Intra- and international risk-sharing in the short run and the long run

We investigate empirically how industrialized countries and US states share consumption risk at horizons between 1 and 30 years. US federal states share about 50% of their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross-state capital income flows. While insurance against transitory fluctuations in output is virtually complete, OECD countries do not share any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Our results suggest that purely transaction cost based theories cannot explain the home bias, since the potential welfare gains from insurance against permanent shocks would by far outweigh that of insuring against transitory variation. We conclude that permanent and transitory shocks constitute two qualitatively different kinds of risk and that various forms of endogenous market incompleteness may render permanent shocks a lot harder to insure, in particular at the international level.     

International portfolio diversification and endogenous labor supply choice

This paper presents a multi-country general equilibrium model driven by productivity shocks, where labor supply and consumption are chosen endogenously. We use this framework to study the effect of labor supply for optimal international diversification. We find that the model's ability to help explain home-bias depends crucially on the level of substitutability between consumption and non-working time. Quantitatively, the non-separability in the preferences helps in a nonnegligible way, but it cannot entirely explain the extreme degree of home-bias in U.S. portfolios.     

Currency substitution, portfolio diversification, and money demand

Abstract .  We extend the Thomas (1985) dynamic optimizing model of money demand and currency substitution to the case in which the individual has restricted or no access to foreign currency denominated bonds. In this case currency substitution decisions and asset substitution decisions are not separable. The results obtained suggest that the significance of an expected exchange rate depreciation term in the demand for domestic money provides a valid test for the presence of currency substitution. Applying this approach to six Latin-American countries, we find evidence of currency substitution in Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, but not in Brazil and Chile.     

European monetary union, adjustment, and exchange rate variability

This paper uses a three-country, three-good, factor-specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how European Monetary Union is likely to affect exchange rate variability. Focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies, it shows that the relative variability (against external currencies) of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks. Monetary union is likely to decrease (increase) aggregate European exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large (small) euro area countries specialize.     

Does financial globalization promote risk sharing?

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. In this paper, we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. Even emerging market economies, many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.     

Exchange rates and trade: How important is hysteresis in trade?

This paper looks at the responsiveness of a country's export supply to exchange rate changes and measures its quantitative importance by breaking down export adjustments between changes in output levels by existing exporters (intensive margin) and movements due to changes in the number of exporters (extensive margin). Using data on a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, the paper finds sunk costs hysteresis in entry and exit to be an important factor in determining export market participation, but unrelated to exchange rate uncertainty. The sunk costs of entering the market appear to be much larger than the costs of exiting the market. Finally, although hysteresis exists, its effect on the responsiveness of aggregate trade volumes to exchange rate changes is quantitatively small. A 10% home currency depreciation results in an increases in export volume due to the increase in the number of exporting firms of only 1.4% of export volume.     

Risk sharing through capital gains

Abstract We estimate channels of international risk sharing between European Monetary Union (EMU), European Union, and other OECD countries, 1992–2007. We focus on risk sharing through savings, factor income flows, and capital gains. Risk sharing through factor income and capital gains was close to zero before 1999 but has increased since then. Risk sharing from capital gains, at about 6%, is higher than risk sharing from factor income flows for European Union countries and OECD countries. Risk sharing from factor income flows is higher for euro zone countries, at 14%, reflecting increased international asset and liability holdings in the euro area.     

A model of relative national price levels under pricing to market

This paper proposes an alternative to the Balassa-Samuelson theory of how relative price levels between countries are determined. The theory is a general equilibrium formulation of a model where pricing to market arises endogenously from firm decisions. It differs from Balassa-Samuelson in that it centers on the distinction between segmented national goods markets rather than the distinction between traded and nontraded goods. The paper also explores how Balassa-Samuelson might be updated by combining it together with pricing to market elements. Applied to the case of a monetary union, the theory offers an alternative explanation for the inflation differentials observed in EMU. It implies that such differentials may be a natural and enduring feature of a monetary union in which markets for goods and labor are less than fully integrated.     

Are valuation effects desirable from a global perspective?

Recent studies have emphasized the role of valuation effects due to exchange rate movements in easing the process of adjustment of the external balance of a country. This paper asks to what extent valuation effects are desirable from a global perspective as a mean to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. In a frictionless world, it is desirable to have large movements in prices and exchange rates. But once a small degree of price rigidity is introduced not only should prices be stabilized but also the response of the exchange rate should be muted. There is a minor role for valuation effects that depends both on the size and composition of assets and liabilities.     

A new approach to capital flows: Theory and evidence

This paper examines how an open economy determines its financial openness and deals with volatile capital flows when deciding to utilize them for output growth. We find that higher economic instability is an inevitable price paid for faster growth if a country permits wider openness without reversing its financial vulnerability. We prove that the country can leave its capital market wider open to achieve higher growth and lower instability if its financial system has been strengthened substantially. We show why some financially advanced countries request reluctant developing countries to liberalize their immature markets and how the conflict of interest between the two parties is formulated. The paper also presents a large sample of cross-country experiences with tradeoffs between growth and instability, with the observed evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.     

Financial liberalization and the relationship-specificity of exports

We investigate the causal impact of equity market liberalizations on sectoral export performance across 91 countries (1980–1997). The increased availability of external finance has boosted trade of industries that intensively use relationship-specific inputs, and lowered exports of industries using standardized inputs.     

Trade openness and the informational efficiency of emerging stock markets

This paper examines the empirical link between trade openness and the informational efficiency of stock markets in 23 developing countries. Our fixed effects panel regression results document a significant negative relation between trade openness and stock return autocorrelations only when the de facto measure is used. On this basis, we argue that a greater level of de facto trade openness is associated with a higher degree of informational efficiency in these emerging stock markets because the former signals higher future firm profitability, and investors tend to react faster to information when there is less uncertainty about a firm's future earnings or cash flows. Further analyses find no significant association between the extent of financial openness and the degree of informational efficiency.     

FEAR OF FLOATING IN EAST ASIA?

Abstract.  We examine the de facto exchange rate arrangements in eight East Asian countries during the post-Asian crisis period. The empirical results suggest that three countries adopted a hard peg or a peg with capital account restrictions, whereas five countries moved toward a more flexible exchange rate arrangement in the post-crisis period. Three of these five countries (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) achieved a level of exchange rate flexibility close to the level accomplished in a free floater such as Australia. These results suggest that 'fear of floating' in East Asia is not prevalent in the post-crisis period, supporting the bipolar view of the optimal exchange rate regime.