Earnings management behaviors under different economic environments: Evidence from Japanese banks

This paper investigates Japanese banks' earnings management behavior under three distinct economic environments: (1) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985–1990); (2) stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991–1996); and (3) severe recession with credit crunch economy (1997–1999). Using bank balance sheet information of 78 Japanese banks, we find that earnings management behavior by Japanese banks differ considerably across the three periods. Our results indicate that banks used security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods. We also find that banks used loan loss provisions to manage earnings; however, this behavior is only prevalent during the first two periods. Due to the fact that banks faced record-high non-performing loans during the latter severe recession period, banks on average may have been restrained from using loan loss provisions to smooth income and/or to replenish regulatory capital. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the Japanese banks significantly lowered their lending with increased provisions.     

BANKING LICENCES, BAILOUTS AND REGULATOR ABILITY

I analyse a model in which it is socially optimal for banks to manage depositor funds but in which concerns about fraud discourage depositing and justify regulation. The regulator screens bankers and decides the level of charter value which they will receive as incentive to prevent fraud. She can also encourage deposits by insuring them. The optimal policy depends upon the regulator's screening ability: high ability regulators rely upon charter value and low ability regulators rely upon deposit insurance. I relate these findings to the regulation of transition economy banks, to operational risk management, and to banking competition policy.     

Intermediate Macroeconomics without the IS-LM Model

The IS-LM model is the primary model of economic fluctuations taught in intermediate-level undergraduate macroeconomics. Recent works by Taylor and Romer make a strong case for an alternative model, known as the aggregate demand-price adjustment (AD-PA) or the aggregate demand-inflation adjustment (AD-IA) model, as a better model of economic fluctuations. The author argues that the AD-PA model is superior to the IS-LM model for teaching about economic fluctuations in intermediate macroeconomics. He compares the perfomance of the two models in teaching about two important issues in current macroeconomics: the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating the 1990s Japanese economy and the rapid switch of the U.S. Federal Reserve from contractionary policy to expansionary policy in 2001.     

EC INTEGRATION AND JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC

This study proposes two hypotheses to identify the cause(s) behind the short-term cyclical Japanese manufacturing foreign direct investment in the European Community (EC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s: (i) a catch-up process of Japanese firms in anticipation of EC single market integration in 1993 and (ii) the so-called bubble economic phenomenon caused by the overheated economy following expansionary monetary policy in Japan in the late 1980s. Applying multinomial logit models to the data on parent firms of 283 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established in the EC from 1988 to 1992 reveals strong support for the bubble economy hypothesis but not for the catch-up hypothesis. Results also show that under a bubble economy situation, tax-related incentive policies in host countries—e.g., an investment tax allowance for foreign direct investment—are quite important in attracting Japanese firms.     

不良资产处理、股份制改造与外资战略--中日韩银行业经验比较

本文通过中日韩三国银行业的经验比较 ,以政府和银行之间的互动关系为切入点来具体说明强政府制度安排下的政银关系、银行不良贷款产生的原因和处理办法以及银行治理结构的内容。在经验证据和理论分析的基础上得到结论 :股份制的形式并不能改变强政府下政银关系的实质 ,为了实现国有银行的改革 ,引进外资是极其重要的战略选择。     

Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s

The governance structure of public corporations is determined by the agency relationship between shareholders and managers, and the agency theory predicts that deregulation of an industry leads to governance adaptation. Deregulation of the Japanese banking business in the 1980s offers an interesting case study in this framework, as Japanese banks fell into serious solvency problems in the post-deregulation 1990s. This paper investigates whether ineffective governance was responsible for the plight of Japanese banks. The sample is 384 corporations that were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1990, which includes 59 banks. One of the findings is that bank shareholders allowed more diffuse ownership structure after deregulation, which demonstrates that the agency theory did not hold for shareholders of Japanese banks.     

ARE SOME BANKS TOO LARGE TO FAIL? MYTH AND REALITY

At the time of the Continental Illinois National Bank insolvency, bank regulators considered some commercial banks "too large to fail" (TLTF) and were reluctant both to legally fail such banks and to impose pro rata losses on any of the uninsured creditors of these insolvent banks and their parent holding companies. This policy was introduced due to widespread fears that large bank failures would set off a domino effect bringing down other banks and possibly even the macroeconomy as it did during the 1930s. Also, because these banks are considered special in that they provide money and credit to their communities, many feared that their failure could reduce greatly the availability of these services.
This paper analyzes the validity of these fears by examining both theory and the historical record. It concludes that neither theory nor history provides strong support for either fear. In addition, the paper finds that the costs of regulatory forbearance granted to insolvent banks and their creditors greatly exceed the alleged benefits. It also reviews how policy makers apply the TLTF principle in practice. The paper concludes that the policy has been modified progressively over time so that some large banks now are declared legally insolvent and all creditors of bank holding companies—and some uninsured creditors of the banks themselves—incur losses. One may reasonably expect that TLTF will be modified further as the large societal costs become more evident to the public and regulators alike.     

