DO DIVIDEND FLOWS AFFECT STOCK RETURNS?

We examine price impacts from dividend flows. Event‐study estimates show that stocks experience abnormal returns on the dividend distribution day. Results also show a spillover effect to non‐dividend‐paying stocks that are likely to be part of the same benchmark portfolio as the dividend‐paying stocks. Regression results indicate that the effect is dependent on the ownership share by professional investors. The temporary nature of the effect on returns is in line with the literature's demand‐driven price pressure hypothesis.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.     

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STOCK REPURCHASES?

Stock repurchases by U.S. companies experienced a remarkable surge in the 1980s and ‘90s. Indeed, in 1998, the total value of all stock repurchased by U.S. companies exceeded for the first time the total amount paid out as cash dividends. And the U.S. repurchase movement has gone global in the past few years, spreading not only to Canada and the U.K., but also to countries like Japan and Germany, where such transactions were prohibited until recently. Why are companies buying back their stock in such amounts? After dismissing the popular argument that stock repurchases boost earnings per share, the authors argue that repurchases serve to add value in two main ways: (1) they provide managers with a tax‐efficient means of returning excess capital to shareholders and (2) they allow managers to “signal” to investors their view that the firm is undervalued. Returning excess capital is value‐adding for two reasons: First, it helps prevent companies from pursuing growth and size at the expense of profitability and value. Second, by returning capital to investors, repurchases (like dividends) play the critically important economic function of allowing investors to channel their investment from mature or declining sectors of the economy to more promising ones. But if stock repurchases and dividends serve the same basic economic function, why are repurchases growing more rapidly? Part of the explanation is that, because repurchases are taxed as capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, repurchases are a more tax‐efficient way of distributing excess capital. But perhaps even more important than their tax treatment is the flexibility that (at least) open market repurchases provide corporate managers‐flexibility to make small adjustments in capital structure, to exploit (or correct) perceived undervaluation of the firm's shares, and possibly even to increase the liquidity of the stock, which could be particularly valuable in bear markets. For U.S. regulators, the growth in open market stock repurchases raises some interesting issues. Perhaps most important, companies are not required to (and rarely do) furnish their investors with details about a given program's structure, execution method, number of shares repurchased, or even its duration. Policy regulators (and corporate executives as well) should consider some of the benefits provided by other systems, notably Canada's, which provide greater transparency and more guidelines for the repurchase process.     

STOCK MARKET OPENNESS AND MARKET QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHANGHAI–HONG KONG STOCK CONNECT PROGRAM

We study the impact of capital market openness on high-frequency market quality in China. The Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program (SHHKConnect) opens China's stock market to foreign investors and offers a natural experiment to investigate this question. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that market liberalization leads to lower quoted spread, lower effective spread, lower market depth, and higher short-term volatility. Our findings imply that opening the markets to more sophisticated foreign investors is associated with higher competition and more cross-market arbitrage activities, narrowing the spread and reducing liquidity providers’ profits, but increasing the price impact and short-term volatility of connected stocks.     

BOND MARKET REACTION TO STOCK REPURCHASES: IS THERE A WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECT?

We reexamine the bondholder wealth impact of stock repurchases with a focus on the wealth transfer effect. We do not detect any transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders surrounding open market stock repurchases. For the overall sample (1994–2002), using daily data we document a significant decrease in bond yields surrounding repurchase announcements. Subsamples classified by attributes that capture wealth transfer propensity also do not reveal evidence consistent with a wealth transfer effect. Correlation analysis between bond and stockholder wealth effects similarly is not supportive of a wealth transfer effect. Contrary to the wealth transfer hypothesis, we document a greater proportion of bond rating upgrades than downgrades in the three months following a repurchase announcement. Our results are robust to alternate bond price data and event return methodology.     

HOW WELL DO MARKET TIMING,CATERING, AND CLASSICAL THEORIES EXPLAIN CORPORATE DECISIONS?

