The Duality of Political Geography in China: Integration and Challenges

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the genealogy of ‘Chinese’ political geography, which, to a certain extent, can be read as a national report of the status of political geography in Chinese scholarship. It begins by outlining the short duration of the development of political geography in China, compared to the longer history of western political geography. Looking at the extant studies related to political geography in China, this paper suggests an existence of a duality in this field. One strand of scholarship is termed ‘exogenous political geography’, which is largely influenced by western scholarship with a particular focus on theories and vocabularies from classical geopolitics and geo-economy. The other strand is termed as ‘endogenous political geography’, which covers rich topics, including, yet not limited to, political and geographical views of inter-state relationships, central-local relationships and emperor-people relationships. Such a duality is important for understanding the condition of current political geography in China. The dualised understanding, however, seems to have undermined the comprehensiveness of political geography in China. In this regard, this paper calls for a more complete, integrated and critical agenda for political geography in China.     

Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

ON THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL TAX RATES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

This article examines the determinants of local tax rates. For the two main local taxes in Spain—the property tax and the motor vehicle tax—we test the existence of tax mimicking, yardstick competition, and political trends in a sample of 2,713 municipalities. Using various spatial models, the results support the hypothesis of tax mimicking, with coefficients above 0.40. We also show the relevance of political variables such as the ideology of incumbents and political fragmentation. The fact that incumbents with weaker political support exhibit stronger mimicking behavior is interpreted as evidence in favor of yardstick competition. Finally, we find that incumbents mimic neighboring municipalities ruled by the same political party, confirming the political trends hypothesis. (JEL C31, H71, H77)     

国企高管政治晋升、研发投资与企业绩效

近年来,国企高管政治晋升激励效果逐渐受到学者们关注。为此,基于2009-2014年国有上市公司752个样本值,从研发投资视角考察高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系。研究结果表明：国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效显著正相关,说明与政治晋升机会较小的国企高管相比,政治晋升机会较大的国企高管更注重企业绩效;国企高管政治晋升与研发投资显著负相关,在晋升当年,高管出于自身利益考虑会减少研发投资;研发投资对企业绩效存在显著促进作用,并对国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系起调节作用。     

政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助*--来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据

文章以2009－2012年中国亏损上市公司作为研究样本,运用社会网络理论,分析和检验了高管的政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠行为获得政府补助的影响。研究结果表明：第一,有政治关联的亏损企业比无政治关联的亏损企业更容易出于获取政府支持而进行慈善捐赠,高管的政治关联广度相对于其政治关联深度对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响更大,同时高管的地方政治关联相对于其中央政治关联对亏损企业慈善捐赠的正向影响也更大;第二,基于“利益互惠”的原则以及对企业积极履行社会责任的鼓励,政府通常会倾向于对进行慈善捐赠的企业给予更多的补助;第三,相对于无政治关联的亏损企业,有政治关联的亏损企业的慈善捐赠能够帮助其获得更多的政府补助,相对于中央政治关联,地方政治关联对亏损企业通过慈善捐赠获得政府补助的“支持效应”更加明显,同时政治关联广度更宽的亏损企业也通过慈善捐赠获得了更多的政府补助。文章的研究结论深化了对中国亏损上市公司慈善捐赠的动机及其经济后果的认识,为相关部门规范企业慈善行为也提供了有益的启示。     

Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption

Using a theoretical model of repeated political competition among two career politicians, I study the incentives of both the corrupt and clean politicians not to adopt a fully effective reform targeting political corruption. In the setup I study, each politician can credibly adopt the reform as part of his policy platform in the elections. Yet, when the level of political corruption is high, neither politician does so in a Nash Equilibrium. Intuitively, political corruption changes the zero-sum nature of political competition: the reform eliminates the illegal rents of the corrupt candidate and the competitive advantage of the clean candidate.     

管理者政治关联、制度环境与企业绩效间关系的实证研究

以2008—2013年中国沪深两市的上市公司为研究样本,采用最小二乘法实证检验了管理者政治关联对企业绩效的影响,探讨了不同层面的政治关联对企业绩效影响的差异,揭示了管理者的政治关联在制度环境不完善时的替代效应。研究结果表明:管理者有政治关联会显著提高企业绩效;中央级政治关联对企业绩效的推动作用显著大于省市县级政治关联;管理者政治关联是一个有效的制度外替代机制,制度环境不完善地区的企业管理者拥有政治关联可有效提高企业绩效。     

Gordon Tullock as a political scientist

We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago encompassed considerable coursework related to political science. We consider three sources of information to draw conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is clearly significant for central questions in political science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the development of political science scholarship.     