The United States and United Kingdom activities of Japanese banks, 1980–1988

This paper analyzes the United States and United Kingdom activities of Japanese banks by integrating their activities in these two markets with the regulatory environment for banks in Japan and Japan's overall external financial position, as well as with business opportunities in the two host countries. The paper concludes that the regulatory environment in Japan, including restraints on interest rates and possible quantitative restraints, has had an impact on activities of Japanese banks in these two foreign markets.Japanese banks appear to have adjusted to their domestic regulatory environment by using their London branches as a flexible funding source and their U.S. offices in extending commercial and industrial loans to Japan-based companies as well as a substitute location for interbank trading. In both markets Japanese banking offices are large net barrowers from unrelated banks because of constraints on raising funds in their homer market.     

To engage or not to engage in corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from global banking sector

Whether or not banks should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities is controversial because of the concomitant high cost even if banks could enjoy the benefits of a higher income as a result of their good reputation. Faced with this dilemma, bank managers are hesitant to engage in CSR. This study pursues this issue by examining whether or not banks engaging in CSR can bring profits and reduce non-performing loans. We apply three novel estimation methods to obtain the unbiased and full-blown CSR effect. The first two methods are matching methods, namely, conventional propensity score matching method and nearest-neighbor variance bias-corrected matching method (nn-VBC). The third method is Heckman's two-step method in switching regression. Regardless of the methods used, CSR banks overwhelmingly outperform non-CSR banks in terms of return on assets and return on equity. Our study offers policy suggestions for both government regulators and bank managers.     

Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries.     

浅谈日本经济飞速发展的原因

日本经济的快速发展与日本企业显示出的强大竞争力,引起国际上的瞩目,各国都在探索其发展原因,日本经济的腾飞在很大程度上受企业文化、管理制度、生产方式等因素的影响.日本企业突破了西方发达国家的规范,结合了东方文化的内涵,使日本企业管理大大优于西方,从而有力地促进了日本经济的发展,是日本经济获得成功的主要因素之一.     

The governance structures of Japanese credit associations and their objective functions

Although Japanese credit associations are non-profit cooperative financial institutions, they assume the same financial functions as regional banks that are stock companies and they could compete with each other in a regional market. On the other hand, the governance structures of credit associations tend to exhibit weaker discipline than those of regional banks, and, for this reason, the financial performances of credit associations and regional banks might differ. In this article, we empirically investigated whether the objective functions of credit associations are different from those of regional banks considering their different governance structures. As a result, although significant differences of profitability of these two types of institutions were not detected, it was demonstrated that credit associations can capture a greater share of deposits than regional banks and the former are more conservative in risk taking than the latter. From these, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations have different objective functions from regional banks.     

Federal banking regulators' competition in laxity: Evidence from CRA audits

The U.S. banking industry has three federal regulators in addition to the 50 state regulators. Through choices regarding its chartering source, joining the Federal Reserve System, and having deposit insurance, a bank also selects which office or agency serves as its primary regulator. Federal regulators gain status and authority from the number of banks over which they have primary supervision. It has long been suspected, therefore, that they compete with each other to entice banks to make choices that increase the number of banks reporting to them. This competition which includes less stringent enforcement and broad interpretation of the laws as favored by the banks is known as competition in laxity. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is enforced by each of the three federal banking regulators. Since 1990, their ratings of banks' CRA performance have been published. This published data provides an opportunity to test accuracy of the competition in laxity theory.     

