those of the linear and symmetric analysis. However, the new approaches in testing the J‐curve between Australia and the rest of the world or between Australia and her trading partners such as the United States did not yield any significant outcomes. Suspecting that those results suffer from aggregation bias, we apply new methods to the trade flows of 123 industries that trade between the United States and Australia and give evidence of an asymmetric J‐curve in 28 industries. Furthermore, we find short‐run asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on the trade balance of almost all studies, short‐run impact asymmetric effects in 27 industries and significant long‐run asymmetric effects in 56 industries. Our findings are industry‐specific.     

Trading asymmetric trend and volatility by leverage trend GARCH in Taiwan stock index

This article develops a leverage trend Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model by incorporating asymmetric trend of returns of the exponential autoregressive and asymmetric volatility of GARCH models to study the asymmetric effects. Using in-sample daily data of Taiex over the period 4 January 1980 to 25 August 1997 and postsample daily data over the period 26 August 1997 to 10 September 2007, the evidence reveals that a curvaceous risk–return relationship and both asymmetric volatility and asymmetric trend of returns are significant in Taiex. The episode of asymmetric trend of returns is that the positive information creates a higher return trend than the negative information of the same amount, while similarly to most studies, the evidence of asymmetric volatility appears that the negative information makes a higher volatility than the positive information of the same size. Most remarkably, we evidence that the volatility asymmetry effect is a conservative trading factor and the return trend asymmetry effect is an active trading factor. In comparison of post-sample performance using rolling-window technique, the leverage trend GARCH model indeed outperforms the other three models with single asymmetry adjusted or without asymmetry adjusted, while the asymmetry nonadjusted model performs the worst. It implies that the return trend asymmetry (active trading) and the volatility asymmetry effects (conservative trading) tend to compensate, but not offset each other.     

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without “common values”. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies.     

Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

We investigate simultaneous inter‐ and intra‐group conflict in the shadow of within‐group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group‐conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group‐conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent‐dissipation is non‐monotonic with the within‐group power asymmetry.