An important debate in corporate finance is whether chief executive officers (CEOs) exploit equity mispricing. In this article I construct a measure of the unexplained change in the CEO's stockholdings of the firm to empirically test the contrasting predictions of market timing, catering, and classical theories of corporate decisions. Consistent with the predictions of classical theories, I find that the firm increases its investments and even uses expensive capital to finance investments when there is an unexplained increase in the CEO's stockholdings. However, I find no empirical support for catering predictions and weak empirical support for market timing predictions.     

HOW DO MANAGERS BEHAVE IN STOCK OPTION PLANS? CLINICAL EVIDENCE FROM EXERCISE AND SURVEY DATA

We use unique case study data to analyze the behavior of top managers in an executive stock option plan. We gather questionnaire data on the managers' traits and combine it with exercise data. Managers in our sample expect low volatilities (compared to historical estimates) and are well diversified and modestly risk averse. This implies that the value–cost wedge of options can be smaller than usually assumed. The exercise decisions vary with expected volatility, managerial wealth, and mental accounting. Managers expecting lower volatility exercise earlier. This result is consistent with the predictions of expected utility models using our managers' survey parameters.     

ARE THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN MUTUAL FUNDS INVESTING DRIVING THE U.S. STOCK MARKET TO ITS CURRENT LEVELS?

We examine the long-run equilibrium relation between the net flow of funds into equity mutual funds and the S&P 500 index. Applying the Engle and Granger error correction methodology followed by a state space procedure, we find that the levels of the stock market are influenced by the net flow of funds into equity mutual funds. Our findings indicate that the U.S. equity market appears to be rationally adjusting to a structural change in the behavior of the U.S. investing public.     

WHY DO STOCK PRICES DECLINE IN RESPONSE TO EMPLOYEE LAYOFFS? UK EVIDENCE FROM THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

Employee layoff decisions made during adverse economic conditions are expected to signal poor investment opportunities, but layoffs undertaken during prosperous markets should be efficiency enhancing. We examine layoffs during the global financial crisis of 2008 and compare this with an earlier period of economic prosperity. We find a positive market reaction to layoffs during rising financial markets but stock price declines following employee layoffs during the 2008 financial crisis. These price effects occur irrespective of the stated reason for the layoff and the industry of the announcing firm, and are mirrored in our robustness test of an earlier period.     

WHAT DO AUDITORS DO? OBVIOUSLY THEY DO NOT SCRUTINISE THE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING

Auditors and auditing firms are important actors in the process of institutionalising accounting standards. However, the formal and institutional requirements to de facto ensure professionalism and independence in the Swedish municipal sector have been strongly questioned. The aim of this paper is to investigate and explain how deviations from accounting standards are treated and reported by auditors. The results indicate deficiency in both competence and independence among the auditors. The institutional arrangements in Sweden do not seem to ensure that auditors facilitate and support the implementation of accounting standards.     

WHEN DO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE?

This article reports the findings of the authors' study of the stock market reaction to 345 strategic alliances announced during the period 1983-1992. The study reports statistically significant gains that, when translated into dollars, are divided roughly evenly between the larger and smaller partners (though the smaller partners experience larger percentage gains). Moreover, the value gains are largest in those cases in which two high-tech firms ally to develop or apply new technology, while the market shows less enthusiasm for non-technical or marketing alliances.
The underlying rationale for strategic alliances is that each partner contributes its expertise to the relationship and gains access to some special resource or competence that it lacks—but without incurring the costs associated with creating a larger organization through a merger or joint venture. Consistent with this argument, the authors report that alliances are relatively long-lasting, and are not preludes to merger or formal creation of joint venture entities.     

THE DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME ANOMALY IN STOCK RETURNS: FACT OR FICTION?

Stock market returns in 22 markets around the world show no evidence of a daylight saving time effect. Returns on the days following a switch from or to daylight saving time do not behave any differently from stock market returns on any other day of the week or month. These results reject earlier conclusions in the literature—based on less data—that investors’ mood changes induced by changes in sleep patterns significantly affect stock returns.