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1.
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×22×2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals.  相似文献   

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Let Ep be a Debreu private ownership economy in which there are some complementary commodities. It means that all commodity bundles are contained in the proper subspace V   of commodity–space [R]l(l∈{1,2,…})[R]l(l{1,2,}). The production plans maximizing the producers' profits do not have to satisfy the dependency in the qualities of commodities seen in the consumers' plans. It may cause no-existence an equilibrium in economy Ep. The competitive leads, however, to adjustment the production plans to improve the consumers' satisfaction. The procedure of change the production system covering the consumers' requirements is presented. As a result, the model of the private ownership economy with complementary commodities and prices, being the simplification of the initial model, is elaborated. Consequently, the necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the economy Ep is proved.  相似文献   

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This study investigates the identification of parameters in semiparametric binary response models of the form y=1(xβ+v+ε>0)y=1(xβ+v+ε>0) when there are nonignorable nonresponses. We propose an estimation procedure for the identified set, the set of parameters that are observationally indistinguishable from the true value ββ, based on the special regressor approach of Lewbel (2000). We show that the estimator for the identified set is consistent in the Hausdorff metric.  相似文献   

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This paper models the data generating process of common value auctions in a parameter-estimation way, known as the classical approach in statistical inference. Viewing the true value of the object as a parameter that nobody ever knows, we let our value function be the average of the individual estimations (signals) of all agents, a robust estimation of the parameter. Under this simple value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that gives the seller the largest portion of the true value in the worst situation among all the direct mechanisms that are feasible, ex-post implementable and individual rational. Our Maxmin mechanism, which randomly assigns the object to one agent, provides the seller (n−1)/n(n1)/n of the true value when expected revenue is concerned, where nn is the number of the agents.  相似文献   

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The utility premium is generally defined as the pain or reduction in expected utility caused by an nnth-degree risk increase, where n≥2n2. While it is a very useful concept in understanding a decision maker’s choice in uncertain situations, the utility premium is not interpersonally comparable. This note shows that the monetary utility premium–the utility premium divided by the expected marginal utility at the random starting wealth–is interpersonally comparable, and the comparison is characterized by Ross more risk aversion of the corresponding degree.  相似文献   

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This paper defines the rate of substitution of one stochastic change to a random variable for another. It then focuses on the case where one of these changes is an nth degree risk increase, and the other is an m  th degree risk increase, where n>m?1n>m?1. The paper shows that the rate of substitution for these two risk increases can be used to provide a broader definition and two additional characterizations of the nth degree Ross more risk averse partial order. The implications for local intensity measures of nth degree risk aversion are also examined. The analysis organizes the existing results as well as generates new ones.  相似文献   

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We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d)V(f)=μρ(d), where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d   is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d)ρ(d) is a measure of (aversion to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium. The key feature of these mean-dispersion   preferences is that they exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion. This class includes many well-known models of preferences from the literature on ambiguity. We show what properties of the dispersion function ρ(⋅)ρ() correspond to known models, to probabilistic sophistication, and to some new notions of uncertainty aversion.  相似文献   

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Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players? strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the players? evolution instead of its velocity (a viewpoint which emerges naturally when it comes to aggregating empirical data of past instances of play). To that end, we derive a wide class of higher order game dynamics, generalizing first order imitative dynamics, and, in particular, the replicator dynamics. We show that strictly dominated strategies become extinct in n-th order payoff-monotonic dynamics n   orders as fast as in the corresponding first order dynamics; furthermore, in stark contrast to first order, weakly dominated strategies also become extinct for n?2n?2. All in all, higher order payoff-monotonic dynamics lead to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, thus providing a dynamic justification of the well-known epistemic rationalizability process of Dekel and Fudenberg [7]. Finally, we also establish a higher order analogue of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory, and we show that convergence to strict equilibria in n-th order dynamics is n orders as fast as in first order.  相似文献   

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This paper proposes an ?1?1 penalized quantile regression estimator which adapts the Hausman–Taylor instrumental variable approach in order to address the bias resulting from the shrinkage of the individual effects.  相似文献   

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In this paper, we study the functional central limit theorem for ARMA–GARCH processes. We prove that, under the finite second moment assumption, the stationary ARMA–GARCH process is geometricallyL2L2-NED and that the functional central limit theorem holds.  相似文献   

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How do moral concerns affect fraud and detection, for example, tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring a psychological 2 × 1 × 2 × 1 inspection game which incorporates belief-dependent guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the inspector's more than the inspectee's) as well as the policy issue whether to allow the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.  相似文献   

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