Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

Monetary policy and financial markets are intrinsically linked. Central banks conduct monetary policy by influencing financial market prices. Financial market prices reflect the expectations of market participants about future economic and monetary developments. Monetary policy works primarily through expectations. Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitutes for action. If a credible central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk losing credibility. To avoid what has been described as “the dog chasing its tail” problem, central banks must exercise caution in basing their monetary policy decisions on financial market information. The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against economic and monetary indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy.     

市场预期的货币政策效应与中国的选择

因为市场预期对货币政策操作效应的影响越来越大,所以世界各国中央银行对待市场预期的态度也发生了改变,开始重视市场预期。中央银行除了通过与市场交流了解和识别市场预期之外,更注重引导和利用市场预期来达到货币政策目标。而在引导和利用市场预期方面,目前最主要的趋势是增加货币政策的透明度。中国中央银行也开始在这方面努力,但在识别和利用市场预期方面,未来还有许多工作要做。     

The reaction of asset markets to Swiss National Bank communication

In this paper we analyze high-frequency movements in Swiss asset markets in reaction to real-time communication by the Swiss National Bank. Our analysis of central bank communication encompasses monetary policy announcements, speeches and interviews. We examine the reactions of the currency market, the bond market and the stock exchange. The evidence suggests that speeches and interviews, along with monetary policy announcements, engender a significant price reaction. This paper sheds light on the relevance of communications other than monetary policy announcements.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

货币政策传导过程中的金融体系研究

金融体系在货币政策传导过程中起“中介”作用,货币渠道过程是通过金融市场从货币政策冲击到市场零售利率的价格传导过程,信贷渠道是通过商业银行从中央银行到商业银行的数量传导过程。完善我国金融体系有利于提高货币政策传导效果,同时也是市场经济体制改革的要求,我国中央银行实施货币政策时应该考虑区域金融差异的客观事实。     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

The Fed,the Bond Market,and Gradualism in Monetary Policy

We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long‐run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time‐consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.     

浅析电子货币对货币政策效应的冲击

货币政策是一个国家调控经济的重要工具，但电子货币在实体经济中的运行使传统的货币政策传导机制受到梗阻，从而使货币政策效应变得难以预测，如挑战传统的货币层次；缩减央行资产负债表的规模，并使利率、货币供应量、超额准备金和基础货币等货币政策中介指标变得难以测度，从而影响货币政策的抉择和实施。故中央银行应研讨新形势下的对策。BIS提供的建议也可咨借鉴。     

Monetary Policy Transmission with Interbank Market Fragmentation

This paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy. Fragmentation is the fact that banks, depending on their country of location, have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings. Once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation, excess liquidity arises endogenously. This leads short-term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates. Using data on monetary policy operations, I show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008. The model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures.     

The channels of monetary policy triggered by central bank actions and statements in the Australian equity market

Owing to the discrete disclosure practices of the Reserve Bank of Australia, this paper provides new evidence on the channels of monetary policy triggered by central bank actions (monetary policy announcements) and statements (explanatory minutes releases), in the Australian equity market. Both monetary policy announcements and explanatory minutes releases are shown to have a significant and comparable impact on the returns and volatility of the Australian equity market. Further, distinct from US and European studies that find strong evidence of the interest rate, bank loan and balance sheet channels and no evidence of the exchange rate channel following central bank actions, this paper finds that monetary policy impacts the Australian equity market via the exchange rate, interest rate and bank loan channels of monetary policy, with only weak evidence of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. These channels are found to be operating irrespective of the trigger (monetary policy announcements or explanatory minutes releases), though results are somewhat weaker when examining the explanatory minutes releases. These results have important implications for central bank officials and financial market participants alike: by confirming a comparable avenue to affect monetary policy; and providing an explication of its impact on the Australian equity market.     

