The dynamics of distributive politics

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period, a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t + 1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee “impatience”). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.     

Voting by veto

This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.     

The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a proposal. The proposals are joined with the current status quo (or another fallback option). For the second stage, a random mechanism determines the order of voting and the committee members sequentially eliminate one alternative each. After every committee member has exercised her veto, a single winning alternative remains. Game theory predicts that the equality of the resulting distribution under VBV varies with group size. Hence, decisions in two-member groups should result in highly unequal distributions of benefits. With increasing group size, however, VBV should generate more equally distributed outcomes. We examine the effect of group size under VBV in a series of laboratory experiments where groups with a varying number of members play a ‘divide the dollar game’. Our results confirm that larger groups choose more equal distributions than smaller groups. However, we also find deviations from the model's predictions. Some committees in our experiment do not select Pareto-optimal alternatives. An exploratory analysis of possible explanations suggests that individual behavior is most likely motivated by a combination of material self-interest and social preferences such as reciprocity and fairness.     

Central bankers in government appointed committees

I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures. These gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small. The former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government's preferred policy. The latter, meanwhile, implies high probability that a single vote affects policy, making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the Central Bank's reputation through his vote.     

Optimal agenda-setter timing

Abstract .  We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.     

The Rise and Fall of National Allocative Planning in Australia

In 1979 the Australian Labor Party's supreme policy making body, Federal Conference, proposed that a future Labor government embark on an extensive program of economic planning. In addition to continuing Keynesian monetary and fiscal policy, the Conference argued in favour of the introduction of a more comprehensive form of stability planning, or incomes policy; partial allocative, or industry, planning; and a national allocative plan. Since coming to power in 1983, the Federal Government has introduced an incomes policy as well as a number of industry plans. However, it has rejected national allocative planning. In this article we discuss the differences between these forms of economic planning and analyse the reasons which might explain the Government's rejection of national allocative planning.     

Financial Inclusion and Financialization: Latin American Main Trends after the Great Crisis

In recent decades, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have promoted policies and programs for financial inclusion (FI). This article studies the meaning of the inclusion proposal as well as the main results. The most important argument of this policy is the increase of local savings as the basis of investment and growth. Although this objective has not been achieved, inclusion remains a current policy. In reality, FI has been driven by an underlying agenda, as has been the case of other policies from the same sphere of interests that the Washington Consensus authored at the beginning of the 1990s. Although this denomination has been abandoned due to the loss of prestige it has achieved in the region, its main objectives continue to be promoted by many governments. Also, FI has been a vehicle for deepening financialization.     

Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy

The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands     

中国科学院院士遴选效度评价研究

在政策文本内容分析的基础上,明晰中国科学院院士遴选目标与遴选标准变化过程,基于科学社会学的奖励系统理论,确定遴选效度评价指标并提出假设,以学部和相应学科为单位,统计分析1956—2015年国家自然科学奖全部获奖科研成果学科分布,以及中国科学院院士获得该奖项情况。验证假设发现,在以目前院士遴选目标为评价标准的情况下,中国科学院院士遴选效度良好,导致院士遴选制度存在缺陷的关键原因在于遴选目标的设置。藉此建议：重视分析院士国家自然科学奖获奖情况,以提高遴选效度评估的准确性;进一步强化国家科技奖励在院士遴选效度评估中的作用,设立总理科技顾问委员会以优化院士遴选目标。     

Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice

A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions. Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the opening of a meeting. Two experts who have known, opposing biases are selected – a dyadic mechanism. The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if committee members know what the experts know. The information transfer occurs because committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts.     

The target projection dynamic

We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some stability results are provided for special classes of games.     

THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR

This article examines the influence exerted by the Federal Reserve chair on monetary policy decisions. We construct a voting model where the chair selects the proposal that is initially put to a vote but is subject to an acceptance constraint that incorporates the preferences of the median Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) member and the probability of counterproposals. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using real-time data from FOMC meetings. Results for all chairs in our sample show that the chair's proposal is the result of a compromise, reflecting a stable balance of power within the FOMC.     

The target projection dynamic

We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some stability results are provided for special classes of games.     

THE SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR BALLOT INITIATIVES: WHAT VOTERS CAN LEARN FROM LEGISLATIVE INACTION

This paper models the process through which proposals are placed on the ballot as initiatives. Importantly, proposals that reach the ballot were not enacted by the legislature. We show that this fact has important consequences for the type of policy proposals that reach the ballot: as the legislature would enact any proposal that increases everyone's utility (in expectation), proposals that reach the ballot must be bad for some segment of the population. We partition the population into voters who would benefit from a group's proposal and those who would not and show that voters can use the legislature's inaction to obtain a better estimate of the initiative's expected value. In particular, we show that voters that are not in the sponsoring group infer that proposals that become initiatives have negative expected value and that the expected value of an initiative is decreasing in the size of the group that sponsors it.     

Controllability and the theory of economic policy: A critical view

It is argued in this paper that the concept of controllability in spite of its intuitive appeal is of limited interest for the theory of economic policy. Controllability implies that a given target can be attained even if the number of instruments is less than the number of independent targets. But there is no guarantee that the economy will be able to stay there. Tirbergen's rule is concerned with the existence of a static equilibrium solution. The controllability concept is concerned with the existence of a dynamic path towards it. But it does not imply that controllability is a dynamic generalization of Tinbergen's rule.     

The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach

This paper analyzes the setting of labor market reforms in the European Monetary Union (EMU), as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of business interests and trade unions. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we model the impact of distorted and non-distorted Central Bank monetary policy on EMU member state incentives to reform its labor market. Paradoxically, a majority of citizens who do not support the reform can lead to an optimal level of reform. We also show that, in a context of EMU enlargement, inflationary policy generates a status quo if there is a majority of non-supporters. Surprisingly, inflationary policy enhances the reform if the share of non-supporters over supporters increases, and weakens it if this share decreases.     

中国农村计划生育家庭风险管理探索与社会保障框架体系构建的思考

介绍了中国计划生育家庭社会保障问题的深刻政策背景,探讨了世人关注的中国独生子女家庭风险,分析了目前针对计划生育家庭风险所实施的社会保障措施、效果及其存在的问题,提出了化解独生子女家庭风险的现实路径,包括充分利用农村的相关政策,实现这些政策在计划生育家庭方面的延伸和扩展,实现普惠+优惠政策等,以及完善计划生育家庭社会救助工程,建立中央和省级人口与计划生育公益基金,建立亲情关怀机制等综合措施。     

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB's shadow committee is more activist than the ECB's Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.