INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

Social media networks,fake news,and polarization

We study how the structure of social media networks and the presence of fake news affects the degree of misinformation and polarization in a society. For that, we analyze a dynamic model of opinion exchange in which individuals have imperfect information about the true state of the world and exhibit bounded rationality. Key to the analysis is the presence of internet bots: agents in the network that spread fake news (e.g., a constant flow of biased information). We characterize how agents’ opinions evolve over time and evaluate the determinants of long-run misinformation and polarization in the network. To that end, we construct a synthetic network calibrated to Twitter and simulate the information exchange process over a long horizon to quantify the bots’ ability to spread fake news. A key insight is that significant misinformation and polarization arise in networks in which only 15% of agents believe fake news to be true, indicating that network externality effects are quantitatively important. Higher bot centrality typically increases polarization and lowers misinformation. When one bot is more influential than the other (asymmetric centrality), polarization is reduced but misinformation grows, as opinions become closer the more influential bot’s preferred point. Finally, we show that threshold rules tend to reduce polarization and misinformation. This is because, as long as agents also have access to unbiased sources of information, threshold rules actually limit the influence of bots.     

Piracy or promotion? The impact of broadband Internet penetration on DVD sales

The Internet provides copyright holders with new sales and promotional channels for their content, while also providing consumers with new opportunities to illegally obtain free copies of this content. Unfortunately, disentangling these two effects is extremely difficult.In this paper we attempt to disentangle these two effects by applying fixed effects and first difference models to a new dataset quantifying changes in broadband Internet penetration and DVD sales at a local level from 2000 to 2003. We then compare our results to those reported in Liebowitz (2008), who uses similar models in a similar time period on a similar product category: music CDs.Unlike Liebowitz, who finds a strong negative impact of broadband penetration on music sales, our results show that increased broadband penetration leads to a significant increase in DVD sales. Using the most conservative results, 9.3% of the $14.1 billion increase in DVD sales during our study period can be attributed to increased broadband penetration. One interpretation of these results is that the difference arises from differences in the ability to pirate these two types of content: while Internet music piracy was easy and rampant from 2000 to 2003, Internet movie piracy was difficult and of generally low quality in this time period. If this interpretation is true it would suggest that, in the absence of piracy, the Internet has an overall strong positive impact on media sales.     

The influence of Internet on politics: the impact of Facebook and the Internet penetration on elections in Taiwan

Previous research on elections indicates that the rise of social media has had a positive impact on political participation and political interest, resulting in more voters going to the polls. However, there has been no research on the impact that social media have on bringing about a change in government. This research investigates the impact that the Internet and the Chinese version of Facebook have had on election results in Taiwan from 2001 to 2016. The findings indicate that after the Chinese version of Facebook appeared in 2008, the higher the penetration rate of the Internet in the Taiwan region, the more likely that political power will change hands and the ruling party will lose an election.     

The effect of presidential election outcomes on alcohol drinking

The growing political polarization and the increasing use of social media have been linked to straining social ties worldwide. The 2016 presidential elections in the United States reflected this trend with reports of fear and anxiety among voters. We examine how election results can be linked to episodes of anxiety through the use of alcohol as self-medication. We analyze a daily dataset of household purchases of alcohol in the weeks following presidential elections. We find that, within 30 days from Election Day, a 10 percentage point increase in support for the losing candidate increases alcohol expenditure by 1.1%. The effect is driven by counties with a higher share of supporters of the losing candidate and is robust to controlling more flexibly for omitted variables related to alcohol consumption. The increase in alcohol consumption is present in the 2016 elections and absent in the previous three presidential elections.     

A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*

Absolute polarization indices remain unchanged under equal absolute augmentation in all incomes. This paper identifies the class of absolute polarization indices whose orderings of alternative income distributions agree with the rankings generated by nonintersecting absolute polarization curves. We explore the possibility of using the Kolm (1976) – Blackorby‐Donaldson (1980) ethical absolute inequality index in polarization measurement. We establish that although inequality and polarization are dissimilar concepts, different absolute inequality indices can be employed to design alternative absolute polarization indices. A numerical illustration is provided using Indian data and it is shown that inequality and polarization are different issues in income distribution analysis.     

