The apparatus of fraud risk

‘Fraud risk’ is ontologically different from fraud. Fraud itself is a disruptive event; fraud risk can and must be governed. This essay draws on Foucault’s concept of an apparatus (dispositif) to explain the emergence of this difference. The analysis begins with a concrete case and explicates the history of fraud risk which flows through a specific organizational setting. First, it is claimed that fraud risk must be understood in relation to the broader historicity of risk in which risk expands its reach as an organizing practice category. Second, it is argued that the diverse elements of the fraud risk apparatus – words, laws, best practice guides, risk maps, websites, compliance officers, text books, regulatory judgments and many more – have a trajectory of formation. This trajectory begins with auditing and expands into risk management, regulation and security more generally. Fraud risk management emerges as a highly articulated, transnational web of ideas and procedures which frame the future within present organizational actions, and which intensify the responsibility of senior managers. Overall, the paper challenges the common sense idea that the present shape of fraud risk management is a functional necessity demanded by fraud events. The purpose is to display the historically contingent regime of truth for speaking about fraud, risk and responsibility in organizations. The paper suggests that this ‘regime of truth’ consists in a form of managerial and regulatory knowledge with a ‘grammar’ governing rules for talking about and acting on risky subjects and organizations. The rise of ‘fraud risk’ management and its prominent position within the field of corporate governance in the 21st century is emblematic of an ongoing neoliberal project of individualization and responsibilization.     

Rationalization of financial statement fraud in government: An Austrian perspective

This paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how existing opportunities and incentives for committing financial statement fraud in government translate into the rationalization of such fraud. The analytical approach is theoretical. The rationalization of financial statement fraud is analyzed through the lenses of a theory of entrepreneurship rooted in Austrian economics. Entrepreneurship, while generally seen as a positive force for economic productivity, is viewed as a source of deception. The framework illustrates that financial statement fraud has its origins in political, rather than economic incentives, and that it is rationalized by elected rather than non-elected officials. Due to a lower proportion of creditors and investors with vested interests in the framework, it is also concluded that the detection process of financial statement fraud in government tend to exhibit less “alertness” than in private sector contexts. Specific techniques associated with financial statement fraud therefore tend to persist over relatively long periods of time.     

The future of financial fraud

Is financial fraud becoming a bigger or smaller problem over time? Current empirical approaches to this question generate mixed inferences. As an alternative, I use two theoretical constructs that isolate several factors that motivate fraud, and use them to consider the impact of technological and wealth changes over time. Some changes, such as an increase in anonymity in some financial transactions, facilitate new fraud innovations and increase the possibility of fraud. The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic shutdown has fostered major disruptions in relative demands and organizational capital that also increase the likelihood of fraud over the next few years. Viewed over a longer time scale, however, the majority of technological and wealth changes seem likely to increase the use and effectiveness of reputational capital, third-party enforcement, and ethical motivations as fraud deterrents. I predict that, on net, these changes will drive a long-term decrease in the incidence of fraud.     

Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.     

上市公司财务报告舞弊的识别——基于三角形理论的实证研究

为构建财务报告舞弊识别模型,本文选取2000—2009年发生财务报告舞弊的A股上市公司及其配对非舞弊公司为研究对象,利用配对样本t检验、Wilcoxon符号秩检验、Logistic回归,对描述三角形理论的25个指标研究发现,两类公司之间营业利润—经营现金流量、外部董事比例等指标描述的压力和机会因素存在显著差异;各指标与舞弊可能性的相关关系表明,压力越大、机会越多,舞弊可能性越大。由此建立的识别模型正确识别率达到93.7%,有助于人们识别舞弊,帮助上市公司发现舞弊根源。     

Firm-level political risk and distance-to-default

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.     

