Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending

This paper tests the predictions that (i) sub-central government expenditures are procyclical and (ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending. The predictions are based on the importance of ‘voracity effects’ and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub-central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure.     

The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.     

National representation in supranational institutions: The case of the European Central Bank

Supranational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand, hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate’s professional qualifications. On the other hand, supranational institutions often aim for broad national representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we find a disproportionately narrow spread of national representation in the top management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 27 European countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for alternative sets of euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national macroeconomic data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the mid-level management of the ECB’s core business areas best describe the central bank’s interest-rate setting behavior.     

Reserve price signaling

In a general auction model in which bidders’ signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers’ signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models.     

Monetary and fiscal institutional designs

Two investment decisions in economic institutions are feasible; investments in monetary institutions in the form of delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative or independent central bank, and investments in fiscal capacity, in the form of combating bureaucratic corruption and its consequent fiscal revenue leakages. Within this framework, we investigate the interactions among those two institutional decisions and the obtained institutional structure. The findings provide support of strategic complementarities; investments in monetary and fiscal institutions reinforce each other. In addition, we identify a set of determinants that impact on the government’s decisions to improve economic institutions, particularly, the structure and intensity of the initial corruption level, the amount of distortions caused by taxation and the policymaker’s goals and preferences across its objectives.     

Revisiting the case for a populist central banker

It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an inflationary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. In a recent issue of this Review, Guzzo and Velasco argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a ‘populist’ central banker). A conceptual flaw of the latter result is identified here. It is shown that when wages are negotiated in nominal terms the result is true only in the special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to decrease welfare.     

Recursive multiple-priors

This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility. A central axiom is dynamic consistency, which leads to a recursive structure for utility, to ‘rectangular’ sets of priors and to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. It is argued that dynamic consistency is intuitive in a wide range of situations and that the model is consistent with a rich set of possibilities for dynamic behavior under ambiguity.     

A bibliometric account of the evolution of EE in the last two decades: Is ecological economics (becoming) a post-normal science?

In ecological economics the debate on formalism and formalization has been addressed in the context of a lively discussion on ecological economics as a ‘post-normal’ (versus ‘normal’) science. Using ecological economics (EE) as a ‘seed’ journal and applying bibliometric techniques to all (2533) the articles published in EE from January 1989 to December 2009, we analyze the evolution of the field of ecological economics aiming to shed light on this debate. We observe the predominance (and increased relevance) of certain research topics: ‘Methodological issues’, ‘Policies, governance and institutions’ and ‘Valuation’. Moreover, ‘Collective action’, ‘Technical change and the environment’ and ‘Values’ stand as emergent themes of research. Finally, we note that ecological economics experienced an ‘empirical turn’ reflected in a shift away from exclusively formalized papers towards exclusively empirical and, to a larger extent, ‘formal and empirical’ ones. The combination of the prominent and emergent topics and the ‘empirical turn’ mirrors the increasing awareness among researchers in the field of the need to address a key specificity of ecological economics — the interdependence of the economic, biophysical and social spheres. On this basis, we argue that at least through the lens of EE, ecological economics has evolved towards a post-normal science.     

Regular Effective Demand Systems (REDS)

Empirical demand analysis is usually conducted on the basis of either ‘regularity’ or ‘flexibility’. This paper takes a middle ground between ‘regularity’ and ‘flexibility’, offering a compromise in the form of a new specification termed ‘REDS’.     

Functions of innovation systems as a framework to understand sustainable technological change: Empirical evidence for earlier claims

Understanding the emergence of innovation systems is recently put central in research analysing the process of technological change. Especially the key activities that are important for the build up of an innovation system receive much attention. These are labelled ‘functions of innovation systems’. This paper builds on five empirical studies, related to renewable energy technologies, to test whether the functions of innovation systems framework is a valid framework to analyse processes of technological change. We test the claim that a specific set of functions is suitable. We also test the claim made in previous publications that the interactions between system functions accelerate innovation system emergence and growth. Both claims are confirmed.     

