The Impact of the Disclosure of Non‐GAAP Earnings in Australian Annual Reports on Non‐Sophisticated Users

The disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings in Australian annual reports has risen steadily in recent years. These non‐statutory earnings measures are generally disclosed in the unaudited section of the annual report and are not consistent with statutory profit as defined under generally accepted Australian accounting standards (GAAP). Recent research conducted in the United States (US) has provided evidence that non‐sophisticated investor decisions are influenced by the presence and prominence of non‐GAAP earnings information. Further evidence suggests that investor perception changed after non‐GAAP earnings disclosures became subject to regulation in that jurisdiction. Australia has high investor participation rates by international standards, including investors operating self‐managed superannuation funds, resulting in a significant number of active individual investors. This study employs an experimental design to investigate the impact on non‐sophisticated investors of the reporting of non‐GAAP earnings information in addition to GAAP earnings information in Australian annual reports. The results of this study show a positive association between the prominent disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings information and non‐sophisticated investor reliance on this information. These results provide important evidence to Australian regulators as these narrative disclosures are not subject to regulation, in contrast to the US where mandatory regulation has been in place since 2003.     

The Value Relevance of Mandatory Non‐GAAP Earnings

This paper examines the value relevance of earnings components where there is a mandatory requirement to report generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings and non‐GAAP earnings, and where the items to be eliminated from GAAP earnings are defined in detail. The setting is different from non‐GAAP earnings disclosures presented in the United States and elsewhere, where managers have discretion over whether to report a non‐GAAP earnings number, and what to exclude from GAAP earnings. Our mandatory setting enables us to report value relevance results that are not confounded by managers' discretionary choices regarding non‐GAAP earnings exclusions. We use price‐level regressions, based on the Ohlson (1995) model, to test for incremental and relative value relevance. The results show that non‐GAAP earnings reported under a mandatory regime have higher value relevance than GAAP earnings. The disaggregation of these items is useful to investors in a setting where managerial motivations are minimized.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

Disclosure Prominence and the Quality of Non‐GAAP Earnings

The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.     

Credibility Attributes and Investor Perceptions of Non‐GAAP Earnings Exclusions

Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors focus more on non‐GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) than on traditional GAAP earnings because non‐GAAP earnings are believed to proxy for a firm's ongoing profitability, a measure useful for valuation. Managers determine these non‐GAAP earnings by excluding certain items from their GAAP income. However, because these non‐GAAP earnings are both unaudited and may be disclosed by a firm to manage investors’ perceptions as opposed to inform, investors must infer the credibility of the disclosure through observable firm attributes. In this study we examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (corporate governance, higher‐quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) will be perceived as providing more credible non‐GAAP exclusions than those with weaker attributes. Our expectation is that the market reaction to non‐GAAP earnings exclusions of firms with stronger credibility attributes will be greater than for those with weaker attributes. Our results support our expectation.     

Components of CEO Remuneration and Non‐GAAP Disclosure

This paper provides evidence of the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration on decisions to disclose voluntary non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) financial measures. We investigate profit announcements that focus on the most emphasised part, which includes mandatorily identified information (results for the announcement to the market) and the least emphasised part, which incorporates other sections. By reading the profit announcements and manually collecting non‐GAAP financial measures (NGFM) data, there is no reliance on keyword search strings and as such we uncover the pervasiveness of the use of NGFM. Results show that the base component of CEOs’ remuneration plays a significant role in reporting NGFM in the most emphasised part of the profit announcement. Conversely, all three (base, short‐term and long‐term incentives) components of the remuneration package have a significant relationship with the reporting decisions in the least emphasised part of the statement. We find that, depending on the regulatory imposition and the emphasis assigned to the section of the profit announcement, the motive for voluntary disclosure of NGFM can be explained as altruistic (informative) or opportunistic (misleading). We contribute evidence on ‘pay–action’ rather than ‘pay–performance’ by incorporating all three components simultaneously into the framework to maintain the assumption of correspondence and internal consistency among those components.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

The Impact of Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediations on Investors' Perceptions of Earnings Quality

We hypothesize and find that firms making SOX‐mandated disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) exhibit lower investor‐perceived earnings quality (IPEQ) than nondisclosers. We measure IPEQ using e‐loading, a market‐returns–based representation of earnings quality developed by Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schipper (2006). Firms do not exhibit decreases in IPEQ after initially disclosing material weaknesses. This is consistent with investors having anticipated ICOFR strength based on observable firm characteristics. However, firms exhibit increases in IPEQ after receiving their first clean audit reports that confirm the remediation of previously disclosed weaknesses. This indicates that, although investors do not find initial weakness disclosures to be incrementally informative, SOX motivates firms to remediate weak controls and provides a venue for credible remediation disclosures, thus enhancing investors' perception of financial reporting reliability. These findings are consistent with the existence of regulatory benefits associated with SOX's internal control disclosure and audit requirements.     

