Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers

This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.     

THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY*

We investigate a basic question about a monopoly with incomplete information: when does the seller have an incentive to allow potential buyers to acquire more private information about their tastes for the seller's product? Under plausible conditions such as log‐concave density of willingness‐to‐pay and convex marginal cost, the seller prefers that the paying customers be well informed as a group but be left in the dark regarding their individual tastes.     

Quality infomediation in search markets

We examine the effects of informational intermediation by a third party ‘infomediary’ in a search model with heterogeneous seller qualities and asymmetric information. The infomediary earns revenue by selling a list of accredited sellers (a ‘guidebook’) to buyers and selling accreditations to sellers. We show that such information always improves welfare but can hurt informed buyers (as well as the uninformed) if it is not sufficiently informative about seller qualities. The model also provides a number of insights concerning the private and social incentives to create information, and the determinants and nature of demand for infomediation services by buyers and sellers.     

Buyer confusion and market prices

We employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices. Each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences. Sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices. The number of attributes bears no cost to the sellers and does not affect the value of the good to the buyers but adds complexity to buyers’ evaluation of the goods. The experimental results indicate that the buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher. Moreover, prices and profits are higher than those in a benchmark treatment with perfectly rational (robot) buyers.     

The origins of power in buyer–seller relationships

Who, or what, holds power in business-to-business buyer–seller relationships is a debate at the heart of power theory. Power in buyer–seller relationships is variously seen as the property of organizations, individuals or relationships yet to be theoretically valid and useful to management, integration of these schools of thought needs to be operationalized. This paper opens up future research avenues through identifying how buyers and sellers understand the origins of power and the nature of self perceived and countervailing power. The paper presents results from 10 focus groups of both buyers and sellers revealing the underlying origins of experienced power. The results support the proposition that power in buyer–seller relationships is a pluralistic concept and that extant theories focused on organizational, individual or relational elements of power are independently too narrow in their reflections of the power construct; rather, they are all part of the same broad construct.     

Ethical Differentiation and Consumption in an Incentivized Market Experiment

In surveys consumers express preferences for ethical goods. Some authors claim, however, that survey responses do not translate into actual costly purchase behavior. To study if ethical consumption and differentiation occur in an incentive-compatible setting, this paper implements a design of an incentivized market experiment, which has been studied in the context of homogenous goods and both theoretically and experimentally engenders a dynamic of price decrease. This experiment establishes that ethical differentiation can be an effective strategy for sellers with ethically motivated buyers; and, although there is an ethical price premium, it accrues to the charity rather than to the seller.     

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.     

Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle

This paper examines an auction platform in which the monopoly platform maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus between the seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller's type is affiliated with the buyers' signals, the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by choosing a first‐price or descending auction than a second‐price or ascending auction.     

Credence goods monopolists

With a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need. Therefore, the seller acts as the expert determining the customers’ requirements. This information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services. We analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non-fraudulent seller behavior. We consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller’s incentives to be honest. In three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services; only in one scenario there is no trade.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Market structure and business performance: An evaluation of buyer/seller power in the pims database

This paper explores the patterns of buyer and seller structure among business units in the PIMS database and how buyer/seller structure is related to profit outcomes, both long-term through the product life cycle and short-term between periods of boom and recession. Businesses with a favourable structure (few sellers, many buyers buying items of low importance) typically maintain margins through the product life cycle, but if there are many sellers facing few and determined buyers, margins and profitability are likely to deteriorate in recession and to continue to decline through the life cycle.     

Price Strategies for Idiosyncratic Goods—The Case of Housing

We determine the mechanism that a rational, profit-maximizing seller would use to revise his reservation price for a heterogeneous or infrequently exchanged good. For instance, while one dimension of a home's quality may be easily determined in competitive markets (e.g., the valuation of floor size, location, etc.), other dimensions of quality may be idiosyncratic (unit specific) and unobservable by the seller (e.g., aesthetics of the home). Here, a seller of a new or infrequently exchanged housing unit may use sales success information to revise his expectation of the unit's market-determined value and hence revise his reservation price. The rational seller will, upon arrival of the first buyer inspecting the unit, determine a sequence of reservation prices for this and expected subsequent buyers. This price sequence falls for subsequent buyers and starts from a lower initial price if the first buyer arrives later than expected. Through this mechanism, we offer an explanation for price dispersion and vacancy durations in housing markets. While we explicitly model the real estate market here, this price revision mechanism is also applicable to rental markets, labor markets, used car markets, and other markets characterized by heterogeneity and infrequent sales.     

An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining.     

