Domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare

This article investigates the consumer welfare consequences of the recent code‐share agreement between Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines. We develop a discrete choice model based on individual flight characteristics. This structural model recognizes that consumers (i) may have heterogeneous preferences for flight attributes, and (ii) may face different prices for the same flight. The empirical methodology also deals with the measurement error problem stemming from the absence of consumer‐level data on prices. The estimation results suggest that, whereas the code‐share agreement did not impact consumers significantly on average, it increased the average surplus of connecting passengers but decreased the average surplus of nonstop passengers. Interestingly, the magnitude of our welfare results may be attributed in large part to changes in product characteristics other than prices.     

Competitive differential pricing

We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.     

Product differentiation and efficiencies in the retail banking industry

We empirically quantify the welfare implications of bank entry in the United States between 2000 and 2008. We use a fully structural framework that combines a differentiated demand model with an endogenous product model to investigate the market outcomes. We find no evidence for under- or over-entry. Compared with the socially efficient outcome, there is a mild welfare loss resulting from banks entering wrong locations in product space. Compared with the observed outcome, consumer surplus drops by 20–38% and bank profits decline by 48–59% when banks are homogeneous. Therefore product differentiation significantly improves welfare under free entry.     

Horizontal mergers and divestment dynamics in a sunset industry

Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business‐stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business‐stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers in the Japanese cement industry, it examines whether such merger‐induced divestment improves total welfare based on a dynamic model of divestment. The findings suggest that merged firms indeed tended to reduce capital more actively and that, as a result of these mergers, total welfare improved despite a reduction in the consumer surplus.     

Entry and pricing in a differentiated products industry: evidence from the ATM market

We estimate a structural equilibrium model of the automatic teller machine market (ATM) to evaluate the implications of regulating ATM surcharges. We use data on bank characteristics, potential and actual ATM locations, and consumer locations; identify the model parameters with a regression discontinuity design; and develop methods to estimate the model without computing equilibria. A surcharge ban reduces ATM entry 12% and consumer welfare 24% but increases firm profits 27%. Total welfare under either regime is 4% lower than the surplus maximizing level. The article can help shed light on the implications of unregulated entry for differentiated products industries.     

Prominence and consumer search

This article examines the implications of “prominence” in search markets. We model prominence by supposing that the prominent firm will be sampled first by all consumers. If there are no systematic quality differences among firms, we find that the prominent firm will charge a lower price than its less prominent rivals. Making a firm prominent will typically lead to higher industry profit but lower consumer surplus and welfare. The model is extended by introducing heterogeneous product qualities, in which case the firm with the highest‐quality product has the greatest incentive to become prominent, and making it prominent will boost industry profit, consumer surplus, and welfare.     

Welfare‐increasing third‐degree price discrimination

When demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means, conditions exist such that third‐degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare. Welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means. Welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution related to the Pareto. In general, whether discrimination increases total output depends on demand being more convex in markets in which prices fall with discrimination than in those in which prices rise.     

Valuing product innovation: genetically engineered varieties in US corn and soybeans

We develop a discrete‐choice model of differentiated products for US corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties. Using a unique data set spanning the period 1996–2011, we find that the welfare impact of the GE innovation is significant. In the last five years of the period analyzed, our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to GE traits was $5.18 billion per year, with seed manufacturers appropriating 56% of this surplus. The seed industry obtained more surplus from GE corn, whereas farmers received more surplus from GE soybeans.     

Limited Liability and Market Power

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of limited liability on firm behavior when market power is present. A risk-neutral monopolist facing uncertain demand (with constant returns to scale technology) produces higher output, yielding higher expected profits when costless exit is induced by limited liability. The higher output may increase social welfare (monopolist profit plus consumer surplus) even though the monopolist may overproduce relative to the quantity that maximizes social welfare. When no market power is present, the overproduction resulting from the provision of limited liability results in loss of social welfare. Appropriate use of liability limitation laws can thus provide policy makers an additional policy instrument with which to mitigate the effects of market power.JEL Classification: D24, D41, D42, G32, G38     

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF VALUE TO THE OWNER

This short paper applies the economists' concept of consumer surplus to the accountants' concept of value to the owner. It is shown that the two relevant concepts of consumer surplus - the equivalent consumer surplus and the compensating consumer - result in valuations that differ from the traditional Solomons, et al., analysis. This proposition is established by use of traditional neoclassical demand theory. It is also shown that whilst the analysis is essentially of a short run nature this is also true of the accountants' concept of value to the owner.     

