农户与市场之间的契约联接方式研究——交易费用经济学理论框架的应用与完善

笔者利用交易费用经济学的理论框架,统一解释了农户与市场之间各种契约联接方式的形成原因.农民与市场之间的交易契约应根据资产专用性、不确定性和交易频率,分别采用商品契约、混合型契约和要素契约,并进行与之匹配的市场治理、双方或三方治理和统一治理.但交易费用经济学理论框架存在不足,不能解释在交易环境和交易特性大致相同的条件下,农户与市场之间出现了不同的契约联接方式.只有将市场主体的企业家才能纳入分析框架,上述问题才能得到合理解释.农户与市场之间的契约联接必须遵循经济规律,应该重视培养和激发市场主体特别是农民的企业家才能.     

论中间商的契约性质

传统的契约理论对纵向一体化的分析多从生产领域角度出发，忽略了流通领域中中间商的性质。交易费用理论分析认为，中间商的出现是因为当不确定性和产品的资产专用性程度较低时，它能比生产商与消费者直接交易节省费用；但是，中间商对市场的代替程度取决于投入品资产专用性程度；中间商人力资本的专用性决定了生产商自建销售队伍不能完全解决机会主义，现实中更多的交易是通过混合型组织来完成的。     

工业园区工业生态系统的内控稳定机制——基于进化博弈的视角

针对工业园区废弃物排放企业和利用企业之间的信息不对称导致的有限理性条件下生态协作各方为实现自身经济利益诉求而持续重复博弈并进而影响园区工业生态系统稳定性的问题,以进化博弈理论为分析工具,研究了工业园区生态系统演化的稳定性。研究结果表明:工业园区内部可通过建立收益分成机制、内部惩戒机制和协作文化培养机制以及采取增加个体产能、提高废物利用效率等的内控措施来实现园区工业生态系统的持续稳定演化。     

基于道德风险的校企合作创新序列机制设计:一种不可再协商契约的视角

在不可再协商契约条件下,通过设计契约中的序列机制,实现校企合作双方真实披露其私人信息,从而减少机会主义行为,促使研发投资达到最优。合作创新序列机制能够提供诱因(或威胁),促使双方自觉放弃投机行为,产生有效的交易结果,使双方的专用资产投资达到最优水平。     

交易成本视角下的农民工劳动关系解析

交易成本视角的分析表明,农民工劳动关系是劳资双方在追求交易成本节约过程中建立的劳动交易关系,农民工劳动交易契约绝大多数属于新古典契约,人力资本专用性低、劳动交易不确定性低、劳动交易频率低.劳动交易治理结构上形成了“企业内部市场”为主的低级交易治理方式.尽管上述治理结构节约了交易成本,但目前存在、并在今后相当长时期仍将存在低人力资本专用性劳动力相对过剩、高人力资本专用性劳动力相对短缺这一劳动力供求格局下, “企业内部市场”为主的交易治理难以兼顾劳资关系的稳定与和谐.调整公共政策,提高农民工人力资本专用性水平,平衡劳动力供求结构性矛盾,优化劳动交易契约及治理结构应是构建稳定和谐的农民工劳动关系的重要路径.     

不完全契约、专用性投资与纵向一体化

笔者探讨了不完全契约情形下市场交易、长期契约和纵向一体化的专用性投资水平.基于博弈结构,我们将市场交易和长期契约分别视为鲁宾斯坦和纳什谈判方式.结论表明,纵向一体化能达到最优的专用性投资水平,并且,在长期契约中下游企业的专用性投资水平要高于市场交易.进一步表明,为了消除市场交易情况下专用性投资的不足,可取的办法不仅仅是纵向一体化,长期契约也是可行的办法,但它的投资激励不如一体化.     

最优农业契约与中国农业产业化模式

本文在一个统一的关系契约分析框架下,比较了单期和多期条件下"农户+市场"、"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"三种主要的农业产业化模式及其衍生模式的生产效率,并分析了产权、声誉、抵押和风险态度对最优农业契约的影响。我们的分析表明,在单期条件下,由于契约不完全和敲竹杠效应,所有模式都无法实现最优效率;在多期条件下,如果贴现率足够低,"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"这两种模式都可以实现最优效率;如果市场价格波动比较大,则"龙头企业+农场"模式优于"龙头企业+农户"模式。我们还分析了农户的转售成本对契约效率的影响,并提供了支持本文结论的典型案例。     

资产专用性理论分析

资产专用性概念引入对交易行为的分析是有用的 ,但资产专用性理论的逻辑是有问题的。如果坚持以企业契约的不完全性为逻辑前提 ,以企业所有权安排为逻辑结果 ,那就会否定资产专用性这一逻辑的核心变量 ;如果坚持资产专用性这一核心变量 ,并由此推出风险控制权而不是企业所有权安排的逻辑 ,就会否定企业契约的不完全性这一逻辑前提。     

专用性人力资本与企业薪酬制度设计

专用性人力资本强调的是人力资本的专用性,所谓资产的专用性是指交易双方被这种关系锁定。也就是说通过很高的成本,资产专用性使一个完全竞争的、可以反复交易的局面变成了双边垄断的局面。新制度经济学家威廉姆森将资产的专用性分为五类：地理区位（或地点）固定的特性;人力资产的专用性;物理资产的专用性;完全为特定协约服务的资产;名牌商标资产的专用性。威廉姆森对人力资本专用性的分析着眼于这种特性对委托人和代理人合同关系的影响,强调了忽视人力资本专用性将会面临极大的风险。     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异-基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一.本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响.实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品.在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健.本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素.     

Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Price manipulation in an experimental asset market

We analyze in the laboratory whether an uninformed trader is able to manipulate the price of a financial asset by comparing the results of two experimental treatments. In the benchmark treatment, 12 subjects trade a common value asset that takes either a high or a low value. Only three subjects know the actual value of the asset while the market is open for trading. The manipulation treatment is identical to the benchmark treatment apart from the fact that we introduce a computer program as an additional uninformed trader. This robot buys a fixed number of shares in the beginning of a trading period and sells them again afterwards. Our main result shows that the last contract price is significantly higher in the manipulation treatment if the asset takes a low value and that private information is very well disseminated by both markets if the value of the asset is high. Finally, even though this simple manipulation program loses money on average, it is profitable in some instances.     

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration

Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior, and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism. In this paper I show that asset specificity can be an argument for non‐integration. In a repeated‐game model of self‐enforcing relational contracts, it is shown that when parties are non‐integrated, increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher‐powered incentives.     

全渠道供应链协同要素关系模型实证研究

新零售要求全渠道供应链的整合和优化,供应链协同有助于全渠道供应链一体化的实现。了解协同要素间关系有利于协同战略的制定与实施,是实现全渠道供应链协同的基础。在供应链管理相关理论研究基础上,构建研究模型,并提出研究假设。在实证研究的基础上,运用结构方程和分层回归的方法对模型和假设进行检验。结果表明,（1）协同收益与供应链协同正相关,分为财务收益和运营收益两部分。（2）收益共享与协同收益的财务收益和运营收益均正相关。（3）信息共享在收益共享与财务收益、收益共享与运营收益的影响过程中起中介作用。（4）契约精神在收益共享与信息共享关系中起调节作用。（5）契约精神在信息共享与财务收益的关系中没有调节作用,在信息共享与运营收益的关系中有调节作用。     

Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation

Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.     

基于SNA的PPP项目中信任影响因素研究

为提升PPP项目中信任度,构建了社会网络分析模型,将影响信任的主要因素视为社会网络的节点,采用调查问卷方法,统计了有关数据,研究公私合作中信任随各影响因素变动而产生的变化情况。使用Ucinet6软件进行分析,结果表明,信任作为关系契约中的重要部分随影响因素而变化,为提高PPP项目合作绩效,应重视关系契约的作用,重视信任的影响因素及其内在联系,正式契约在PPP项目中的作用不容忽视,但关系契约更有利于保证公私间长期与高效的合作关系。     

Limited attention and the optimal incompleteness of contracts

A decision-maker's limited attention is allocated between writingnew contracts and directing current contracts. More time spentwriting a new contract makes the contract more complete. A morecomplete contract performs better and generates higher returns.The optimal allocation of attention implies two types of contracts,relational and market. A relational contract, which is directedperiodically, is optimally less complete than a market contract,which is not directed. The completeness of relational contractsdecreases with the ability to direct contracts, since changingcircumstances can be dealt with later. In addition, the completenessof relational contracts increases with the ability to writenew contracts, since more complete relational contracts aredirected less frequently and leave more time for writing newcontracts. The optimal allocation of attention to relationalcontracts is socially efficient even though it does not maximizethe discounted expected returns of the firm.     

The Effect of Confidence in Valuation Estimates on Arbitrager Behavior and Market Prices

The authors develop a complete framework for optimizing trading decisions that incorporates investors' confidence in their valuation estimates. Quantified estimates of arbitragers' uncertainty about their appraisals of asset values are shown to be extractable from market prices alone. An empirical investigation over the 1977–2015 interval indicated that confidence levels exhibit persistence subject to mean reversion, with a positive relationship found with the magnitude of existing mispricings. Higher returns are discovered to long (short) arbitrage of an asset, whose intrinsic value is higher (lower) than the market price, after rises in uncertainty among informed investors.     

No trade

We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders' private signals. We first establish a no-trade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the effect of the asset valuation structure and the trading mechanism on extent to which asymmetric information induces individuals to engage in mutually unprofitable exchange. A laboratory experiment is conducted, where trade is found to occur between 19% and 35% of the time, and this depends in systematic ways on both the asset valuation function and the trading mechanism. Both buyers and sellers adapt their strategy to changes in the asset valuation function and to changes in the trading mechanism in clearly identifiable ways. An equilibrium model with naïve belief formation accounts for some of the behavioral findings, but open questions remain.