表外业务的现状与监管

表外业务,简称OBS(off-balance sheet activities),即不列入资产负债表,而仅可能出现在财务报表脚住中的交易活动。根据巴塞尔委员会对表外业务狭义、广义概念的区分。狭义的表外业务是指商业银行从事的、按照通行的会计准则不计入资产负债表内,不影响资产负债表总额,但由于银行已承担了经济责任,在一定条件下可能会转化为资产负债义务,并能改变当期损益及运营资金的业务活动。这些业务构成了商业银行的或有资产和或有负债,需要在资产负债表外记载、反映、核算和管理,在风险成为现实时,就转为表内业务,在资产负债表中得到反映。 一是各类担保业务,包括贷款偿还担保、银行承兑汇票、有追索权的交易、备用信用证,跟单信用证(商业信用证)、保函、背书等。 二是承诺业务,包括可撤销的承诺业务和不可撤销的承诺业务。可撤销的承诺业务主要有:贷款限额与透支限额。不可撤销的     

关于商业银行承诺业务的思考

承诺业务是指银行承诺客户在未来一定时期内,按双方事先确定的条件,应客户要求,随时为其提供一定限额的融资服务的一种表外业务.按其约束力,承诺分可撤销承诺和不可撤销承诺;按其内容,主要有贷款承诺和票据发行便利.贷款承诺是典型的含有期权的表外业务,签约后,在规定的条件下是否让银行提供贷款,完全取决于客户.不可撤销的贷款承诺实际上是信贷替代工具.票据发行便利是一种中期的(一般期限为5至7年)、具有法律约束力和循环融资的承诺.根据这种承诺,客户(票据发行人)可以在协议期限内周转性发行短期票据,承诺包销的商业银行依照协议负责购买发行人未能按期售出的票据或向客户提供等额银行信贷.票据发行便利根据有无包销可分为两大类:包销的票据发行便利和无包销的票据发行便利.其中前者又可分为循环包销便利、可转让的循环包销便利和多元票据发行便利.     

我国商业银行表外业务存在的风险及监管

商业银行表外业务是一种在未来而非现在实现的或有资产和负债,它们在一定程度上影响银行未来的偿付能力和获利水平。根据巴塞尔委员会规定,商业银行表外业务可以分以下四类：第一类,商业银行传统的中间业务,即客户资产管理的中介,包括银行结算、信托、委托存贷款、代理等业务,它给商业银行带来手续费收入;第二类,保证或担保,包括传统的对偿还贷款的担保,跟单信用证担保,汇票承兑以及有追索权的债务的转让,对附属机构的融资支持;第三类,贷款承诺,     

大连建行个贷现状及相关问题分析

个人住房贷款的安全性、流动性和效益性是影响其业务发展的关键，本文在立足于大连建行个人住房贷款业务发展现状的基础上对大连建行个人住房贷款业务的“三性”做了实证分析，同时在对市场进行了大量调查的基础之上，论证了大连建行个人住房贷款业务的发展前景，并对其个人住房贷款业务的进一步发展提出了相关意见。     

中国工商银行信贷产品介绍(一)

流动资金循环贷款 流动资金循环贷款是贷款人与借款人一次性签订借款合同,在合同规定的有效期内,允许借款人多次提取、逐笔归还、循环使用的流动资金贷款业务(以下简称循环贷款).可以发放循环贷款的企业必须具备以下条件:信誉良好,按期清偿贷款本息,无不良履约记录;结算业务60%(含)以上通过我行办理;资产负债率低于60%;信用等级为AA(含)以上(提供低风险担保的可以不受信用等级限制);除信用方式贷款外,能提供符合贷款人要求的贷款担保;贷款用途符合国家法律、法规及有关政策规定,承诺贷款不以任何形式流人证券市场、期货市场和用于股本权益性投资.     

政府激励对银行专利质押贷款业务影响的实证分析——以上海浦东发展银行为例

本文利用上海浦东发展银行截至2015年7月在全国各省市的专利质押贷款合同数量数据,简要分析了该行专利质押贷款业务发展的区域差异,同时结合该行专利质押贷款合同数排名前三的天津、上海和浙江省的相关激励政策,实证分析了政府激励对银行专利质押贷款业务的影响,并提出了一些促进银行专利质押贷款业务发展的对策及建议。     

我国商业银行流动性成因及与股市的相关性分析

商业银行流动性管理风险来源于两个方面负债方和资产方。由负债方引起的流动性风险主要源于商业银行很难在不受损失的情况下变现资产或者被迫以较高成本融入资金来满足负债持有人即时提取现金的需求;资产方引起的流动性风险是指表外业务的贷款承诺。考虑到我国商业银行的实际情况,本文主要分析由负债方引起的流动性风险,分析我国商业银行流动性的原因以及股市变化对其影响。     

资本监管、流动性约束对商业银行贷款行为的影响北大核心CSSCI

本文研究资本监管与流动性约束的交互效应对商业银行贷款行为的影响。结果表明:(1)资本监管会促使商业银行调整表内外资产结构,减少表内贷款发放,扩张表外未使用贷款承诺业务,严格执行监管惩罚措施有利于抑制商业银行表内外信贷增长;(2)资本监管与流动性约束具有互补性,资本监管对商业银行贷款行为的非线性影响依赖于流动性比率的大小,流动性比率越高,其促进资本监管压力下的信贷紧缩效应越明显;(3)逆周期监管政策的实施,有助于减弱资本监管与流动性水平交互作用对商业银行贷款行为的负向影响。     