Impact of risk aversion and countervailing tax in oligopoly

The literature recognizes the qualitative effects of risk aversion on oligopolistic market performance, but less is known about their magnitudes. We quantitatively evaluate these effects in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies where firms maximize mean-variance utilities under linear demand and costs. The impacts are very similar for the two types of oligopoly, but have opposite signs. The impacts of a firm’s risk aversion on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare can be expressed via potentially observable variables. Since these impacts resemble the effects of firms’ cost changes, a regulator can reduce or eliminate undesirable effects of risk aversion by changing firms’ costs with appropriate countervailing taxes.     

Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high‐risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low‐risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high‐risk agents. Second, we identify a trade‐off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low‐risk market to the less elastic high‐risk market. Third, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further, at the cost of efficiency.     

政策性农业保险补贴的最优边界与方式探讨

政策性农业保险补贴具有动态性和多维性的最优边界,补贴的不足和过高均会减少福利。本文将消费者剩余和外部性结合起来构建了农业保险的福利经济学模型,探讨了最优补贴边界的决定标准;从保户和保险机构两方面分析了直接补贴原保险相对低效率的原因所在,提出了涵盖运作主体、基金运作方式、费率和再保险责任限制方式等要素的以再保险补贴为核心的最优补贴方式的构想。相对于直接补贴原保险的做法,这种构想更有利于实现农业风险的分散,减少信息不对称,提高转移支付的效率,进而实现农业保险供给的扩张。     

Consumer‐surplus‐enhancing collusion and trade

That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated‐product duopoly operates in two geographically separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.     

Joint audit,audit market structure,and consumer surplus

We use a structural application of the discrete choice model to investigate how the introduction of a joint audit policy would affect audit market structure and consumer surplus. We perform this policy evaluation by identifying demand fundamentals in a joint audit regime and applying them to a single audit regime. We find that a joint audit requirement has the potential to change the audit market structure substantially but that the effects are sensitive to the specific policy design. For example, small audit firms gain market share in a joint audit regime but only if an equal sharing of the workload between the two joint auditors is not required. Our counterfactual analysis reveals that the introduction of a joint audit regime would be associated with a substantial loss of consumer surplus. The loss results from restricting clients from giving all of the audit work to their most preferred audit firm, but it is partly offset by gains in consumer surplus deriving from the opportunity to choose the best combination of auditor pairs.     

A Survey of Agricultural Household Models: Recent Findings and Policy Implications

Semicommercial farms that produce multiple crops make up a largepart of the agricultural sector in developing economies. Thesefarms or agricultural households combine two fundamental unitsof microeconomic analysis: the household and the firm. Traditionaleconomic theory has dealt with these units separately. But indeveloping economies in which peasant farms dominate, theirinterdependence is of crucial importance. Researchers at theFood Research Institute, Stanford University, and at the WorldBank have developed models of agricultural households that combineproducer and consumer behavior in a theoretically consistentfashion. Recent empirical applications of these models haveextended them and expanded the range of policy issues whichcan be investigated using this general framework. This article reports the results of empirical applications ofthis model in India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Taiwan, and Thailand.It provides a comparative analysis of the policy implicationsof the approach for such matters as the welfare of farm households,the size of marketed surplus, the demand for nonagriculturalgoods and services, and for hired labor, and the availabilityof budget revenues and foreign exchange.     

Dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger

We evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger in the medium‐sized, wide‐body aircraft industry. We find that the merger led to lower prices. To explain the price drop, we develop a dynamic oligopoly game with learning‐by‐doing. We quantify the welfare effects of the merger by incorporating both increased market power and merger efficiencies from accelerated learning‐by‐doing. Our dynamic analysis indicates that net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion, whereas a static model ignoring efficiencies of learning‐by‐doing predicts a $0.92 billion loss.     

Regulation and welfare: evidence from paragraph IV generic entry in the pharmaceutical industry

This article estimates welfare effects of accelerated generic entry via Paragraph IV challenges. Using data from 2000–2008 for hypertension drugs in the United States, we estimate demand using a random‐coefficients logit model. We find consumers gain $42 billion whereas producers lose $32.5 billion from entry. This modest $9.5 billion gain in social welfare is consistent with our observation that overall consumption does not increase after entry—generic sales displace branded sales, shifting surplus downstream from producers to consumers, insurance companies, and retailers. We demonstrate significant cross‐molecular substitution and discuss challenges in determining what fraction of downstream surplus actually goes to consumers.     

Credit card interchange fees

We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. In the model a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. This always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus.