城市公用事业民营化的政策困境--以水务民营化为例

目前中国城市公用事业正在探索民营化改革,应该说民营化方向是正确的。但是,由于我国城市政府、民营企业等民营化有关各方关于城市公用事业民营化改革的理论上准备不足,操作上又无现成的、符合国情的模式可供模仿。因此在实际运作中出现了一系列矛盾和问题,使民营化有关各方陷入了两难境地,这也说明了城市公用事业民营化改革的艰巨性和复杂性。     

我国公用事业的改革

本文在对已有的提高公用事业效率的三种思路分析的基础上,提出了公用事业改革的民营化、有效竞争和规制改革协调发展的思路。     

英国城市公用事业民营化改革评析

20世纪80年代初，英国以电信产业为开端，相继对电力、煤气和自来水供应、铁路运输等主要城市公用事业实行了民营化改革，同时，对这些产业的政府管制体制也实行了重大改革。改革中积累的经验和教训为中国城市公用事业的民营化改革提供了一个可资借鉴的范式。     

规制与竞争——我国公用事业民营化问题与对策研究

公用事业属于市场机制不能发挥作用或作用发挥不好的"市场失灵领域",民营化已经成为公用事业发展的取向所在,本文首先从理论上分析公用事业民营化的内涵、效益与模式,然后在存在问题分析的基础上借鉴发达国家经验,提出我国公用事业民营化改革过程中加强政府规制与促进有效竞争的对策建议.     

公用事业民营化与政府规制

本文以H市Y区管道燃气民营化为个案,分析了我国公用事业民营化过程中政府规制的需要。通过分析表明,公用事业民营化并不意味着不需要政府规制,而是要根据公用事业的自然垄断特性,调整政府规制的范围和内容。并且,政府规制框架的确立应该尽可能先于公用事业民营化的实践。这对处于起步阶段的我国公用事业民营化将有所裨益。     

我国公用事业民营化的现状及其发展趋势透析

城市公用事业包括城市供水、节水、供热、供气、公共交通、排水、污水处理、道路与桥梁、市政设施、市容环境卫生、垃圾处理和城市绿化等方面。城市公用事业是城市经济和社会发展的载体，它直接关系到社会公共利益，关系到人民群众生活质量，关系到城市     

公用事业民营化改革中的政府责任

一、公用事业民营化改革的背景 自19世纪70年代以来,全世界范围内掀起了汹涌澎湃的行政改革浪潮。当代行政改革是在世纪之交和时代转型的环境下推行的。改革既是对数十年来行政管理实践的检讨和反思过程,同时也是对新时代、新环境的自觉适应过程。全球范围致力于传统行政模式向新行政模式的转换,使得当代行政改革具有划时代的重要意义。     

城市公用事业民营化改革理论探讨

随着城市公用事业民营化改革的不断深入,从政府、企业到学术界,以不同的角度对改革进行了探讨,政府的规制方法、民营化的经营模式、定价问题等等,一直是研究的重点内容,而经营企业的逐利性,使商业目标与公用事业的公益目标产生了冲突,在民营化经营过程中既要满足社会公众的利益,又要满足企业盈利性的目的,文章就从民营化改革方式角度入手,使公益目标和商业目标达到均衡。     

城市公用事业民营化中的腐败与削减

城市公用事业民营化虽然作为中国城市公用事业改革的趋势方向,同任何改革一样,也存在着负面效应,民营化中的腐败就是其主要负面效应之一.与民营化相关的腐败主要包括两个方面,即民营化中的国有资产流失与民营化后的寻租.本文分析了城市公用事业民营化中的腐败、形式、成因,并结合模型从预防角度上提出了治理对策.     

加快推进我国经营性公用事业民营化问题研究

市政公用事业是指对包括城市供水、节水、供热、供气、公共交通、排水、污水处理、道路与桥梁、市政设施、市容环境卫生、垃圾处理和城市绿化等在内的城市公共设施的投资建设、维护和经营。在讨论城市公共基础设施投融资体制改革时,公用事业的市场化和民营化是其中必须深入研究的十分重要的课题。可以说,我国城市公共基础设施投融资手段改革与创新的成败,在很大程度上取决于我们能否有序、有效地推进市政公用事业的市场化和民营化。     

城市公用事业民营化改革的复杂性研究

我国城市公用事业民营化改革处于初始阶段且有加速推行的迹象,但改革的微观模式尚没有厘清。从理论上看,城市公用事业民营化在技术不变的情况下,无论禀赋是否增加,均非帕累托改善。从实际上看,城市公用事业民营化也会产生诸多的政策困境,且有两难的特点,其中包括民营化与固定回报;价格调整与普遍服务;特许经营中的垄断与竞争;市场准入门槛的高与低等一系列操作性难题。加之,民营化易引发的腐败和失业等负面效应。因此,必须建立符合我国国情的城市公用事业民营化改革模式。     

利益博弈缺失与公用事业民营化的限度

本文从利益集团角度分析了公用事业民营化的合意性问题.在规制政策的制定过程中,消费者集团是一个缺少政治影响力的利益群体,它与企业之间的利益博弈是缺失的,因而政府的决策通常倾向于照顾企业的利益.当公用事业由国有企业经营时,产权的公共性使得政府能在一定程度上关注公共目标,政策的扭曲不至于太严重;而当公用事业由民营企业经营时,政府对公共目标的顾虑就可以减少,政策的扭曲就会更加严重.因此,民营化将造成企业的垄断力量受到政府纵容的危险.     