The intergenerational transmission of education: Evidence from Taiwanese adoptions

This paper examines the causal effect of parental schooling on children’s schooling using a large sample of adoptees from Taiwan. Using birth-parents’ education to help control for selective placement of children with adoptive parents, we find that adoptees raised with more highly educated parents have higher educational attainment, measured by years of schooling and probability of university graduation. We also find evidence that adoptive father’s schooling is more important for sons’ and adoptive mother’s schooling is more important for daughters’ educational attainment. These results support the notion that family environment (nurture) is important in determining children’s educational outcomes, independent of genetic endowment.     

A review on cost-effectiveness analysis of agri-environmental measures related to the EU WFD: Key issues, methods, and applications

The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) explicitly integrates economics into water management and water policy in Europe. Specifically, Article 11 and Annex III of the Directive call for a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of alternative mitigation measures as a requirement in formulating Programme of Measures (PoMs) to achieve ‘good ecological status’ for all waters in Europe. As agriculture is supposed to be the major contributor to diffuse water pollution, CEA of agri-environmental measures has been given paramount importance in establishing the PoMs. This paper summarises the status, significance, and methodological limitations of WFD-related CEA studies in Europe. Cases from the United Kingdom, countries surrounding the Baltic Sea and central and southern Europe were included in the review. Review results indicate that most WFD-related CEA studies: (1) were based on models of ‘representative’ farms without capturing the variability among real-world farms; (2) concentrate on a single ecological effect of measures or are based on cost estimates of the sectors directly involved in the pollutant-reduction programme (i.e., co-benefits, trade-offs, and external costs were not examined); and (3) did not incorporate uncertainties in both cost and effectiveness estimates. Based on the review results, the paper suggests policy implications and recommendations for future research in the field.     

Globalization, the output-inflation tradeoff and inflation

This paper provides comprehensive evidence on the relation between inflation and globalization, defined here as trade and financial openness, using a large cross-section of 91 countries over the period 1985-2004. We establish two main empirical regularities: both higher trade and financial openness (i) reduce central banks’ inflation bias, yielding lower average inflation and (ii) are associated with a larger output-inflation tradeoff. This evidence is at odds with the standard Barro-Gordon framework, which would require globalization to have a negative effect on the output-inflation tradeoff to yield lower equilibrium inflation, but it is consistent with a recent strand of new Keynesian models emphasizing the role of imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. Our findings also support the relevance of the time-inconsistency hypothesis, which underlies the theoretical models predicting a relation between globalization and inflation. For the OECD subsample, however, we do not find an effect of openness on inflation (the output-inflation tradeoff), suggesting that these countries have created an institutional framework for central banks that eliminates distortions due to the time-inconsistency problem.     

Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.     

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.     

An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery

Governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first-come-first-served basis (rationing by waiting), while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes. A model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery, and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting. If the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods (‘other’ income) are ‘complements’, then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency, and a ‘dual pricing’ scheme can augment social welfare. However, if the rationed commodity and ‘other’ income are ‘substitutes’, then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency, and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal.     

Monetary Policy in Russia: Identifying exchange rate shocks

Russian monetary policy has failed persistently to achieve sustained low inflation, both in absolute terms and relative to the peer group of countries similarly exiting from Soviet-style central planning. This paper explores the reasons for this state of affairs by analysing the kind of monetary policy that has been pursued by the central bank during the period 1995 to 2009. Our contribution is to search for a possible transmission channel between the real interest rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, output growth and foreign reserve growth, after having controlled for the effect of oil price inflation. Using a vector autoregressive model in error-correction form and using sign restrictions methodology, we show that the monetary authorities’ failure to abate double-digit inflation appears to be driven by the policy of exchange rate targeting, as reflected in our identified exchange rate shocks.     

Role of honesty in full implementation

This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents’ preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. We show that the presence of such preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree of the preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail free and involve only small fines.