财政限制下政府债务与通货膨胀研究

随着人口老龄化,许多发达经济体都步入了财政压力时代,政府对养老金的承诺大大高于财政收入,政府为了实现承诺将利用发行新债务进行融资,这将带来未来的高税收预期.随着债务水平和税率水平的上升,人们对税收的容忍度将下降,从而触碰财政限制的可能性增大.在采取固定税率情况下,调整税收不再能稳定债务,必须采取政策转变来应对.在财政限制之前债务增长与政策调节如何相互作用,若采用货币政策的被动调节来满足稳定债务,那么政府债务将影响到通货膨胀,从而使货币政策失去对通货膨胀的控制,进而需要通过财政政策来解决通胀问题.     

Sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps

A credit default swap (CDS) contract provides insurance against default. This paper incorporates the contract into a sovereign default model and demonstrates that the existence of a CDS market results in lower default probability, higher debt levels, and lower financing costs for the country. Uncertainty over the insurance payout when the debt is renegotiated explains why in the data, as the output declines, the CDS spread becomes lower than the bond spread. Finally, my results show that the 2012 CDS naked ban, that decreased the levels of CDS for European countries, is a welfare reducing policy.     

Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds

We argue that corporate bond yields reflect fears of debt deflation. When debt is nominal, unexpectedly low inflation increases real liabilities and default risk. In a real business cycle model with optimal but infrequent capital structure choice, more uncertain or procyclical inflation leads to quantitatively important increases in corporate log yields in excess of default‐free log yields. A panel of credit spread indexes from six developed countries shows that credit spreads rise by 14 basis points if inflation volatility or the inflation‐stock correlation increases by one standard deviation.     

A comparison of nominal and indexed debt under fiscal constraints

This paper makes a welfare comparison between the issuance of price-indexed and nominal public debt in the presence of fiscal constraints, viz. a debt constraint, a deficit constraint and a combination of both. Distortionary taxes or public consumption are regulated to avoid the violation of the relevant fiscal constraint(s). Under a debt constraint indexed debt is generally preferred, while under a deficit constraint the results are more mixed. Introducing inflation persistence and raising the maturity of the debt tend to increase the magnitude of the welfare differences between the two types of debt. Welfare differences are further affected by the degree to which public consumption and tax revenues are indexed to actual versus structural nominal GDP.     

Liquidity and CDS premiums on European companies around the Subprime crisis

This paper sheds new light on the liquidity dynamics of the credit default swaps (CDS) market in Europe around the Subprime crisis. Based on an original dataset of 94 European companies from 2005 to 2009, we use a panel regression analysis to study the relationship between CDS premiums and liquidity. We measure the level of liquidity, look at liquidity risk, and study the liquidity spillovers from the bond and equity markets to the CDS market. We show that the effect of liquidity on CDS premiums is dominated by the influence of worsening credit conditions and deteriorating investors?? expectations about default risk. Controlling for credit risk, we also find that liquidity risk is priced in the European CDS market and that liquidity spillovers from the bond market matter in determining CDS premiums.     

From equity to default correlation with taxes

For fixed income investment, the preponderant risk is the clustering of defaults in the portfolio. Accurate prediction of such clustering depends on the knowledge of default correlation. We develop models with exogenous debt and endogenous debt to predict default correlations from equity correlations based on a self-consistent structural framework. We also examine how taxes affect the prediction of default correlations based on the two models. The empirical analysis shows that the corporate taxes tend to decrease default correlations, while personal taxes could increase or decrease default correlations. Our default correlation model with exogenous debt does a better job of predicting default correlations for high quality bonds, while the one with endogenous debt predicts more accurately for lower rated bonds. Our studies not only theoretically improve the modeling of default correlation in the structural setting but also shed new light on various aspects of default correlations and thereby help financial practitioners price credit derivatives more accurately and formulate more effective strategies to manage default risk of credit portfolios.     

The impact of junior debt issuance on senior unsecured debt’s risk premiums

Numerous studies have examined the impact of security issuance upon the value of pre-existing debt and equity but the focus has largely been on changes in equity value. We examine changes in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that accompany new junior debt issues. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of junior debt issues. Extant theory suggests senior debt value may be threatened under certain conditions by the issuance of junior debt. Our results indicate that when junior debt replaces bank debt, senior default risk premiums experience abnormal declines. The result is broadly consistent with the elevation of the senior unsecured debt by way of the elimination of a separate and more senior class of debt claimants. In contrast, we also find that larger junior bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums, broadly consistent with issue size being correlated with negative information about firm cash flows. We find strong evidence of interaction effects. For example, replacement of bank debt results in greater changes in default risk premiums the larger the issue size. We also find lower credit ratings magnify other effects. For example, if the junior debt issued matures before the outstanding senior unsecured bond, senior risk premiums experience abnormal increases for lower rated debt.     

Valuing Debt in a Complex Capital Structure

This article extends previous bond valuation models to account for more realistic assumptions regarding financial distress. Realized value of an individual bond under severe financial distress will reflect the expected outcome of credit-event negotiations and the relative priority listing of the security. We explicitly represent the probability rate of credit-event occurrence as a function of firm value relative to the fixed overall debt obligations of the firm. Risk premiums generated under reasonable parameter value choices fall within the range of observed bond risk premiums. Our model also provides an explanation as to why observed bond risk premia are positive after adjustment for default.     