The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Effects of winsorization: The cases of forecasting non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings

This study examines how the winsorization procedure affects the performance of regression‐based earnings forecasting models. I find that the impact is multifaceted and depends principally on three factors: the level of data errors in the tails, the characteristics of firms affected by the process, and the use of scaling. For a non‐GAAP earnings yield specification, where data input errors exist, winsorization changes the information set in a non‐systematic way and helps to improve the performance of regression‐based forecasts, especially when the least squares estimator is employed. However, for a non‐GAAP earnings per share specification, with fewer data input errors found in the tails of the distribution, winsorization has a particularly strong effect on very large companies, lowering the economic value of earnings predictions. I observe similar results for corresponding GAAP earnings specifications. Robust estimators, such as least absolute deviation, high breakdown‐point and Theil‐Sen, appear to be a more effective solution than winsorization. Their earnings forecasts consistently yield significant positive abnormal returns across non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings specifications.     

Future Cash Flow Predictability of Non‐IFRS Earnings: Australian Evidence

The global proliferation of reporting non‐International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (pro forma) earnings has been subject to academic debate and regulatory reform. This study examines whether non‐IFRS earnings contain statistically significant information on future cash flow predictability that could be useful for investors. The study uses data from large Australian listed companies over a six‐year period (2006–11) covering three distinctive periods around the global financial crisis (GFC): pre‐GFC, GFC and post‐GFC. Results based on fixed effects panel estimation methods suggest non‐IFRS earnings do exert a significantly positive impact on future cash flow predictability but only during pre‐crisis and crisis periods.     

Earnings Management by Non‐profit Organisations: Evidence from UK Charities

Informed by stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory, this paper investigates whether UK charities are engaged in earnings management practices. Based on a sample of 1414 charities over a five‐year period (2008–2012) the study firstly finds that UK charities use discretionary accruals to drive their financial results towards a zero surplus/deficit; this result also reveals that the distribution of reported earnings around zero is prevalent amongst UK charities. In addition, in contrast to prior findings, the empirical results point to a significant association between leverage and earnings management behaviour by charities. Lastly, this study finds that the practice of earnings management is influenced by non‐profit organisational size.     

The Differential Value Relevance of S&P's Core Earnings Versus GAAP Earnings: The Role of Stock Option Expense

In 2002, Standard & Poor's (S&P) introduced Core Earnings as a proprietary, uniform earnings metric, with the goal of improving financial reporting. The distinguishing feature of Core Earnings is its consistent treatment of seven adjustments to GAAP earnings for which there is no consensus adjustment by managers and analysts. We use stock price and return data to assess whether investors perceive Core Earnings to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings. The implementation of FASB 123R changed the calculation of GAAP and Core Earnings. This change allows us to assess the role of stock option expense in the valuation of earnings numbers by partitioning the sample into pre‐ and post‐FASB 123R periods and creating consistent measures of GAAP and Core Earnings. Our price results indicate that Core Earnings is more value relevant than GAAP earnings in the pre‐period after controlling for stock option expense, and in the post‐FASB 123R periods. The price results provide empirical evidence consistent with S&P's expectation that a uniformly calculated earnings measure is a more consistent and useful indicator of current performance and future earnings.     

Do Investors Perceive the Link Between Equity Method Earnings and Future Earnings? The Role of Supplemental Disclosures

Equity method investments are commonly a material component of a firm's corporate structure, yet these investments are presented to financial statement users through opaque financial reporting. This study demonstrates that the link between equity method earnings and future earnings is stronger than the link between consolidated earnings and future earnings, consistent with the synergistic and diversification benefits of equity method investments. Next, this study demonstrates a limitation in the opaque reporting of equity method investments by revealing that the market fails to fully incorporate into prices the link between equity method earnings and future earnings. Further, this study contributes to the active debate among practitioners and regulators about the usefulness of supplemental disclosure requirements related to equity method investments. Results indicate that supplemental equity method investment disclosures aid the market in impounding the persistence of equity method earnings into share price.     