Attitude,Machiavellianism and the rationalization of misreporting

Audit standards around the world describe three factors, known together as the fraud triangle, that purportedly predict the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting ( and ). The first two factors, opportunity and incentive/pressure, are largely accepted as being associated with fraud (,  and ), whereas the third factor, attitude/rationalization, remains a relative mystery ( and ). I conducted an experiment in which participants were provided the opportunity and motivation to misreport, in order to explore attitude and rationalization in greater detail. As expected, I found that participants whose attitude favors misreporting and individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism are both more likely to misreport; and participants who misreport experience negative emotions (affect). Of concern, however, is that higher Machiavellians who misreport feel significantly less guilt than others who misreport. When I changed the experimental setting and asked participants to think about common rationalizations they may use, in an attempt to reduce rationalizing before they made their reporting decision, significantly fewer participants misreported; while those who still misreported rationalized to an even greater extent. Implications for future research and fraud detection and prevention are discussed.     

Effects of the fraud triangle on students’ risk assessments

This study is motivated by Bailey’s [Bailey, C. D. (2004). An unusual cash control procedure. Journal of Accounting Education, 22, 119–129]. A disappointing 89% of Bailey’s 502 students appear to have overestimated the risk of an asset misappropriation. This study presents the results of two quasi-experiments that test whether students’ risk assessments are affected by the type of model presented to them immediately preceding their risk assessments. One group was provided an overview of the widely used Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), Internal Control—Integrated Framework and the second group was provided a briefing on the Fraud Triangle, a model originally developed by criminologist, Donald R. Cressey (1973). As predicted, students who were provided an overview of the fraud triangle committed fewer Type I and Type II errors than students who were provided an overview of COSO. The results from this study contribute to the literature on risk assessment by demonstrating how the fraud triangle could, in some situations, lead to better risk assessments.     

The role of auditing in the fight against corruption

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how various types of auditing may contribute to fight corruption. While previous literature has primarily addressed auditing's ability to prevent corruption, this paper systematically explores auditing's potential to detect corruption. It argues that financial auditing has excluded corruption from the definition of fraud and instead classified it as ‘non-compliance with laws and regulations’. The main arguments for this exclusion is that corruption leaves no material errors in financial statements and no evidence for the auditor to follow. The paper refutes this, arguing that commercial and political corruption creates misstatements in the financial statements of the corruption giver's organization as well as the corruption receiver's organization. Thus, if auditing is to gain a more prominent role in the fight against corruption, auditing standards must include corruption in the definition of fraud, private and public sector auditors need to cooperate and exchange information, auditing techniques to detect corruption should be employed, and the auditing profession must embrace effective preventive measures such as anti-corruption certifications.     

Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China

This study investigates the effect of politically connected independent directors on a firm's likelihood of committing fraud in China. We classify the political backgrounds of independent directors into three categories based on their employment histories: local background, central background, and local and central background. Using corporate fraud data from 2000 to 2014, we find that independent directors with local political backgrounds significantly reduce the likelihood of a firm committing fraud. Further analysis shows that locally connected independent directors are more likely to have both employment experience in regulatory agencies and financial/accounting/law expertise.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.     

Die Rolle der Versicherungsvermittler beim Versicherungsbetrug – experimentelle Ergebnisse

The GDV estimates the amount of insurance fraud across Germany to be € 4 billion per year. This work examines, using experimental approach, the role of insurance agents in insurance fraud. This research shows that fraud behavior is not only dependent on economic motives even though these can make financial sense for the agent. Different crime detection rates and reward scenarios do not lead to any significant differences in behavior. If the insurance agent, however, completed an apprenticeship in the insurance sector, then this agent generally has a lower willingness to support the customer when committing insurance fraud. Against this, specifically men (as a research category) and holders of several policies tend to be more susceptible to support customers in insurance fraud.     

高管连锁、同业监督与公司违规

本文选取2011—2018年度A股上市公司为研究样本,以具有竞争关系的同业公司间的高管连锁作为同业监督的渠道,检验了同业监督对目标公司违规的影响。研究发现:(1)同业监督能有效抑制目标公司违规倾向,且这一影响当且仅当连锁公司是同业公司时存在;(2)同业竞争是同业监督的基础,在行业集中度低和行业增长率低的行业中,同业监督对目标公司违规的抑制作用更强;(3)目标公司的政治关联会瓦解同业监督对公司违规的抑制作用;(4)区分违规行为类型后发现,同业监督对经营违规的抑制作用最强,对信息披露违规次之,对领导人违规几乎没有效果。本研究丰富了公司违规监督机制的内容,也提供了辩证看待高管同业兼任的新视角。     