Sovereign default risk and state-dependent twin deficits

This paper analyzes the impact of the government debt-to-GDP ratio on the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account. Above a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 percent the correlation of the two balances decreases by 0.16 in a sample of 12 euro area countries and by 0.17 for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This paper develops a small open economy model with defaultable government debt and riskless international capital markets to explain the empirical evidence of a state-dependent change in the correlation. In the model high public debt-to-GDP ratios raise sovereign risk premia as the default probability increases, leading to higher uncertainty about future taxes. In this case precautionary savings of households increase and partially compensate current account deficits that result from fiscal deficits. The increase in households' saving reduces the correlation of the two balances by the same magnitude as documented in the data. The model calibrated to Greece matches further business cycle moments and the empirical default frequency.     

Credit default swaps and debt specialization

We examine the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on debt specialization. We argue that reference firms in CDS contracts, seeking to minimize creditor conflicts and bankruptcy costs, exhibit higher debt concentration than firms on which no CDSs are traded. Our results show that firms engage in greater debt specialization and are more likely to specialize following the inception of CDS trading. Additionally, we find that, while lender concentration in firms increases, the number of bank lenders drops, lead arranger share rises, and the probability that lead arrangers and lenders are repeated increases following the onset of CDS trading. Our results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, propensity-score matching, different model specifications, and different subsamples.     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

Hedging credit: Equity liquidity matters

We theorize and confirm a new channel by means of which liquidity costs are embedded in CDS spreads. We show that credit default swap (CDS) spreads are directly related to equity market liquidity in the Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] model via hedging. We confirm this relationship empirically using a sample of 1452 quarterly CDS spreads over 2001–2005. In the model, this relationship is monotone increasing when credit quality worsens. These results are robust to alternative measures of equity liquidity and other possible determinants of CDS spreads.     

Pricing Sovereign Credit Risk of Poland: Evidence from the CDS Market

We analyze the market assessment of sovereign credit risk using a reduced-form model to price the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, thus enabling us to derive values for the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) from the quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. We compare different specifications of the models allowing for both fixed and time-varying LGD, and we use these values to analyze the sovereign credit risk of Polish debt throughout the period of a global financial crisis. Our results suggest the presence of a low LGD and a relatively high PD during a recent financial crisis.     

Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment

What might happen if a third-party entity had the power to implement fiscal reforms and/or punish sovereign debt defaulters? In contrast to recent history, extreme sanctions such as gunboat diplomacy and “fiscal house arrest” were used to punish debt defaulters during the period 1870–1913. We find that, after a “supersanction” was imposed, a country improved its fiscal discipline. As a result, ex ante default probabilities on new issues fell dramatically and the country spent no additional time in default. Our results suggest some type of external fiscal or monetary control may be effective in imposing discipline on serial debt defaulters.     

On the International Dimension of Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the international dimension of fiscal policy in a small open economy framework. We consider the case in which the government finances its spending by levying distortionary taxes and issuing state‐contingent debt. While in a closed economy taxes are essentially invariant, in an open economy taxes can be as volatile as output. This is because the presence of a terms of trade externality introduces efficient fluctuations in the consumption–leisure wedge driven by movements in the real exchange rate. As a result, the optimal fiscal rule suggests that taxes should be varied to replicate these fluctuations.     

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries.     

Fiscal hedging with nominal assets

We analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy with distortionary labor income taxes, nominal rigidities, nominal debt of various maturities and short-selling constraints. Optimal policy prescribes the almost exclusive use of long term debt. Such debt mitigates the distortions associated with hedging fiscal shocks by allowing the government to allocate them efficiently across states and periods.     

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).     

房价调控、地方政府债务与宏观经济波动

在地方政府债务高企的背景下,房价调控能否使资本流向非房地产部门？房价调控如果触发地方政府债务违约,宏观政策应如何应对？本文基于中国宏观经济的特征事实,引入地方政府的土地财政行为,将房价变动与地方政府的偿债能力联系起来。研究表明,由于地方政府依赖土地出让和土地抵押贷款筹集收入,房价管控导致的地价下降会带来地方政府收入的下降,直接影响地方政府的偿债能力。如果地方政府债务不出现违约,那么房价管控带来的地价下降会降低地方政府从金融部门获得的抵押融资额,使非基建部门的融资成本下降,非基建部门投资和产出上升。而如果调控房价带来的地价下降导致地方政府出现债务违约,金融部门资产受损,使金融中介减少贷款和提高贷款成本,带来整个社会的信贷紧缩,经济中各个部门的产出大幅下降。进一步的政策分析表明,有必要在避免地方政府债务违约的同时,使用财政资金补充银行资本金等多种方式稳定金融中介的资产负债表,从而将房价调控对经济的负面影响程度降到最低。     

Financial dollarization and systemic risks: New empirical evidence

This paper explores the persistence of financial dollarization in a group of 79 economies with different levels of development. Our main hypothesis is that a high level of domestic debt combined with default risk explains this persistence, even after a decline in inflation rates. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) in a panel data analysis, our results show that inflation risks caused by increasing probability of default account for financial dollarization more than inflation rate itself. After the decrease in inflation rates, the foreign currency-denominated deposits remain large because of the high debt-to-GDP ratios, particularly in speculative-grade economies. High public indebtedness leads to expectations of default. Dollarization is a rational response to the future inflation associated with investors' expectations of default observed in highly indebted economies.