政府生命周期模型--对公共政策理论基础的重新阐释

文章以财政的视角,在一个契约的框架内通过对穷人、富人以及代理人集团博弈的财政过程的描述建立了政府生命周期模型.在此基础上对公共政策的理论基础进行了重新阐释,得出了公共政策的实质是权利分配、政府通常偏好短期政策操作、公共政策多是"穷则思变"的结果、权威在公共政策施行中起着独特作用的结论.本模型在还政府行为本来面目的同时,可以扩展到对企业家生命周期和对经济史上制度变迁的研究中.     

The Reform of Local Public Utilities in Italy

The Italian system of local public utilities has recently undergone an important reform process. The first round of reforms, introduced in the 1990s, represented a remarkable change in the social welfare function with regard to the management of local public utilities. The legislation was specifically designed to cut costs and reduce deficits. A second round of reforms, required by European directives, started around the mid-1990s. Several laws were passed introducing important innovations and regulating specific sectors: public transport; electricity; and gas. Article 35 of the 2002 Financial Law was the final step in a comprehensive reform of the whole local public utility sector. The main innovations of the Financial Law concerns liberalization. Article 35 states that the general rule for awarding service provision contracts is competitive tendering; the rationale is obviously that of competition for the market. The general rule as expressed by Article 35 is nevertheless limited during the transition period. In the long run, competitive tendering will become the normal way of awarding contracts for local public utility provision. Even if there are doubts that full competition will be introduced into the sector, liberalization does appear to be having an effect, forcing many local public utilities to become more efficient. The changes introduced have brought about a better and a more efficient system with a greater number of large size enterprises and on the average a more active management.
In the future, the liberalization process may come to a standstill due to an insufficient number of competitors. Strong public administrations are therefore needed to prevent opportunistic behaviour by private firms.     

公用企业滥用行为与"混合型"管制改革

公用企业滥用垄断地位行为是管制改革和中国反垄断法中的核心问题.本文采用线性城市模型证明,管制改革中纵向经营在位企业具有采取排他性行为对新企业实行市场封锁的激励.在此情况下,混合型管制体制具有相对的效率优势.中国自然垄断行业具有自然垄断、行为垄断和行政垄断三重交织的特点,垄断性公用企业具有特殊的滥用行为产生机理和滥用行为方式.反公用企业滥用行为应建立"混合型"管制体制模式,将深化行业管制体制改革和反垄断执法有机的结合起来.     

西方国家公用事业民营化改革的经验及其对我国的启示

西方国家公用事业领域的改革取得了显著的成效,积累了相当丰富的经验。在我国公用事业领域改革过程中,借鉴国外公用事业民营化的成功经验,在政府宏观规制下,通过引入竞争机制,实现公用事业的民营化改造,有利于公用事业摆脱困境,实现企业效率和公共福利的共赢。     

Privatization Policies and Public Enterprise: A Survey*

This paper surveys and analyzes the economic literature on ‘privatization’ policies, restricting coverage to policies designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises through increased exposure to competitive market forces. These include asset sales, liberalization (or deregulation) and franchising. The objectives, incentives and constraints of public and private enterprises are examined, and evidence on their comparative performance is analyzed. Public sector revenue effects from asset sale are also explored. On the basis of these considerations, the paper concludes that liberalization is an important ingredient in any policy package designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises. Asset sale may enhance the beneficial impact of deregulation but asset sale in the absence of deregulation is unlikely to improve efficiency, and may introduce additional market distortions. Franchising is seen as an appropriate mechanism for privatization when the market is inherently monopolistic and when the government desires to retain control over output and/or price.     

Public Enterprise Privatization: A General Equilibrium Analysis

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to examine the short‐run and long‐run optimal privatization policies. By assuming that all firms are public firms initially, the paper focuses on how the degree of product differentiation γ and the average efficiency of the industry influence the determination of the optimal privatization policy. The paper shows that privatization decreases the more efficient firms' outputs while increases the less efficient firms' outputs in the short run, and reduces all firms' outputs in the long run. The paper also shows that the larger is γ and the smaller is the number of firms, the more privatized will be the public firm in the short run. Moreover, as γ or the entry barrier f_E is sufficiently small, full privatization is the best policy in the long run. On the contrary, as γ and f_E are large enough, partial privatization is optimal.