Cheap Exclusion in Markets with Multiple Complements

We extend the theory of exclusive dealing in first-mover environments to settings where the incumbent seller’s product is used with multiple complements in a distribution chain and the incumbent can sign exclusive dealing contracts with more than one of them. The model is motivated by the market for biosimilar pharmaceuticals, where incumbent sellers that face a threat of entry can sign exclusionary contracts with both providers and insurance carriers prior to entry. We show that when the incumbent’s complementors are vertically related, it can be profitable for the incumbent to sign exclusive contracts with indirect buyers, who operate downstream from the direct buyers of the product. Under linear pricing, such exclusion is profitable if the pass-through rate is sufficiently low, and under nonlinear pricing and symmetric Nash bargaining, it is profitable for all pass-through rates. Complementors face a more severe coordination problem than independent buyers that can make anticompetitive exclusion more likely and especially cheap.     

Secret reserve prices in first-price auctions

This article offers a theoretical explanation for the use of secret reserve prices in auctions. I study first-price auctions with and without secret reserve price in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral buyers and a seller who cares at least minimally about risk. The seller can fix the auction rules either before or after she learns her reservation value. Fixing the rules early and keeping the right to set a secret reserve price can be strictly optimal. Moreover, I describe the relation of using a secret reserve price to phantom bidding and non-commitment to sell.     

Power in distribution channels — Supplier assortment strategy for balancing power

This paper focuses on the move from buyer dominance toward interdependence between buyers and suppliers in a distribution channel. The paper introduces a case study collected through in-depth interviews and participative observations. It examines the relationships between a timber supplier and its customers in the builders' merchants sector. We stress the relevance of considering actions intended to change the power balance, rather than focusing only on trust. The power balance in a dyadic relationship is dynamic, and power positions need to be constantly re-evaluated. An important power resource is information asymmetry, manifested in the supplier's information about: products, regional and local demand, and the usage of the products. For practitioners, we highlight the possibility of exerting a non-coercive power resource, such as information asymmetry, in order to increase the relative power. Furthermore, being open about the power position between a buyer and a seller can foster a more efficient collaboration.     

Relationship quality as a resource to build industrial brand equity when products are uncertain and future-based

This article extends our understanding of industrial branding and the influence of buyer–seller relationships by examining key constructs within an industrial context where products are uncertain and future-based. SEM results elicited from 249 buyer surveys empirically validate satisfaction, trust and commitment as dimensions of relationship quality, and show that buyer–seller relationship quality facilitates direct and indirect seller brand equity accruals. Findings reveal that while focusing on sellers' corporate and product brands is good advice for building buyer–seller relationships, seller resource allocations to these areas should vary depending upon the selected target market segment(s). Findings support that sellers should place more focus on developing quality relationships with buyers than they should in focusing on the non-relational attributes of their corporate brands; however, if sellers choose to bypass building high quality customer relationships, they should instead funnel resources into their product brand offerings. Findings demonstrate that buyers credit their own skills and acumen when evaluating products with which they are confident, and ascribe increased value to the involvement of the seller as their attitude and certainty decrease. These findings provide strategic guidance to the sellers of uncertain and future-based industrial products.     

An experimental study of exclusive contracts

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment based on exclusive contracts that may theoretically lead to inefficient “naked exclusion” of a potential rival. The data indicate that changes in the number of buyers in the market have no significant effect on exclusion rates but the likelihood of inefficient exclusion is decreased both when a larger fraction of signed buyers are needed to deter a rival's entry and when buyers engage in non-binding communication. These results have antitrust implications both in terms of helping to identify “at-risk” market characteristics and suggesting potential competition-enhancing strategies. A sub-game of the experiment where buyers make signing decisions can be illustrated as a coordination game with the unique feature that payoffs are affected by a separate but interested party (the incumbent seller). I find that the height of the potential function and relevant basin of attraction, especially when combined with quantal response estimation, have larger predictive power in this sub-game than several other equilibrium selection criteria.     

Information disclosure in optimal auctions

This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valuation of a good to be sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online advertising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the optimal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information provided increases with the number of potential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distribution of a bidder’s expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly) affects the reserve price. We show that as the number of bidders increases, the optimal reserve price becomes more restrictive.     

Competition Among Middlemen When Buyers and Sellers Can Trade Directly

This paper examines competition among middlemen when sellers and buyers can trade directly. Direct trade alters the supply and demand facing the middlemen, making them interdependent, and reduces the market power of intermediaries. However, it does not alter the Stahl [1988] result that middlemen may have an incentive to “corner” the market if demand is inelastic. The model is applied to market making in financial markets, vertical integration in goods markets and to the question of bypass in utilities. This discussion suggests that cornering is most likely in markets for essential inputs and that it may enable seller collusion.