循环经济发展的金融支持研究

循环经济体系,没有强大的资金支持是不可能实现的。只有建立和完善有效的金融支持体系,才能全方位地满足循环经济产业化的金融需求。因此,我们要为循环经济相关的市场主体建立一个良性的、面向市场的投融资环境和金融支持体系：改革发展循环经济的商业银行间接融资体系;建立专为循环经济生产提供资金的政策性金融组织;组建循环经济产业投资基金;培育和发展资本市场,拓宽循环经济项目融资渠道;推进与循环经济相关的金融资源创新,实现循环经济和金融创新的双赢。     

什么决定了中国商业银行的高盈利

本文分银行和省际两个层面探讨了中国商业银行高盈利的原因。研究结果显示,经济持续良好的增长使人们的收入不断提高,人们对银行产品和服务的需求日益高涨,而政府对存款利率和民间金融等的严格控制,使商业银行处于供不应求和相对垄断的地位。这些是商业银行利润持续走高的最主要原因。虽然2003年开始的银行业改革使银行的市场化程度大幅提升,但是中国的商业银行仍不是自主经营的真正企业。银行的利润主要是宏观和政策环境给予的,这也是银行的高利润备受市场批评的主要原因。     

The relationship between interest rate volatility and the shadow economy in OECD countries: An asymmetric analysis

Interest rate changes by central banks are a strong monetary policy tool that has a significant impact on the performance of the real economy via various channels. Despite extensive theoretical and empirical studies in this area, the current literature lacks a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between interest rate volatility and the shadow economy. This study explores the link between interest rate volatility and the shadow economy for 38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries over the period 1991–2021 using both linear and non-linear ARDL models. The use of the non-linear ARDL specification will allow for the possibility of an asymmetric effect of interest rate volatility on the shadow economy. In addition to the examination of the potential asymmetric effects, we also discuss the ramifications for policymakers with respect to monetary and financial policies while considering each country's specific economic structure.     

The Role of Foreign Capital in the Banking Sector of Korea and Its Implications for Developing Countries

The entry of foreign capital marked a significant change in the Korean banking sector. It played a critical role in transforming insolvent banks into profit-making banks. The acquisition of domestic banks by foreign private equity funds restructured the management by changing the corporate governance and pursuing result-oriented policies, while it had a negative impact on the national economy in general. Korea’s experience shows that the role of foreign private equity funds in the domestic banking sector needs to be evaluated from the perspective of both the performance of each bank and its effect on the national economy.     

Credit Losses in Australasian Banking

We analyse the determinants of bank credit losses in Australasia. Despite sizeable credit losses over the past two decades, ours is the first systematic study to do so. Analysis is based on a comprehensive dataset retrieved from original financial reports of 32 Australasian banks (1980–2005). Credit losses rise when the macro economy is weak. Asset markets, particularly the equity market, are also important. Larger banks provide more for credit losses while banks with high cost-income-ratios show greater loan loss provisions. Strong loan growth translates into significantly higher credit losses with a lag of 2–4 years. Finally, the results show strong evidence of income smoothing activities by banks.     

If the Banks are Doing So Well,Why Can't I Get a Loan? Regulatory Constraints to Financial Inclusion in Indonesia

Indonesia's financial sector has two paradoxes: (i) Indonesia has been a global leader in microfinance for the past 25 years, but access to microfinance services is declining; and (ii) Indonesia's commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and profitable, and the Indonesian economy has been doing well over the past decade, but small and medium enterprises are facing a credit crunch. Although Indonesia is underbanked, most commercial banks have been unresponsive to unmet effective demand. The behavior of banks has been in their own short‐term best interests, primarily because of the unintended consequences of Indonesia's financial sector reregulation after the East Asian crisis and contradictory monetary policies, which have produced a prudentially sound but inefficient, narrow, and homogenized banking oligopoly. Indonesia should not respond to financial exclusion by artificially pumping out and administratively allocating more credit. Instead, it should promulgate smart regulation so that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursuing noncompetitive and noninclusive business practices.     

Does a one-size-fits-all approach to financial regulations alleviate default risk? The case of dual banking systems

Financial regulations are developed to curb financial and economic fragility costs without undermining the economic contributions of banks to economic development. To understand the impact financial regulations have on reducing the financial fragility of banks we use the probability-of-default of banks as a proxy for bank failure. After analyzing data collected from 15 countries with a dual banking system for the period 2000–2015, we find convincing evidence that not all financial regulations have risk-reducing benefits for banks and the impact of financial regulations on default risk is not the same for conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks (IBs). The empirical evidence suggests that regulations that lessen overall default risk have a greater impact on IBs while those increasing default risk have a greater impact on CBs. Based on our findings we recommend that regulators should consider the different natures of CBs and IBs and tailor financial regulations to suit these operationally distinct financial intermediaries.