政治关联、并购战略选择与企业价值*

本文以2010年发生并购的上市公司为初始样本,实证检验了企业政治关联对并购当年（2010年）和并购后连续五年（2011—2015年）企业价值的影响,并进一步分析这种影响在并购企业采用不同并购战略选择时是否存在显著差异。本文研究发现,并购企业中央政治关联和地方政治关联均对并购后企业短期价值和长期价值具有显著的正向影响。进一步研究发现,从总体上看,在一定条件下,跨地并购战略在企业中央政治关联与企业价值（短期/长期）间有正向的部分中介效应,即中央政治关联企业通过跨地并购战略的实施进一步增强了对企业价值的提升作用;企业地方政治关联可以显著地促进多元化并购战略的实施,而实施多元化并购战略进一步增强了对企业价值（短期/长期）的抑制作用,即多元化并购战略在企业地方政治关联对企业价值的影响机制中发挥部分中介效应,并且对直接正效应具有抑制作用。     

宏观经济学中的政治经济学——以新政治经济学的研究方法为视角

新政治经济学以使用经济学现代方法对政治与经济相互作用的研究为核心,成为政治经济学的一个新发展。宏观经济学中的政治经济学作为新政治经济学的一个重要分支,其研究对象是政治对宏观经济运行和政策的影响。宏观经济学中的政治经济学的出现对当代宏观经济理论的影响,则表现在研究形式和研究方法所做的创新。     

The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

Firm location,political geography and environmental information disclosure

As the subjective and objective factors that influence corporate behaviours, political region and firm location are of great importance to environmental information disclosure (EID). With spatial and political geography as a research perspective, this article makes a study by using the samples of manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2011. As a result, we determine that regulatory distance and political geography had negative effects on EID, while political geography weakens regulatory distance’s function. After considering an enterprise’s administrative rank, we determined that when the rank is higher, regulatory distance has negative effects on EID; when the rank is lower, the effects are the opposite. Regarding political geography, it always weakened the regulatory distance’s function. Moreover, the effects are significant only when the enterprises had low governmental regulation. The study shows the effects that firm location and political geography have made on EID. At the same time, this study also gives theoretical and empirical evidence to the necessity of raising governmental regulatory effectiveness.     

Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26     

Political Economy and the Idea of Development

This paper explores the questions: what are the main organizing concepts of the older political economy of Smith and Marx; and how do they differ from those typical of more recent work in political economy? Special emphasis is placed on the importance of an idea of development in the older political economy, and on how that idea has been replaced in the newer political economy by notions of power and interest. The paper considers how the absence of a concept of development in the newer versions of political economy limits the scope and depth of these versions. Recent criticism of the idea of development is also considered. In light of this criticism, the paper considers weaknesses in the concept of development in the older political economy. However, rather than fully accepting the critique of the idea of development, the paper suggests that weaknesses in the classical construction can be corrected by paying closer attention to how we understand the ends of the development process.     

对思想政治教育学中主体定位的逻辑审视

关于思想政治教育主客体范畴及其关系的争论中比较集中的三个问题：即在思想政治教育学中有无必要引进主客体范畴;关于思想政治教育学研究中主体定位的争论;怎样审视思想政治教育学中主体定位的基本逻辑。分析学科产生的特定政治环境为我们准确理解和把握思想政治教育主体提供了基本路径,政党作为终极意义上的思想政治教育主体乃是思想政治教育的基本逻辑。     

Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics

While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis: ideas, power, and institutions. For each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining “what’s in it” for environmental economics.     

Political economy of private firms in China

The sweeping change in political economy associated with the rapid growth of the private sector in China is rarely studied empirically in the economics literature. Using four cross-sectional surveys of private firms between 1995 and 2010, we examine the dynamics of rent creation from Party membership and other political connections when the regime changed from anti-capitalistic to pro-capitalistic during the period 2002–2004. We find that entrepreneurs with political connection enjoyed significantly more rents only after the constitutional amendments. This finding sheds lights on the nature of the political economy of today’s Chinese economy. Endogeneity/causality problems are addressed.