保险合同免责条款正当性实证研究

免责条款作为保险合同的核心要素,其正当性直接关系着保险消费者能否获得赔偿的重大利益诉求。本文基于机动车辆保险合同典型案例的实证分析,在对免责条款涉诉焦点问题客观分类的基础上,着重从免责条款效力评价规则和法律规制的构建,开展免责条款正当性研究。     

浅论格式合同免责条款

随着社会经济的发展,格式条款中免责条款的使用越来越普遍。但在实践中,却存在一些经营者利用其优势地位在与相对人订立合同时以免责条款加重对方义务,免除或减轻自己应当承担的法律责任,以致损害相对人的利益。这种表面上看起来是依双方合意而成立的合同,实际上违反了契约自由、意思自治的社会基础,危害了民法的基本原则和私法精神。我国法律对格式合同的免责条款虽有规定,但较为简单。因此,正确理解与适用格式合同的免责条款,具有重要的实践意义。     

保险合同免责条款说明义务探究

明确说明免责条款是保险法规定保险人必须履行的义务,但由于现行法对此仅有概括性规定,故在实务中出现许多纠纷。本文着重对免责条款在实务操作中存在的法律风险和如何规避该风险两个方面进行分析。     

保险合同免责条款的理解与法律适用

保险合同的免责条款是保险人维持正常运营、防范自身风险所必须具备的条款,也是我国法律所允许的保险人的一项正当权利。同时,为了防止保险人滥用此项权利,我国法律对保险合同的免责条款的效力也做出了一定的限制,要求保险人对免责条款履行提示与明确说明的义务,同时也规定了免责条款法定无效的情形。如何准确理解免责条款的内涵与外延,准确适用法律,本文采用比较法的角度,联系我国保险实践与保险诉讼司法实践情况,作了有益的探索,提出在适用法律时,应做到保护保险合同双方当事人利益的平衡及维护投保人、被保险人、受益人利益及防范保险欺诈的平衡。     

论保险合同的射幸性特征

保险合同的射幸性特征似乎是保险合同的一个众所周知的特点。据考证,当保险制度于19世纪中叶传入中国后,我国学者将描述保险合同性质的“Aleato-ryContract”一词译成了射幸性合同。由此,保险合同具有射幸性特征一说便自然而然地流传到了今天。我国民法将有偿合同分为实定合同及射幸性合同。其中,实定合同在成立时,当事人的给付义务及给付的范围都已确定;而射幸性合同是指当事人一方或双方的给付义务取决于合同成立后约定的偶然事件的发生与否。大部分的有偿合同属于实定合同,     

论保险合同免责条款和保险人明确说明义务——《保险法》第17条和第19条的理解和适用

2009年修订后的《中华人民共和国保险法》（以下简称“新保险法”）根据保险市场信息的高度不对称性,即保险人处于相对强势地位的特点,强化了对投保人、被保险人、受益人利益的保护,其中一个重要表现就是规范格式条款。新保险法在免责条款的明确说明义务、无效免责条款的规定上做出了进一步修改和完善。本文从免责条款的性质及法律效果等角...     

免责条款明确说明义务的履行

新保险法对免责条款明确说明义务的进行修改和完善,本文在对比的基础上,探讨了免责每款的内涵与外延,明确说明义务的含义．对于实务中免责条款明确说明义务的履行难的情况提出了三种可行的履行方式。     

论格式条款与其相近概念的区别

在探讨格式条款的相关问题时,我们常常会遇到与格式条款相近含义的概念,如格式合同、示范合同、免责条款、不公平条款等诸多概念,笔者在此对格式条款与其相近概念的区别进行探讨,以期进一步明确格式条款的科学含义.     

基于转股价修正条款的可转债定价

在研究可转债定价问题时考虑转股价修正条款是十分必要的。尤其是在2008年的熊市中,各可转债纷纷调低转股价,转股价修正条款给予投资者保护作用不容忽视。基于AFV模型,本文建立了包含转股价修正条款的定价模型,并利用有限差分法进行数值求解。     

The Design of an Optimal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contract

This article focuses on the design of a crop insurance contract when the indemnity is based on the aggregate yield of a surrounding geographical area. Coinsurance under a critical yield often provides an efficient sharing of systemic risk. Under a linear relationship between individual yield and aggregate yield, the optimal form depends on the individual beta coefficient, which measures the sensitivity of individual yield to aggregate yield. The optimal hedging position of the producer on the yield options market is to buy put options or call options depending upon whether his beta coefficient is positive or negative.     

