Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets

Many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive. When markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics, however, shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches? This paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits. Results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms,strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models,undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer. Whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm, marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets. Final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy, indicating that policy-makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets

The present paper analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two imperfectly competitive product markets. Even if firms are price takers in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. If there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms, the integration of the permit markets could have a positive effect related to the flexibility of an integrated market; this flexibility can justify integrating the permit markets.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

Trading Hot-Air. The Influence of Permit Allocation Rules,Market Power and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

After the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech, it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market␣are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely the institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization, more hot-airis supplied than in the case where governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.     

Decentralization in Pollution Permit Markets

A pollution permit market is decentralized when firms are allowed to trade permits across time, regions or pollutants. Using a model in which firms have better information about their abatement costs than a regulator, we develop a comparative advantage formula that delineates whether or not pollution permit markets should be decentralized. When the damage from pollution is described by a separable function, the formula implies a simple sufficient condition for not allowing decentralization.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

资本配置、管理激励与内部资本市场效率

通过构造了一个多分部企业内部跨期资本配置模型,本文考察了内部资本市场的管理激励和配置效率问题,这是对企业内部资本市场配置效率研究的一个综合和扩展。本文的模型把内部资本市场“有效率论”和“无效率论”结合到一起,分析表明,在通过内部资本市场重新配置资本并能诱使两个经理努力工作的情况下,内部资本市场的效率可能高于、低于或等于两个单分部企业组合的效率,而不只是其中的某一种结果。     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Bilateral Oligopoly,Private Information,and Pollution Permit Markets

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.      

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

Transactions Costs in Tradable Permit Markets: An Experimental Study of Pollution Market Designs

Regulators' choices of market rules and permit allocations influence tradable emission permit programs. This paper uses laboratory experiments to study how transaction costs interact with permit allocations to determine the cost-effectiveness of emissions abatement. With positive transaction costs, in theory the initial distribution of permits can affect both abatement costs and equity. Consistent with theory, we find that with declining marginal transaction costs prices deviate less from the efficient level if the misallocation of the initial permit distribution is greater, and the deviation from efficient prices does not vary with the initial permit endowment when marginal transaction costs are constant.     

On the Endogeneity of Market Power in Emissions Markets

Previous approaches on market power in emissions trading markets rely on the existence of a subset of competitive players. In this paper, I relax this assumption and treat market power as an endogenous concept which depends on the initial allocation of allowances. All parties realize their potential influence on the market price. This approach allows a clear comparative statics analysis of the impact of the allowance allocation on the efficiency of markets. I provide specific examples that illustrate the implications that stem from the proposed modeling approach relative to previous models.     

我国资本市场配置效率探析

法玛的有效市场假说(EMH)理论——基于价格是否包含所有信息来划分市场效率的高低——是对资本市场效率进行分析的最具影响力的理论之一,但它并没有直接证明资本市场的配置效率。由于我国资本市场的固有特点决定,这种理论方法并不适用于对我国资本市场配置效率的判断。运用Jeffrey的方法来直接衡量中国资本市场效率并与其他国家相比,可得出资本市场配置效率较低的结论。     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.     

中国商业银行市场势力、效率及其福利效应

文章对中国商业银行1998-2007年的市场势力与效率之间的关系及其福利效应进行了初步研究。结果表明,运用随机前沿成本函数所估计的贷款边际成本大于存款边际成本,四大国有银行的市场势力勒纳指数明显大于股份制商业银行,国有银行行政性市场势力不容忽视。在此基础上,文章估计了基于市场势力的社会福利效应,因银行成本无效率带来的福利损失远大于因市场势力而引致的社会福利损失。检验安逸生活假设表明,贷款市场拒绝安逸生活假设,而存款市场接受安逸生活假设。贷款市场势力对银行业发展具有一定的负面作用,而银行生产率的提高促进了银行业的持续发展。     

市场化环境、所有权性质与集团内部资本配置效率

本文以2001—2007年我国企业集团的成员企业为研究样本,依据sh in和stu lz与Jeffrey的模型对企业集团内部资本配置的效率进行了评价,并实证检验了市场化环境和所有权性质对集团内部资本配置效率的影响。研究发现,市场化环境好的地区,其内部资本配置是有效率的。相比于非国有的企业集团,国有集团的内部资本配置是无效率的。但是随着政府干预的减少、金融业市场化程度的提高以及市场化状况的改善,国有集团相比非国有集团,在内部资本配置效率上的差异逐渐缩小。     

我国火力发电行业SO2排放许可限值约束作用研究

2017年,我国环保部门完成了火力发电等行业的排污许可证的核发,对我国建设排污权交易制度和实现“一证式”环境管理体制具有重要意义。围绕排污许可证中污染物的排放许可限值展开研究,应用脱钩原理对我国2003—2017年火力发电行业SO2排放与经济增长之间的脱钩关系进行分析,并基于脱钩理论,结合灰色预测方法GM(1,1)并运用情景假设法分析评价了排污许可证对我国2018—2020年火力发电行业SO2排放的约束作用强弱及其合理性,并提出建议。