Belonging or estrangement—The European Refugee Crisis and its effects on immigrant identity

This study examines the impact of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis on the ethnic identity of resident migrants in Germany. To derive plausibly causal estimates, I exploit the quasi-experimental setting in Germany, by which refugees are allocated to different counties by state authorities without being able to choose their locations themselves. This study finds that higher shares of refugees in a county increased migrants’ attachment to their home countries, while not affecting their perceived belonging to Germany. Further analyses uncover strong heterogeneities with respect to country of origin and suggest that concerns about xenophobia, experiences of discrimination, and the consumption of foreign media contributed to these effects. Lastly, I find that changes in ethnic identity coincide with the political polarization of migrants.     

INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND FRACTURALIZATION:AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

This paper investigates the relationship between economic inequality and the distribution of votes among political parties, namely political polarization and fracturalization. Economic inequality is captured by the Gini index, whereas new measures of political polarization and fracturalization are offered. This is the first paper to calculate political polarization and fracturalization indices by a methodology previously used for ethnic, religious and linguistic polarization and fracturalization. Empirical analysis uses data for 17 European countries and for three decades, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It is shown that increased income inequality increases political party polarization and reduces fracturalization and that political party polarization decreases with increased GDP per capita.     

江苏省县域经济发展差异与极化比较

以县域为研究基本单元,选取了人均GDP、人均工业总产值、农民人均纯收入和职工平均工资等四个指标,运用差异系数与极化指数等相差数理模型,对1994年以来江苏省县域经济发展差异与极化的演化过程与格局进行了定量比较,结果发现：江苏省县域经济发展差异与极化伴随着＂缩小—扩大—再缩小＂演化过程,总体上呈现出生产水平差异与极化增强、生活水平差异与极化减弱的特征,且生产水平的差异与极化远大于生活水平的差异与极化;在空间上,主要表现为苏南、苏中与苏北三大地区之间的差异与极化,且三大地区之间的极化呈增强趋势。     

近50年来我国区域经济空间极化的变化趋势研究

首先利用新近发展的ER、TW指数,以人均实际国内生产总值为指标,从经济总量上,详细考察了1952-2000年我国省市区经济空间极化变化趋势;其次利用广义熵的可分解特性,进一步探讨了1952-2000年我国区域经济不均衡在沿海-内陆、南方-北方区、高城镇化-低城镇化地区等具体空间方向上的极化及其变化趋势。     

Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.     

关于两极分化的思考

我国正处在社会主义初级阶段。在当前条件下，鼓励非公有制经济的存在和发展，就应该承认由资本与劳动的对立所决定的在一定范围内的两极分化也是一种客观的存在。因此，应该按照历史唯物主义关于生产关系与生产力的相互关系的原理来理解和对待两极分化；应该采取措施，缓和两极分化带来的社会矛盾；应该明确，我们的最终目的是在消灭私有制的基础上彻底消除两极分化现象。     

The recent process of job polarization in Japan: evidence from 1980 to 2010

This study investigates the recent process of job polarization in Japan. We focus on three particular aspects: the relationship with business cycles, total hours rather than employment and age cohorts. We find that, regardless of whether the focus is employment or total hours, job polarization is concentrated in recessions and that job polarization has occurred mainly in younger-age cohorts.     