Management Going‐concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation

The UK regulatory requirements relating to going‐concern disclosures require directors to report on the going‐concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially‐distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going‐concern cases over the period 1994–2000. We find that whereas auditors' going‐concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going‐concern uncertainties directors' going‐concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going‐concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions.     

GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings

Managers, security analysts, investors, and the press rely increasingly on modified definitions of GAAP net income, known by such names as "operating" and "pro forma" earnings. We document this phenomenon and discuss competing explanations for the recent rise in the use of such modified earnings numbers and implications for the interpretation of related accounting research. Our results show that over the past 20 years there has been a dramatic increase in the frequency and magnitude of cases where "GAAP" and "Street" earnings differ. Further, there is a very strong bias toward the reporting of a Street earnings number that exceeds the GAAP earnings number. We also show that the market response to the Street earnings number has displaced GAAP earnings as a primary determinant of stock prices. Finally, through an analysis of earnings releases, we show that management has taken a proactive role in defining and emphasizing the Street number when communicating to analysts and investors.     

The Share Price Impact of UK CCA Disclosures

This study investigates the impact of the experimental standard, SSAP16 (Current Cost Accounting), on share returns on the London stock market. Approximately 200 companies were examined between 1980–84. The experimental design specifies current cost as a supplementary signal to historical cost and employs two main statistical tools: ordinary least squares regression and the abnormal performance metric. In addition, a number of different CCA measurements are specified in order to assess the sensitivity of the results and to ease comparison with other studies. The results suggest that CCA information has a small but significant impact on stock returns in the days up to announcement. However, CCA does not seem to be the main driving force behind long period returns. Returns in the long run are associated more closely with historical cost information than with that generated by SSAPI6.     

Impact of Segment‐level Natural Resource Operational Risk Reporting on Earnings Predictions

Non‐financial reports alert investors to operational risks associated with issues such as insufficient access to natural resource inputs and related costly interruptions to production, while segment‐level reports alert investors to operational risk distribution across a firm. An important issue, to date unexplored, is how segment‐level non‐financial reporting has an impact on earnings predictions. We report the results of an experiment used to examine how mining company segment‐level water reports affect investors' earnings predictions, where water reports indicate whether the firm and its segments will have access to sufficient water to meet production needs. We find that investors do not change their earnings predictions when firm and segment‐level reports indicate low water risk but they do revise down their earnings predictions when firm and segment‐level water reports indicate high water risk. This is consistent with investors responding to the additional information provided in segment‐level reports confirming that water risk is high across the firm. Regardless of whether firm‐level water reports indicate high or low water risk, when segment‐level reports indicate that one segment is low water risk and another is high water risk, investors revise down their earnings predictions. This is consistent with investors recognizing that natural resource operational risk concentration in one segment can affect earnings more than evenly‐distributed risk. Overall, our findings suggest that belief‐adjustment theory explains how investors react to prospective operational risk information contained in segment‐level water reports according to the similarity of the segment‐level risks, and that this information is factored into earnings predictions.     

Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures on the Face of the Income Statement by UK Firms: The Effect on Market Liquidity

This study benefits by a special feature of the UK information environment which allows UK firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement to examine two interrelated questions. First, we ask whether the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is related to the firm's financial performance and corporate governance characteristics, and second, we investigate the effect of this disclosure decision on market liquidity. Using a dataset of 1227 hand-collected firm-year observations during the period 2006–2013, we show that better governed firms and firms with weaker financial performance are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Our evidence also suggests that this disclosure is associated with increased levels of market liquidity and the results hold after controlling for self-selection bias. We conclude that firms' decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is more consistent with the incentive to provide information than to mislead the market.     

盈余管理对审计费用影响分析——来自中国上市公司首次审计费用披露的证据

审计收费作为客户与注册会计师之间重要的经济联系,是审计研究的重要对象;而在资本市场与会计市场的发展过程中,盈余管理问题也引起了广泛而高度的重视。那么,上市公司的盈余管理问题是否会影响到注册会计师的收费呢?自2001年开始,上市公司需要在年报中披露支付给会计师事务所的报酬情况,本文选取了2001年报按照证监会要求披露审计费用的282家公司作为研究样本,发现公司盈余管理的表现之一,即公司的净资产收益率(ROE)处于“保牌”区间,是年度财务审计费用的显著影响因素;此外,公司规模、是否由国际5大(4大)所审计显著正向影响年度财务审计费用。