Interchange fee regulation and service investments

This paper analyzes the impact of interchange fee regulation on the investment incentives of a payment card platform in the presence of full merchant internalization. We distinguish between investment in consumer and retailer services. We find that the optimally regulated interchange fee can be above the privately optimal one to induce the platform to invest more in retailer services. We also demonstrate that the two prominent regulatory benchmarks of a zero interchange fee and regulation according to the “tourist test” tend to set too low investment incentives under a total welfare standard. Instead, “tourist test” regulation can be a reasonable approximation under a total user surplus standard.     

Search diversion and platform competition

Platforms use search diversion in order to trade off total consumer traffic for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We show that competition between platforms leads to lower equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the intensity of competition is high. On the other hand, if there is only mild competition, then competing platforms induce more search diversion relative to a platform monopolist.When platforms charge consumers fixed access fees, all equilibrium levels of search diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level, irrespective of the nature of competition. Furthermore, relative to platforms that cannot charge such fees, platforms that charge positive (negative) access fees to consumers have weaker (stronger) incentives to divert search.     

Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

We propose a two‐sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CP's). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CP's which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination, investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination.     

Price disclosure by two-sided platforms

We consider two-sided platforms with the feature that some users on one or both sides of the market lack information about the price charged to participants on the other side of the market. With positive cross-group external effects, such lack of price information makes demand less elastic. A monopoly platform does not benefit from opaqueness and optimally reveals price information. By contrast, in a two-sided singlehoming duopoly, platforms benefit from opaqueness and, thus, do not have an incentive to disclose price information. In competitive bottleneck markets, results are more nuanced: if one side is fully informed (for exogenous reasons), platforms may decide to inform users on the other side either fully, partially or not at all, depending on the strength of cross-group external effects and the degree of horizontal differentiation.     

Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards,discounts and surcharges

The proliferation of new payment methods on the Internet rekindles the old and unsettled debate about merchants’ incentive and ability to differentiate price according to payment choice. This paper develops an imperfect-information framework for the analysis of platform and social regulation of card surcharging and cash discounting. It makes three main contributions. First, it identifies the conditions under which concerns about missed sales induce merchants to perceive that they must take the card. Second, it derives a set of predictions about cash discounts, card surcharges and platform fees that shed light on existing evidence. Finally, it shows that the optimal regulation of surcharging is related to public policy toward merchant fees and substantially differs from current practice.     

Complementors as connectors: managing open innovation around digital product platforms

In the digital age, open innovation is increasingly organized around platform ecosystems. This paper investigates how firms can coordinate open innovation as a platform strategy for the development of complementary products by independent third parties. We draw on a qualitative case study of Philips Hue – a connected lighting platform for consumers with its variety of complementary products. We identify three increasingly complex ways in which independent complements connect to a focal platform. Our findings show that managing these connections requires a hybrid open innovation approach that combines arm’s length coordination, with a large number of complementors through open interfaces, and intensive bilateral collaboration, with a selected number of partners. Our findings demonstrate that complex interconnections across digital platforms and products lead to the management challenge of navigating an ‘ecology of platforms’, which warrants future research.     

PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ‘MUST‐HAVE’ COMPONENTS*

In platform‐component systems with indirect network effects, some ‘must‐have’ components are so popular with consumers that they create large, discrete indirect network effects when they become available on a platform. For example, ESPN is a must‐have component of cable TV platforms. This paper examines how platform market structures determine exclusive versus non‐exclusive contracts between platforms and components. It shows that a component provider is more likely to sign exclusive contracts with a single platform if its popularity is high, the platform market share difference is large, and cross‐platform indirect network effects are low.     

基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析

本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属（接入）寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明：在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。     

Platform competition with complementary products

We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.     

Seller curation in platforms

This article explores why market platforms do not expel low-quality sellers when screening costs are minimal. I model a platform market with consumer search. The presence of low-quality sellers reduces search intensity, softening competition between sellers and increasing the equilibrium market price. The platform admits some low-quality sellers if competition between sellers is intense. Recommending a high-quality seller and this form of search obfuscation are complementary strategies. The low-quality sellers enable the recommended seller to attract many consumers at a high price and the effect of the recommendation is strengthened as low-quality sellers become more adept at imitating high-quality sellers.     

Value co-creation and appropriation of platform-based alliances in cooperative advertising

Digital platforms help develop the open value co-creation strategic alliances, reshape traditional B2B relationships, and promote inclusive social innovation. This research explores the nature of coopetition between the digital platform and its participants. The focus is on how the platform-based alliance balances the contradiction between value creation and appropriation. The support evidence derives from a Stackelberg game in the context of cooperative advertising. Either the platform or the participant supporting advertising in the alliance prompts a Pareto improvement for all players. But the increased profit would be mainly occupied by the dominant platform. The incentive mechanism of profit sharing can promote the alliance to co-create value in a sustainable manner. The game illustrates the significance of cooperative relationships to co-create a larger total value and the existence of an unequal win-win relationship in the strategic alliance. The contradictory logic of cooperation and competition can be accommodated in the platform-based alliance. The dynamic coopetition is involved in a partially convergent interest structure and impacted by power asymmetry. The results highlight the balance between the tensions and harmonies through value creation and appropriation.     

Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*

Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.     