The Bank Lending Channel Revisited

A central proposition in research on the role of banks in the transmission mechanism is that monetary policy imparts a direct impact on deposits and that deposits act as the driving force of bank lending. This paper argues that the emphasis on policy‐induced changes in deposits is misplaced. A reformulation of the bank lending channel is proposed that works primarily through the impact of monetary policy on banks’ balance sheet strength and risk perception. Such a recasting implies, contrary to conventional wisdom, that greater reliance on market‐based funding enhances the importance of the channel.     

Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: Evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

中央银行沟通的金融市场响应——基于股票市场的事件研究

本文使用事件研究法分析我国中央银行沟通行为对股票价格走势的影响。研究发现,影响确实存在且影响方向和力度与央行沟通方式以及股票市场背景有关。具体而言:(1)书面沟通影响显著,口头沟通则无明显作用;(2)宽松性政策信息沟通产生了正向影响,紧缩性信息沟通影响为负;(3)沟通事件的影响主要体现为一种短期作用,并伴随着即时效应、预知效应和滞后效应;(4)在熊市或牛市的不同市场背景下,央行沟通对股价的影响存在非对称性。结果表明,央行的沟通手段对金融市场有重要影响。     

货币政策可信度的理论分析

货币政策可信度是指经济主体相信中央银行采取系统性的行动以最终达到所承诺的政策目标.如果公众相信中央银行将言行一致地进行货币政策操作,那么这样的货币政策就是可信的.市场经济中,货币政策的可信度在很大程度上影响到货币政策的效率.因此,明确货币政策可信度的涵义,分析货币政策可信度的影响因素,致力于提高货币政策可信度的制度建设,对提高货币政策的有效性具有现实意义.     

货币政策、宏观审慎与汇率波动--基于时变效应的新视角

本文研究央行政策对人民币外汇市场压力的时变性影响。研究发现,央行数量型货币政策和宏观审慎政策主要通过影响人民币在国际货币市场的"相对"供给水平来影响人民币外汇市场压力的波动,宽松政策在经济高涨时期和经济新常态时期会引起人民币外汇市场贬值压力,在经济萧条时期会引起人民币外汇市场升值压力;央行价格型货币政策主要通过影响人民币在国际货币市场的"相对"需求水平来影响人民币外汇市场压力的波动,宽松政策在经济高涨时期和经济新常态时期会引起人民币外汇市场升值压力,在经济萧条时期会引起人民币外汇市场贬值压力。     

Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries. We use quarterly data in the 1980.1–2005.4 period and exclude EMU countries. Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant index of central bank independence with government ideology. The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.     

Perfecting the Market's Knowledge of Monetary Policy

The rational expectations revolution made clear that a complete macro model requires a specification of the government's economic policy. We argue that monetary policy should be conducted in such a way that the market can predict policy actions. An implication of market success in predicting policy actions is that interest rates move ahead of the policy actions, and such a timing relationship may appear to some as the central bank following the market instead of leading it. Another implication of the market predicting policy actions is that nominal interest rate changes provide no useful information to the central bank about the strength of aggregate demand or inflationary expectations. Finally, failure of the market to predict policy actions reflects a problem that needs to be addressed.We explore the theoretical implications of a monetary policy that is completely specified and perfectly understood by the market. We construct a bare-bones model to illustrate the key concepts. Finally, we conduct an empirical investigation of these issues, especially in the context of monetary policy since 1988, when the establishment of the federal funds future market made available well-defined market information on expectations about Fed policy actions. We find that when the intended funds rate is changed, interest rates over the maturity spectrum respond to news measured by changes in the one-month-ahead funds futures yield but do not respond to the anticipated component of the change in the intended funds rate.     

The discrete and differential impact of monetary policy

This study exploits a unique feature of the Australian monetary policy environment to determine whether economic recovery can be stimulated via central bank communications. This study finds that unexpected monetary policy announcements and communications have a significant and comparable impact on the value and volatility of the Australian foreign exchange market, suggesting that they can be used interchangeably to stimulate economic recovery. However, further analysis reveals that the state of the economy influences this impact. Specifically, during poor economic states, monetary policy actions speak louder than words, an adage that in this context provides actionable information for central bank regulators.