Central Bank Digital Currency,Credit Supply,and Financial Stability

We examine the implications of central bank digital currency (CBDC) for credit supply and financial stability using a monetary general equilibrium model. The introduction of deposits in CBDC account decreases credit supply by banks, raising the nominal interest rate and lowering a bank's reserve-deposit ratio. This increases the likelihood of bank panic in which banks exhaust cash reserves. However, once the central bank can lend all the deposits in CBDC account to banks, an increase in the quantity of CBDC which does not require reserve holdings can enhance financial stability by increasing credit supply and lowering nominal interest rate.     

International monetary transmission with bank heterogeneity and default risk

This paper compares the effectiveness, efficiency and robustness of standard and non-standard monetary policy tools, such as the banks’ refinancing interest rate, penalty interest rate on deposit facility holdings and minimum reserve requirements on attracted deposits. The assessment is performed on the basis of a numerically evaluated open economy general equilibrium model for macro-prudential analysis where optimal decisions by internationally linked banks are key determinants of international financial flows and wider economic outcomes. Banks differ in terms of balance sheet endowments and risk preferences and take decisions rationally and competitively. Default risk, borrowing and lending are endogenous results of individual decisions of private agents (banks and households), as well as systemic outcomes of market interaction.     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Money, banking, and monetary policy

An important function of banks is to issue liabilities, like demand deposits, that are relatively safe and liquid. We introduce a risk of theft and a safe-keeping role for banks into modern monetary theory. This provides a general equilibrium framework for analyzing banking in historical and contemporary contexts. The model can generate the concurrent circulation of cash and bank liabilities as media of exchange, or inside and outside money. It also yields novel policy implications. For example, negative nominal interest rates are feasible, and for some parameters optimal; for other parameters, strictly positive nominal rates are optimal.     

Funding Modes of German Banks: Structural Changes and their Implications

We investigate the funding modes of German banks and the implications for lending and profitability during 1992–2002. We find that at many banks, deposits from customers decrease in relative terms while interbank liabilities increase as a source of funding. We cannot detect a negative impact of the relative decline in deposits on lending. The decreasing ability of banks to collect deposits and the substitution of deposits by interbank liabilities unfavorably affects the net interest result of banks that exhibit a deposit deficit, especially savings banks. Our findings indicate a structural lengthening of the intermediation chain, which has broader implications for the functioning and stability of the financial system.     

Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and changes in the deposit insurance system on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. In an environment of less restrictive bank supervision and a deposit insurance policy that favored state banks, we find that depositors exacted a price for risk-taking. After a new law increasing insurance coverage for private banks went into effect, however, bank specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. We report, however, that the three fully guaranteed state banks pay significantly lower rates than private banks. Moreover, other state-owned banks, with the same explicit guarantee as private banks, pay significantly lower rates than private banks, so it appears that depositors treat these state-owned banks as if they have a larger implicit guarantee.     

Incentive-Based Lending Capacity,Competition and Regulation in Banking

This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G28, L13.     

Bank Competition with Financing and Savings Substitutes

This paper models the banking competition in loan and deposit markets on two levels. We measure the competition among different banks and among banks and non-bank financing and saving alternatives. We estimate a model of demand, cost, and market equilibrium equations for differentiated products by using data from the confidential reports that Spanish banks provide to the Bank of Spain during the period from 1988 to 2003. This database contains information on the effective interest rates on new loans and deposits, and the expected loan losses obtained from the Spanish Credit Register. The estimated price elasticities show that the products offered by different banks are close substitutes, which puts pressure on the banks’ profits margins. However, the substitutability between bank and non-bank products is much lower than the substitutability among products offered by different banks. The results also show that Spain’s entrance into the Eurozone did not cause a structural change in the demand and cost conditions of Spanish banks. The banks financed most of the imbalances between bank loans and domestic deposits before the crisis through the interbank market.     

Liquidity regulation and the implementation of monetary policy

We study the impact of the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) on interbank interest rates in an otherwise-standard model of monetary policy implementation. When banks face the possibility of an LCR shortfall, the overnight interest rate tends to decrease, while a regulatory premium arises in longer-term rates. In addition, the LCR requirement can substantially alter the effect of a central banks’ open market operations on equilibrium interest rates.     

Sources of Liquidity and Liquidity Shortages

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.     

