排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在（非）排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。     

Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms negotiate bilaterally with prospective workers and learn about workers’ performance in previous jobs. We show that the interaction between social preferences, the incompleteness of contracts and the existence of information about a worker’s past performance provides an explanation for firms forgoing market opportunities and bilaterally negotiating with a worker. We observe that approximately 30% of all job contracts were bilaterally negotiated when these contracts are incomplete as opposed to only 10% when contracts were complete. The surplus from trade is higher when incomplete contracts can be bilaterally negotiated, which can be attributed to the presence of information.     

Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

Summary We examine the problem of incentive compatibility and mechanism design for incomplete information principal-agent problems. Allowing for risk aversion on the part of the principal and agent, we show the existence of an optimal, incentive compatible contract selection mechanism for the principal under conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection. Since we assume that the contract set is a function space of state contingent contracts, and that the set of agent types is uncountable, the set of contract selection mechanisms becomes infinite dimensional. Hence, novel existence arguments are required. Our existence result extends those of Grossman and Hart [10] and Page [23] to an infinite dimensional setting with incomplete information.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR MANIPULATION ECONOMIES

We design a competitive market for exclusive contracts in large economies with observable types where trades are subject to postcontractual manipulations. We do not impose quantity restrictions at the trading stage—for example, incentive constraints on the consumption or production sets. We establish existence and constrained optimality of equilibrium. Our design can accommodate manipulations stemming from private information as well as from behavioral biases—for example, time inconsistency and false beliefs. We discuss the needed size and complexity of the commodity set.     

On contract duration of royalty licensing contracts

This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.     

Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard

Summary We study the problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist seeking to design a line of contracts so as to simultaneously screen consumers by type and resolve the moral hazard problems associated with contract performance. We formulate the monopolist's problem as a mechanism design problem in which the set of consumer types is taken to be a Polish space, and the contract space an arbitrary compact metric space. Allowing for risk aversion on the part of the monopolist and consumers, and taking as the feasible set of mechanisms the collection of all measurable functions defined on the space of consumer types with values in the space of contracts, we present a new characterization of incentive compatibility in an infinite dimensional setting which allows us to reformulate the monopolist's design problem as an unconstrained optimization problem (i.e., as a problem without the incentive compatibility contraints). Using simple techniques, we then demonstrate the existence of an optimal screening mechanism for the monopolist. We thus extend the existing analysis of the incomplete information monopoly problem to an infinite dimensional setting with moral hazard, and we provide an existence result not available in the existing literature.I thank seminar participants at Indiana University, McGill University, and the University of Calgary for helpful comments. I also thank Kerry Back, Bob Becker, Praveen Kumar, Mark Johnson, Ramon Marimon, Murat Sertel, Bill Sealey, Gordon Sick, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. The comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee are especially appreciated. I am solely responsible for any errors.     

Anonymity and individual risk

Adverse selection economies with private information are generally studied under the assumption that contracts are exclusive. That is, retrading is prohibited. An alternative market mechanism, the anonymous mechanism, is studied here. Risk averse agents trade contingent claims directly and side markets are in equilibrium. The result is the anonymous equilibrium. The anonymous equilibrium results in a set of endogenous transfers and subsidies.     

Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage

It has been argued that competitive tendering for contracts can be used to overcome problems of natural monopoly and to make markets 'contestable'. The recent Productivity Commission (2002) report into harbour towage in Australia noted the potential benefits of competition for contracts. Using the example of harbour towage, we investigate these claims when competitive tendering involves one segment of a vertical production chain. We show that direct customer contracting will not result in a perfectly contestable outcome if there is a complementary input provider with market power. We consider whether this situation improves when customers delegate the contracting process. Delegation only improves the outcome from the customers' perspective if the authority is able to receive side payments from the towage operators. Such side payments a priori would appear to be against the interests of the customers. We show, however, that side payments help the port authority to overcome the problems of market power, benefiting both the port authority and the customers. Further, these contracting outcomes are socially preferred to the unregulated outcome where port authorities and towage operators set prices and quality independently. This analysis sheds light and generally supports the Productivity Commission's recommendations.     

Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets

Conclusions The classical foundation of general equilibrium analysis by the cooperative concept of the core has been extended to an economy with incomplete trading possibilities. This has been accomplished by restricting the exchange possibilities of coalitions of traders in accordance with the available market structure. However, compared with the classical result, the present foundation of rational expectations equilibria may appear much weaker. The reason is that in reality consumers may sign contracts which are more complex than the existing market structure. Therefore, it may happen that prices cannot decentralize all cooperative transactions by markets, in spite of perfect competition. With an incomplete set of markets, therefore, a cooperative exchange of commodities by individual contracts may coexist with trading in non-cooperative, competitive markets.I wish to thank Martin Hellwig for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, I remain responsible for all shortcomings of the paper.     

Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information

We introduce differential information in the asset market model studied by Cheng J Math Econ 20(1):137–152,1991, Dana and Le Van J Math Econ 25(3):263–280,1996 and Le Van and Truong Xuan J Math Econ 36(3): 241–254, 2001. We prove an equilibrium existence result assuming that the economy’s information structure satisfies the conditional independence property. If private information is not publicly verifiable, agents have incentives to misreport their types and therefore contracts may not be executed in the second period. We also show that under the conditional independence property equilibrium contracts are always executable.     

Procurement contracting: efficiency,renegotiation and performance evaluation

Renegotiation of long-term contracts can result in inefficiency if it is associated with strategic behavior that reduces the reliability of ex ante agreements. The focus of this paper is on the consequences of opportunistic renegotiation of procurement contracts, and the subsequent performance evaluation, when commitment is limited and information is incomplete or verifiability is limited. Performance data that would indicate efficiency in a complete information setting may indicate inefficiency in an incomplete information setting. Performance evaluation thus should focus on procurement mechanisms that relate the quantity purchased to the possible costs of the supplier.     

生态工业园企业合作非正式契约的博弈分析

企业间稳定的合作关系是生态工业园顺利成长的前提条件．要保证这种合作关系就必须有强有力的制度保障。新制度经济学理论提出将长期契约用来代替纵向一体化经营,同时将长期契约分为正式契约和非正式契约。由于正式契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性,提高了它的实施成本,因此,非正式契约在规范园区企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文对防止园区企业机会主义行为的非正式契约进行了博弈分析．着重用不完全信息下的动态博弈理论阐释非正式契约运行的内在机理,并对如何规范园区企业间合作关系提出了建议与对策,以期有助于生态工业园的健康成长。     

Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design

We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players' commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non‐participants. The difference stems from the players' ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.     

When vagueness induces indirect competition: strategic incompleteness of contracts

Summary. A class of employment contracts entailing production targets and consequent rewards is studied. In a nondiscriminatory environment, a principal hiring many agents faces the problem of writing a common contract which induces the highest possible effort from each one of his agents. While a very high target may get the best out of highly skilled agents, low skilled ones tend to shirk. On the other hand, although low targets make every agent put positive effort, there are efficiency losses from the high skilled agents. Also, in such environments the principal often has better information regarding the skills of all his agents than what each agent has regarding the rest of the agents at work. We show that if skills of agents are sufficiently close, the informed principal earns strictly higher profits by offering incomplete contracts as against being specific, as incomplete contracts reduce flow of information and induce indirect competition amongst agents. Received: May 19, 2000; revised version: August 28, 2001     

不完全合同理论的新视角——基于演化经济学的分析

长期以来,主流不完全合同理论一直没有在理论逻辑上圆满解答"合同为什么不完全",其理论基础存在很大的争议,这也导致其研究范式存在内在的逻辑矛盾与冲突,大量有关不完全合同的研究本质上却是关注完全合同。本文尝试从演化经济学的视角重新审视不完全合同理论,强调必须从知识不完全性的视角来阐释合同的不完全性,认为个体的有限认知是合同不完全性的重要理论基础,在此视角下探讨了不完全合同的功能、生成及其演变,并重新考察了权威在不完全合同中的作用。     

不完全契约理论视角下的政府失灵分析

市场经济既存在市场失灵,也存在政府失灵。如何有效规避政府失灵是全世界所有国家都亟待解决的难题。政府失灵与不完全契约之间具有较强的相关性,因而不完全契约理论能够对政府失灵现象提供较强的解释能力。通过对政府与人民之间失灵、政府部门之间失灵和国家之间失灵等不完全契约性的理论解析,将会对正处于转型关键时期的中国现代化崛起,不仅能够提供富有价值的发展启示,而且也具有非常显著的政策借鉴意义。     

Informed principal with correlation

In this paper we analyze an adverse selection model with one principal and one agent, who are both risk neutral and have private information. We assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with that of the agent. The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. The principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent's one. We fully characterize the equilibrium of the game in which different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leaves the agent uninformed about the principal's type. This gives more freedom to the principal when setting the transfers because the agent's constraints need to hold only at an interim stage.