产业资本向金融资本渗透的路径和影响——基于资本市场“举牌”的研究

随着金融市场化的进一步推进,资本市场发挥着产业资本向金融资本渗透的重要作用。文章选取以举牌为核心的产业资本向金融资本渗透的微观案例,分析了产业资本通过金融市场向金融资本渗透的途径和结果。研究显示,产业资本渗透金融资本后被举牌公司的经营业绩得到提高,产品市场份额增强,说明通过产业资本对被举牌企业实施经营管理提高了被举牌企业的经营效率,实现了产业调整。这也说明金融手段能够有效支持产业资本的扩张和结构调整,显示了资本市场在两者转换过程中所起到的关键作用。     

Polarization Orderings and New Classes of Polarization Indices

This paper explores equivalent formulations of the polarization ordering first proposed by Foster and Wolfson. Motivated by the class of polarization indices proposed by Foster and Wolfson, we have developed a class of generalized Foster-Wolfson indices. In addition, a new class of polarization indices satisfying a set of desirable axioms is also derived.     

混合型供应链订单渗透点的确定

推式供应链追求的是效率,其缺点是当市场需求预测不准确时产品的滞销大.拉式供应链追求的是对客户的快速响应、减少在制品库存,其缺点是响应需求的成本较高、难以形成规模经济.多数产业的供应链是由“推式”与“拉式”两部分组成的混合型供应链,其追求的是效率与响应的平衡,即确定订单渗透点的合理位置.订单渗透点的位置受市场因素、产品因素、生产因素的影响.导致订单渗透点位置向前或向后移的主要驱动因素分别是提高定制化水平、减少在制品库存、减少送货时间和提高生产效率.最后,用一个家具企业的案例说明订单渗透点的位置是如何移动的,并由此导致供应链绩效的提高.     

A Class of Two‐Group Polarization Measures

The phenomenon of income polarization is generally associated with a disappearing middle class but there does not seem to be a generally accepted definition of this notion. We characterize classes of polarization quasi‐orderings and polarization measures in a framework where there are two income groups separated by the median. The axioms we employ are variants of within‐group clustering and between‐group spread properties, and an independence property. Furthermore, we illustrate that attempts to extend the axioms to more general settings severely restrict their appeal and conclude that alternative approaches may be required to capture concepts involving polarization.     

当前我国贫富差距拉大原因的“市场根源论”辨析

尽管市场经济的内在运行机制的确会导致贫富分化甚至两极分化,但是,事实上,当前我国贫富差距扩大的根本原因尚不是市场经济的过与不及造成的,而是腐败、垄断、政策的部分失误造成的。市场优胜劣汰或两极分化的机制尚未在中国产生巨大影响;彻底市场化并不是解决贫富分化的灵丹妙药。整治腐败、健全民主监督机制,实现机会公平的竞争;打破垄断,实现起点公平的竞争;以人为本,落实科学发展观,实现决策科学化、民主化才是解决贫富分化的现实出路。     

DRAMs, fiber and energy compared with three models of market penetration

When a new technology is introduced in the market, this technology generally follows an S-shaped curve, especially if measured on a relative (market share) basis. Marchetti and Nakicenovic and Norton and Bass have modeled the multivariant case of various technologies introduced at different times. A new, simple and flexible model has been proposed based on potential penetration. Potential penetration is penetration on the assumption that no other new technology will enter the market. In a stable competitive environment, potential penetration curves are typically positively sloped S-curves. The new model gives a good fit in markets with a limited number of competitors, which are capable of totally cannibalizing previous generations of technologies. It also fits well with markets with many competitors in a competitive equilibrium situation. Examples are the Dynamic Random Access Memory chips (DRAMs), fiber and energy market. The new model features fewer variables compared with existing models and can readily be adapted to technological processes with time varying parameters, which is particularly important in volatile competitive markets.     

Market penetration by entry-exit dynamics

A generic characterization of the dynamics of market penetration by technological artifacts is here formulated on the basis of entry rate and exit rate considerations. It is shown that low-order reductions lead to the biologically based logistic dynamic, which—by empirical fit—has been found to be in very good agreement with numerous specific cases. In addition to the derivational justification of the logistic for artifact market penetration, we find that but a small number of parameters are involved in these autonomous characterizations suggesting therefore that market penetration may well be reduced to a similarly small number of dominant operative processes. Some nonautonomous extensions are also discussed.