开放平台与所有权平台的竞争:网络效应与策略选择

开放平台（标准）的出现给所有权平台带来很大冲击，也给经济学家提出了挑战．这种免费的资源提供的动机何在？它对创新活动有何影响？它会如何影响市场竞争的结果？本文提供了一个分析开放平台和所有权平台（双寡）竞争的理论模型，在考虑网络效应以及所有权平台拥有者的兼容策略选择等情形下。分析了不同平台的目标和均衡策略选择。在此基础上。我们还拓展分析了社会对不同产业结构（开放＋所有权VS所有权＋所有权）的选择激励．结果发现不同的参数设定会得到不同的结论。     

From channel integration to platform integration: Capabilities required in hospitality

Although channel integration is vital to manage multiple channels in harmony, most research focuses on direct and indirect channels. However, hotels increasingly engage with platforms – an interface bringing together a network of hotels and customers. Channels and platforms have distinct attributes – channels facilitate economies of scale, while platforms foster network effects, i.e., growing the number of hotels and customers for the benefit of both parties. Therefore, we question whether channel integration capabilities are relevant in platform contexts. Furthermore, because platforms have high market power which affects hotel profitability, research is required to explore the specialized platform integration capabilities for optimal hotel performance. Applying grounded theory, we identify five coordinating capabilities for hotels to align their operations with platforms and three learning capabilities for hotels to develop new knowledge to work with platforms. Our contribution is the explication of the similarities and differences between channel integration and platform integration: (i) one set of integration capabilities are similar across channels and platforms – they manifest similarly and serve similar objectives. However, in platform contexts (ii) some integration capabilities satisfy different objectives, (iii) some are wider in scope to achieve a broader set of objectives, and (iv) some are unique and attain new objectives.     

Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming?

Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming (i.e., some users joining both platforms). If initially both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This in not always true, as the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.     

基于非线性效应的第三方支付平台兼容性研究

本文在设定网络外部性效用为符合梅特卡夫法则的非线性函数条件下,构建双寡头支付平台兼容和不兼容两种情况下的优化模型,探讨双寡头支付平台的兼容性策略选择问题。研究发现,规模对称的双寡头支付平台兼容之后,两家支付平台的利润、消费者效用及社会福利均会增加;银联成立后中国工商银行的银行卡业务利润得以提升也验证了模型结果。建议政府借鉴银联的成功经验,使银联在线成为各支付平台的聚合型平台,提高第三方支付清算系统的效率。     

Evaluating Product Plans Using Real Options

Product planning helps a company to strategically plan its current and future product platforms and offer product variants in the marketplace. Product platforming is widely touted as a successful strategy for mass customization. However, due diligence should be exercised before implementing any product platform strategy. The product planning exercise should account for future uncertainties. Traditional financial tools such as the net present value (NPV) are static since they do not compensate for any exogenous and endogenous uncertainties during the course of the project. The crux of the problem lies in the evaluation model that is used for evaluating the product planning projects. While many view uncertainties in a product planning project as problematic, it can also be viewed as a source of new opportunities. We argue that uncertainties should be an integral part of the evaluation model. If the future possibilities (or strategic options) are not considered in the evaluation model, a corporation may face a “myopic syndrome”.

In this article, we consider two important product planning decisions—platform decisions and product variant decisions. The platform decision involves strategic selection of a concept product platform from various possible alternative concept product platforms. The product variant decision involves deciding how long a company should continue to offer its current product variant in the marketplace and whether the existing product variant should be discontinued, scaled down, or scaled up with additional product features. To address the two aforementioned decisions, we developed a real options–based methodology that considers technical, project implementation, and market-related uncertainties. The proposed methodology uses a binomial and quadranomial lattice approach to build a decision tree. Product planning decisions at various decision tree nodes are evaluated using a risk-neutral option valuation methodology. We demonstrate the working of the proposed methodology using an illustrative example.     

Search algorithm,repetitive information,and sales on online platforms

A prominent feature of online sales is that buyers rely on the search tools offered by platforms to process information when searching for products. We develop a model that captures how the search algorithm affects buyers’ search processes, which further influences market equilibrium and welfare. If a platform adopts a highly unequal search algorithm, buyers are likely to obtain repetitive information about a small group of sellers, which causes buyers to consider fewer options and suppresses competition. By using data from food delivery platforms, we provide empirical evidence that markets with less equal distributions of store rankings in search results have higher average prices and more concentrated sales. We suggest that regulators should restrict search algorithms from showing repetitive information.     

How Subprime Borrowers and Mortgage Brokers Shared the Pie

We develop an equilibrium model for origination fees charged by mortgage brokers and show how the equilibrium fee distribution depends on borrowers' valuation for their loans and their information about fees. We use noncrossing quantile regressions and data from a large subprime lender to estimate conditional fee distributions. Given the fee distribution, we identify the distributions of borrower valuations and informedness. The level of informedness is higher for larger loans and in better educated neighborhoods. We quantify the fraction of the surplus from the mortgage that goes to the broker, and how it decreases as the borrower becomes more informed.     

Private labels in marketplaces

Regulators are concerned that by introducing their own private labels, dominant online marketplace operators distort competition in their own favor. This paper addresses this concern by studying how online marketplaces differ from classic retailers with a wholesale arrangement. In online marketplaces individual sellers set their own consumer prices, while the marketplace operator collects fees from their sales. I show that when introducing a private label, the marketplace operator does not have an incentive to distort competition and foreclose the outside seller. On the contrary, when introducing a private label, there is an incentive to decrease the fee charged to the outside seller and to vertically differentiate its own product in order to protect the seller’s channel. However, relative to the wholesale model of classic retailers, online marketplace operators offer a lower quality with higher consumer prices, leading to less improvement in consumer surplus and potentially less harm to the outside seller.