“落实贷款新规 加快转变银行发展方式”征稿启事

2009年末至2010年2月,中国银监会相继发布“三个办法一个指引”（《固定资产贷款管理办法》、《流动资金贷款管理办法》、《个人贷款管理暂行办法》和《项目融资业务指引》）贷款新规,从贷款全流程管理、诚信申贷、协议承诺、实贷实付、贷放分控、贷后管理、罚则约束7个方面,制定了一系列指导原则,为构建和完善我国银行业金融机构贷款业务法规框架奠定了基础。成为我国信贷市场走向规范和成熟的新起点。     

对贷款承诺会计处理若干问题的认识

贷款承诺(loancommitment)是重要的表外信用工具。比如在美国,80%以上的商业贷款是通过贷款承诺形式作出的。此外,贷款承诺费也是商业银行重要的收入来源。在银行监管方面,贷款承诺是计算和考核商业银行资本充足率的重要表外风险项目。本文拟对贷款承诺有关会计处理问题作一探讨。一、对贷款承诺内涵和性质的认识贷款承诺是指商业银行等金融机构作出的在一定期间内以确定条款和条件向承诺持有者(潜在借款人)提供贷款的承诺。1993年12月,美国联邦储备系统理事会发布修订后的条例H(RegulationH《)联邦储备系统中的州成员银行》。条例H在附录…     

Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.     

Modeling loan commitments

Loan commitments represent more than 82 percent of all commercial and industrial loans by domestic banks. This paper develops a valuation model for loan commitments incorporating early exercise, multiple fees, partial exercise and credit risk. The model is analytically tractable and easy to implement. Using a sample of commercial paper backup credit lines from the Dealscan database, we show that our model prices closely match loan commitment market prices.     

Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments

I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.     

Bank stability and the price of loan commitments

Firms insure themselves from liquidity shocks by contracting on credit lines from banks. I document novel empirical evidence on how the risk of contract nonperformance by banks is priced. Firms pay a higher price for loan commitments from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. To investigate a potential causal effect of lender stability on commitment fees, I exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks’ assets from natural disasters. The sensitivity of the fees is higher for firms with higher short-term liabilities and higher income uncertainty.     

Commercial paper,bank reserve requirements,and the informational role of loan commitments

An explanation is provided of the often-observed purchase of ‘back-up’ bank loan commitments by corporations immediately preceding their sale of dealer-placed commercial paper. Since loan commitments are typically viewed as hedging instruments, our paper explains why a risk-neutral corporation would purchase this type of instrument and how it is priced. It is assumed that while firms know their own credit risks, neither banks nor the paper market can distinguish between some credit applicants. We show that the purchase of a commitment can identify these Firms to the market. The equilibrium is partially revealing; of the firms with unobservable quality, those with higher quality identify themselves by purchasing commitments while those with lower quality sell unbacked paper and are ‘pooled’ together. Unbacked paper is sold also by firms whose quality is observable. Unidentified firms in the lowest quality range do not sell commercial paper.     

Business collateral and personal commitments in SME lending

Using a database of SME credit approvals from a large Belgian bank, this paper extends the empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral by examining the determinants of business collateral simultaneously with the determinants of personal collateral/commitments. Our results suggest that firm and relationship characteristics seem to be more important determinants of collateral/commitment protection than loan and lender characteristics. Family firms are more likely to offer a higher degree of collateral/commitment protection while introducing competition between banks decreases this likelihood. The collateral requirement decreases in the length of the bank-borrower relationship. Furthermore, trade credit seems to have a signalling effect. The ‘lazy banks hypothesis’ was not supported. Our results suggest that beside risk arguments, also commercial arguments help explain the pledging of collateral. Using a continuation-ratio logit model, we discover several differences in the determinants of the collateralisation decision and the determinants of the type of collateral/commitments.     

PARTIAL EXERCISE OF LOAN COMMITMENTS UNDER ADAPTIVE PRICING

The partial takedown phenomenon associated with bank loan commitments is examined in a dynamic context in which banks adjust commitment prices to client takedown behavior. The optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness and a decreasing function of the time the client plans to remain with its present bank and the cost of switching to a new bank. Since the bank's learning is cumulative, the longer a client remains with its bank the smaller is the commitment price adjustment resulting from an aberrant takedown. The enhanced commitment price certainty, obtained with longevity of the client relationship, helps to explain client reluctance to switch banks. Since the optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness under adaptive pricing, such pricing may serve the added purpose of providing information on client risk.     

Liquidation under moral hazard: Optimal debt maturity and loan commitments

This paper examines the benefits and limitations of loan commitment financing. Commitments enable firms to adopt more efficient liquidation policies. We demonstrate, however, that the limitations of commitment financing depend on a number of firm characteristics. In some circumstances, firms find long-term debt to be a superior alternative to commitment financing. This provides a possible explanation for why loan commitments are not universally utilized. By considering both the benefits as well as the limitations of loan commitment financing, we are also able to integrate loan commitment contracts into a model of optimal debt maturity.     

Valuing and hedging fixed rate mortgage commitments

A fixed rate loan commitment that is binding on the lender but not on the loan applicant is equivalent to a put option. This article uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to establish a value for fixed rate loan commitments and to derive the hedge ratio for the lending institution to hedge the interest rate risk associated with the commitments in the FHLMC forward market for mortgages. The effectiveness of the resulting hedge is tested in a simulation, where it is found that the result is a 71% reduction in the variance of the value of the lender's gain or loss associated with the commitment period.     

An Analysis of Bank Loan Rate Indexation

This paper examines the economic rationale for the use of bank loan commitments and the effect on the allocation of bank credit of indexing the loan rate offered through the commitment to the prime. A simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in loan demand and the cost of bank funds have on the allocation of bank credit under indexation. It is shown that indexing implies changes in the relative cost of borrowing for certain groups of bank customers. For nonprime customers, an increase in the cost of bank funds results in a decline in the relative cost of borrowing under commitments. The pattern of commitment use is found to be consistent with the predictions of the model.