Exclusion,competition, and regulation in the retail loan market

Exclusion of borrowers from credit markets became a primary concern for regulators during the recovery from the recent recession. The paper analyzes loan-making institutions that set both interest rates and minimum credit requirements. We propose analytical measures of the degree of borrower exclusion from receiving loans. We analyze five market structures: Single lender, regulated interest rate, entry, interest rate discrimination, and highly-competitive lenders. Interest rate regulation improves total welfare relative to a single lender market. However, entry of a second lender reduces exclusion and generates higher total welfare. In the absence of fixed costs, perfect and Bertrand competition are optimal.     

国外对金融道德风险研究的前沿理论及防范经验

近年来,金融道德风险已成为我国金融业运行中的突出问题。本文在论述国外对金融道德风险研究前沿理论的基础上,进一步比较了美国、欧盟、日本、韩国、新西兰、中国台湾等主要国家或地区对金融道德风险的防范经验,总结出可供我国借鉴的启示,对提高我国金融道德风险的防范水平、维护金融稳定、确保金融安全运行具有重要的参考意义。     

我国企业年金逆向选择和道德风险管理研究

当前形势下我国人口老龄化问题日益凸显,基本养老保险制度面临着巨大的支付压力。企业年金在缓解基本养老保险给付方面起到了重大的补充作用,但是我国现行的企业年金在实际运营管理中存在很多问题。论文从委托代理角度分析企业年金各主体之间的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出几点相关政策建议,以完善我国企业年金制度,使其更好地为企业职工提供更安全更实惠的社会福利。     

An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market

Although traditional Japanese insurance theory has tended to assume the basic altruism of policyholders, this assumption may not be warranted. Many people might be opportunists rather than altruists. So in the actual insurance market, moral hazard may occur not accidentally but naturally. Without effective incentive mechanisms, policyholders may deviate from their original purpose. It is important to design penalties as negative incentives for the control and prevention of moral hazard. We test these propositions here by means of a game theory and questionnaire. The reason why we use a game theory and carry out the questionnaire is that it is not suitable to apply the econometric model to collect reliable data about moral hazard.     

农业供应链金融道德风险的放大效应研究

农业生产的规律和广泛存在的信息不对称容易触发由偶然事件引发的金融道德风险,这些道德风险经农业供应链的规模经济性、范围经济性、羊群效应和合成谬误集聚并放大,可能引致系统性金融风险。基于这一论点,本文采用序贯博弈方法以及实证方法证明了基于龙头企业决策的农业供应链金融道德风险放大的可能性。为了防范农业供应链金融引致的系统性风险,商业银行可与农业龙头企业合力推行订单模式,强化农业供应链金融的封闭式管理,积极融入农业供应链文化价值体系,并加强农业供应链金融的宏观审慎与微观审慎的协调监管。     

The Effects of State Risk and Controllability Filters on Compensation Contract and Effort Choice

Surveys of business firms in the U.S.A. indicate that standard-based compensation contracts are common in practice. Analytical studies of this form of contract have suggested that under conditions of state risk, an employee's contract and effort choice are significantly affected by how pay relates to measured performance, and whether the compensation contract filters out the effects on measured performance of factors beyond the employee's control. This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment indicating that in the presence of state risk, an individual's choice of compensation contract depends jointly on these two contract attributes and his/her risk preference as well as performance capability. The findings also indicate that actual effort is a function of the realized state, the presence/absence of a controllability filter, and the level at which the individual had expected to perform at the time of his/her contract selection. When an adverse state was realized, subjects without a controllability filter still exerted the level of effort that they had expected at contract selection, even though their marginal return to effort had been substantially reduced. On the other hand, when the controllability filter was absent, subjects who had a favourable realized state increased their effort in response to the increased marginal return to effort.     

我国商业银行道德风险的实证分析:信贷风险掩饰和推迟视角

近年来,我国商业银行经理人追求自我利益最大化的道德风险问题突出。本文对我国商业银行道德风险现状进行简要考察,梳理了银行经理人道德风险的主要表现;构建一个简单的两期模型,分析了银行经理人信贷风险掩饰和推迟行为的动机和收益;以商业银行贷款质量迁徙和行长变动的相关数据,对商业银行道德风险进行实证分析,验证了银行行长对本行的信贷风险有明显的掩饰与推迟行为,证实了商业银行道德风险的存在。     

完全信息状态下保险市场主体间的静态博弈研究

保险市场主体的行为以及他们之间的复杂关系直接影响着保险市场的发展,特别是投保人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险代理人的违规操作广泛存在,长期困扰着保险界。本文针对投保人和保险代理人的问题行为,通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,来深入研究保险人与投保人、保险代理人之间的博弈关系,探讨解决问题的现实对策。