Why computer-mediated communication improves the effectiveness of fraud brainstorming

Current auditing standards require auditors to conduct a fraud brainstorming session aimed at considering ways in which the audit client's financial statements might be fraudulently misstated. Lynch et al. (2009) document that computer-mediated fraud brainstorming is significantly more effective than face-to-face brainstorming for generating relevant fraud risks. In this study, we code and analyze process-level data from the Lynch et al. (2009) study to understand the factors contributing to the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming. Specifically, we conduct mediation analysis to discern the degree to which equality of participation and two measures of task focus contribute to greater fraud brainstorming effectiveness when using a computer-mediated communication system compared to traditional face-to-face brainstorming. We also examine participants' perceptions of ease of system use, satisfaction with the process, and satisfaction with the outcome. Overall, the results indicate that the primary reason for the greater effectiveness of electronic fraud brainstorming is the greater degree of task focus as revealed through the length of comments made when using computer-mediated fraud brainstorming. In an absolute sense, participants using electronic brainstorming felt that their brainstorming mode was easy to use and they were satisfied with the process and outcome. The primary contribution of this study is in enhancing our understanding of precisely why computer-mediated fraud brainstorming outperforms face-to-face fraud brainstorming.     

Keeping Up with the Joneses: A Model and a Test of Collective Accounting Fraud

This paper explains the variations in incidence of accounting fraud across economic settings by putting the behaviour and motivation of managers under the microscope. To safeguard their reputation in the managerial labour market, managers of firms that perform poorly are prone to fraudulently inflate earnings if they expect the economy to be strong, since that raises the likelihood of peers reporting high performance. A realised level of economic activity, on the other hand, counteracts this tendency on the part of managers to overstate earnings, by reducing the number of firms that actually perform poorly. We term these two effects the incentive effect and the need effect, respectively. The two effects yield a distinctive relationship between the incidence of accounting fraud and macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, the fraction of firms fraudulently over-reporting earnings is positively related to expected economic performance and negatively related to realised economic performance.
The incentive and need effects on collective fraud are examined empirically by relating proxies of the aggregate incidence of accounting fraud to expected and realised GDP growth rates. The results unambiguously support the predicted influence of macroeconomic performance.     

金融诈骗罪刑法单独设节的理性思考

现行刑法将金融诈骗罪单独设节作为刑法分则第三章第五节从而与分则第三章第四节破坏金融管理秩序罪形成独立、并列的关系。这种被视为突破刑法立法体例传统的做法引起理论上的争议。肯定金融诈骗罪单独设节的观点从社会危害性、罪刑法定原则、金融诈骗罪罪群以及便利实务适用等四个方面论证了这种做法的合理性,否定说的学者认为金融诈骗罪单独设节具有与立法体例不合、立法思路不一、无单独设节之必要以及与境外刑法立法趋势相悖等缺陷从而不应单独设节。本文从金融诈骗罪主要客体、金融犯罪逻辑体系以及刑事立法传统等方面论证了金融诈骗罪单独设节不具有合理性且一一回应了肯定说所提出的观点。本文认为,金融诈骗罪的主要客体是金融交易秩序,其是金融管理秩序的下位概念,金融诈骗罪应当划入破坏金融管理秩序罪分节之下。     

Constitutional concepts within the process of European integration

In order to come to an understanding concerning the questions surrounding the drafting of a European constitution, one must differentiate the three different meanings of the word ‘constitution’ by virtue of the very nature of its beginnings. The concept of a constitution in the organisational sense is the first possible way to understand the term. As such, ‘Constitution'is synonymous with the organizational founding statute of any association or collective. Separate from this is a second possible context of the term, which refers to the legal meaning of the word. Here, the expression is understood as the highest legal norm of an autonomous legal order, its first and highest law. Within both of these meanings, one can speak of a ‘European Constitution’. A third, political way of understanding the term refers to the concept of the constitution as an ordering idea, which a specific place to the internal and external independent political unity combines and which orders from the outside inward. In other words, with this is concerned the question, why exactly this specific space within these specific limits to the independent political unity should be combined/bound. The introduction of such an order upon which can be founded, why exactly this concrete space in the specific limits as independent unity should be constituted, is still not today found for Europe.