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1.
Bank Competition and Loan Quality 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We analyze the impact of bank competition on the equilibrium quality of loans in a formal model where banks do not observe the type of loan applicants, i.e. face an adverse selection problem, nor borrowers’ effort, i.e. also face a moral hazard problem. The main finding is that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the average quality of loans. Policy implications are derived from this result and from an extension to the basic model where banks may sequentially acquire information about potential borrowers. 相似文献
2.
In this paper, we examine the disciplinary role of borrowers, who are one of the key stakeholders in Turkish banks and are heavily affected when their banks experience difficulty. In the theoretical model, we show that borrowers prefer to have a relationship with less risky banks although it increases their cost of getting funds. Empirically, we examine the relationship between quality of a bank and its loan demand and find that as riskiness of a bank decreases, its loan demand increases significantly, suggesting the disciplinary role of borrowers in Turkey. 相似文献
3.
Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships. 相似文献
4.
THOMAS KICK MICHAEL KOETTER TIGRAN POGHOSYAN 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2016,48(7):1467-1494
We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed‐out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years. 相似文献
5.
We show that collateral plays an important role in the design of debt contracts, the provision of credit, and the incentives of lenders to monitor borrowers. Using a unique data set from a large bank containing timely assessments of collateral values, we find that the bank responded to a legal reform that exogenously reduced collateral values by increasing interest rates, tightening credit limits, and reducing the intensity of its monitoring of borrowers and collateral, spurring borrower delinquency on outstanding claims. We thus explain why banks are senior lenders and quantify the value of claimant priority. 相似文献
6.
This paper considers the extent to which loan commitments mitigate the problems of information monopolies that arise when the firm contracts with a private lender. Loan commitments in conjunction with short-term debt often provide the firm with superior investment incentives by influencing both the states in which bargaining occurs as well as the outcomes from bargaining. Commitment contracts are particularly valuable when there is a high likelihood that information about the firm will be publicly revealed ex post. We also identify circumstances under which the firm foregoes commitment financing, relying on short-term debt instead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G32, D82. 相似文献
7.
随着银行对社会奖金的集散、调剂作用日益加强,贷款规模不断膨胀,银行的抵债资产也越来越多。由于抵债资产作价方法不科学、缺乏变现途径、变现差额管理不规范等原因,银行对抵债资产的管理存在一些不容忽视的问题。本文对我国商业银行目前抵债资产的现状、审计方法及对策作出了阐述。 相似文献
8.
以2005年10月27日为起点,建行迈出了成为国际一流银行坚实的第一步。深圳,曾经以“一夜建大楼”的发展速度而受全球瞩目,如今,建行深圳市分行以更严谨的管理制度。更全面的战略眼光,组合出质量、速度与效益的完美舞步,创造了深圳金 相似文献
9.
We analyze the bank's decision to reschedule or to foreclose on a loan in default and the borrower's decision to divert lender-financed assets to personal use, i.e., to consume the assets. We show that the debt of borrowers in financial distress that have substantial intangible or highly specialized assets—i.e., illiquid assets—is likely to be rescheduled. Alternatively, banks will likely foreclose on borrowers in distress that have assets that are difficult to monitor. It is the interaction of the asset's liquidity and the borrower moral hazard that helps determine the nature of the equilibrium. When the condition of the borrower upon default is observable, we find that suboptimal foreclosures are possible but reschedulings are always optimal; when the borrower's condition is private information, however, reschedulings may also be suboptimal. Additionally, borrowers whose lenders foreclose are more impaired then those whose debt is rescheduled. Finally, we show that randomization of the rescheduling/foreclosure decision by the bank and the decision to consume by the borrower may be optimal for particular assets. 相似文献
10.
William G. HardinIII Zhonghua Wu 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2009,38(3):275-301
The impact of bank mergers on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) loan pricing and takeover likelihood is assessed. REITs
that lose their primary banking relationship due to bank mergers pay higher interest rates on future borrowings. Bank consolidation
reduces bank competition for REIT loans which affects loan pricing. Moreover, based on randomly matched samples of REITs,
the results imply that firms losing their agent banks due to bank mergers and those with limited access to bank debt are more
likely to be acquired while REITs associated with acquiring banks are more likely to acquire other firms. Additional analysis
of the 92 merged REITs reveals that 33% of the target REITs’ banks are merged with their REIT acquirers’ banks prior to the
REIT mergers while 67% of the target REITs share at least one major bank with their acquirer. 相似文献
11.
Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative 下载免费PDF全文
AYTEKIN ERTAN MARIA LOUMIOTI REGINA WITTENBERG‐MOERMAN 《Journal of Accounting Research》2017,55(4):877-918
We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices. 相似文献
12.
Wolf Wagner 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2010,37(1):71-81
Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using
a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition
on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want
to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer
borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives. 相似文献
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14.
公司治理与银行借款融资 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。 相似文献
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16.
Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
MARK T. LEARY 《The Journal of Finance》2009,64(3):1143-1185
This paper explores the relevance of capital market supply frictions for corporate capital structure decisions. To identify this relationship, I study the effect on firms' financial structures of two changes in bank funding constraints: the 1961 emergence of the market for certificates of deposit, and the 1966 Credit Crunch. Following an expansion (contraction) in the availability of bank loans, leverage ratios of bank-dependent firms significantly increase (decrease) relative to firms with bond market access. Concurrent changes in the composition of financing sources lend further support to the role of credit supply and debt market segmentation in capital structure choice. 相似文献
17.
以上市公司披露的银行信贷数据为样本,实证分析产业政策指导对企业贷款利率的影响。结果表明:产业政策指导中的重点支持类企业和一般支持类企业往往获得了银行贷款的利率优惠,商业银行较好地落实了国家的产业政策;相比于民营企业,与政府有密切关系的国有企业获得了较低的贷款利率,商业银行的信贷决策表现出一定程度的所有权金融歧视。 相似文献
18.
在支持产业发展过程中,金融机构需根据产业发展政策要求,整合信贷资源,加强风险管理,重点支持有市场、有潜力的项目发展。钢铁行业发展状况近几年,邯郸市钢铁行业发展迅速,就业人口18万,已成为市第一支柱产业,在河北省乃至全国占有非常重要的地位。目前,全市钢铁企业有40余家,生产能力500万吨以上的有1家,100万~500万吨的有11家,100万吨以下的有28家,生产能力铁1900万吨、钢2060万吨、钢材1400万吨。2005年底全市钢铁工业铁、钢、材产量分别完成1806万吨、1696万吨、1212万吨,完成利税63.3亿元、利润36.1亿元、增加值205亿元、总产值675亿元,分别占全市入统工业的54%、58%、55.7%、56.9%。 相似文献
19.
W. SCOTT FRAME DIANA HANCOCK WAYNE PASSMORE 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2012,44(4):661-684
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances are a source of government‐sponsored liquidity intended to encourage housing finance, although “community financial institutions” may use such funds more generally. Because money is fungible, it is an empirical question as to how advances are actually employed. Using panel‐vector autoregression techniques, we estimate dynamic responses of U.S. commercial bank portfolios to: FHLB advance shocks, bank lending shocks, and macroeconomic shocks. We find that FHLB advances: (i) are used as a general source of liquidity by U.S. commercial banks of all sizes and (ii) dampen the sensitivity of mortgage lending to macroeconomic shocks at small banks. 相似文献
20.
商业银行贷款定价理论与实践 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
本文系统阐述了贷款定价的基本理论,对西方商业银行贷款定价主要模式进行了比较分析,结合我国金融市场发展现状和商业银行内部管理体制,提出建立我国商业银行贷款定价体系的建议. 相似文献