Effect of Internationalization on the Cost Efficiency of Taiwan’s Banks

Abstract:

We focus on the effect of internationalization on the cost efficiency of banks by studying Taiwan as a sample for developing countries. We find that (1) increasing overseas businesses and foreign exchange deposits increases cost efficiency; (2) expanding offshore banking units increases bank efficiency; and (3) the profitability of a bank’s overseas branch is not a critical factor behind the differences in cost efficiency across both financial holding company (FHC) banks and non-financial holding company (non-FHC) banks. Finally, our metafrontier empirical results illustrate that FHC banks in Taiwan show better technical performance in cost control than non-FHC banks.     

Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks

This paper captures banks’ dynamic response to depositor discipline. Recognizing that the price and quantity response of uninsured deposits in the face of deteriorating fundamentals needs to be modeled as an endogenous process, we investigate how depositor discipline constrains banks’ behavior by extracting the impact of an exogenous rise in interest rates on the quantity of uninsured deposits. We find that good banks can raise uninsured deposits by raising their price, while weak banks cannot. This suggests that depositor discipline not only raises the cost of choosing a higher level of risk but also may, at very high levels of risk, effectively constrain bank managers’ behavior.     

What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.     

An analysis of nontraditional activities at U.S. commercial banks

In recent years, commercial banking in the United States has experienced a decline in its traditional business of financing loans by issuing deposits. Simultaneously, banks have become more involved in nontraditional activities that provide financial services and generate fee income. As a result, real aggregate noninterest income has risen relative to income from traditional activities. This paper examines features common to banks that are heavily engaged in nontraditional areas. The empirical analysis suggests that these banks tend to be larger, have smaller net interest margins, have relatively fewer core deposits, and exhibit less risk. These findings have intuitive appeal and conform to conventional wisdom; while larger banks have fewer core deposits and face more competitive interest rate conditions, resulting in narrow spreads from traditional intermediation, they have more diverse sources of revenue and greater access to financial markets, which reduces risk.     

Monetary policy effects in times of negative interest rates: What do bank stock prices tell us?

This paper investigates bank stock performance following different monetary policy actions in times of positive and negative interest rates. Controlling for the broader stock market, monetary policy announcements that cause an unanticipated downward shift in the yield curve and a flattening of the shorter-end of the yield curve are found to persistently reduce bank stock prices once the interest rate environment is negative. Consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy, the effects are larger and more persistent for banks that are relatively dependent on deposit funding. By contrast, a surprise movement in the slope of the longer-end of the yield curve does not impact bank stock prices in times of negative interest rates. Accounting data confirm that a parallel drop in the yield curve following a monetary policy decision in a negative interest rate environment hurts banks through shrinking deposit margins.     

商业银行吸收存款能力、发行理财及其经济后果研究

本文分析了商业银行吸收存款能力和发行理财产品的关系及其经济后果。本文发现商业银行吸收存款能力越弱,通过理财产品募集资金越多,理财产品收益率越高。具体来说,非四大国有银行,通过理财产品募集资金越多,理财产品收益率越高;银行的网点数量越少,通过理财产品募集资金越多,理财产品的收益率越高;银行所在地区贷存比越高,通过理财产品募集资金越多,理财产品收益率越高;银行所在地区的金融机构密度越大,通过理财募集资金越多,理财产品收益率越高。进一步研究发现,非保本理财产品加大了银行经营业绩波动,从而增大了银行经营风险。     

利率市场化对我国商业银行收入结构的影响研究 —基于16家上市银行数据的实证

利率市场化对我国商业银行转型发展产生了深刻的影响,本文以2008~2015年间16 家上市银行的数据作为研究样本,实证分析了利率市场化对商业银行业务收入结构的影响效 应。结果表明：利率市场化显著改善了我国商业银行业务收入结构;资产规模、监管压力、风 险水平、宏观经济也对业务收入结构具有正向促进作用,而货币供应量快速增长则对业务收入 结构起到抑制作用。鉴于此,我国商业银行要保持持续稳健增长,必须加快业务创新步伐,创 造新的盈利增长点,以适应利率市场化后的外部竞争环境。     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

第三方合作存款与商业银行风险承担

近年来与第三方互联网平台合作推出存款产品一度成为部分中小银行吸收存款的重要手段,监管部门对此高度关注并出台监管措施,但相关的学术研究较为匮乏。本文基于国内上市银行2012—2020年的面板数据,实证分析开展第三方合作存款业务对银行风险承担的影响并考察内在机理。研究发现,开展该业务显著提高了银行风险承担水平,表现为加权风险资产的扩张及高风险行业信贷资产配置的提升。机制研究表明,合作银行的储蓄存款规模显著扩张,流动性资金的过快增长刺激银行信贷向高利率贷款、高风险行业倾斜。本文研究对完善互联网存款监管,防控商业银行风险具有一定的启示意义。