顺“市”而“退”

在经历了艰难的上市过程之后最终选择顺应资本市场的形势变化抽身而退,这种退市现象无论是对于已经在海外上市的中国公司,还是正在为进入异地资本市场积极热身的国内企业都是一个值得思考的话题。     

有一种智慧叫“以退为进”——访宇信易诚董事长兼CEO洪卫东

洪卫东,北京宇信易诚科技有限公司董事长兼CEO,清华大学工学学士、EMBA,曾荣获"2012优秀董事长"、"十大金融科技企业杰出人物奖"、"IT渠道十大年度人物"、"中国金融IT企业精英人物"等奖项。由于部分在美上市公司涉及财务造假风波,美国中介机构借机大举做空中国概念股(简称中概股)等原因,在美上市的中国企业开始主动寻求退市,形成赴美上市的中国企业私有化热潮。     

中国境外上市企业私有化退市问题研究

近期,出于对股价低迷、支付费用高,或长远战略调整、转换场地上市等因素的考虑,中国海外概念股开始集体主动回归,阿里巴巴、盛大、小肥羊实施私有化退市。然而,中国境外上市企业私有化退市面临着代价过高、程序繁杂、回归A股困难以及潜在诉讼等风险。因此,我国应结合本国实际,适时推出国际板,完善主板、创业板双向退市制度,推行国有上市企业私有化,引导企业理性上市融资和私有化退市,确保投资者与经营者之间合理分配报酬,实现全员共同富裕。     

分众传媒退市案例研究

近年来许多在境外上市的中国企业掀起了一股私有化退市的浪潮,比如盛大网络,阿里巴巴,小肥羊等知名企业。在国内许多企业还在排队等待IPO之时,这些好不容易上市了的企业为什么会选择私有化退市呢?本文以分众传媒的退市案例来解读企业选择退市的原因以及海外退市对我国资本市场的启示。     

分众传媒退市案例研究

近年来许多在境外上市的中国企业掀起了一股私有化退市的浪潮,比如盛大网络,阿里巴巴,小肥羊等知名企业。在国内许多企业还在排队等待IPO之时,这些好不容易上市了的企业为什么会选择私有化退市呢?本文以分众传媒的退市案例来解读企业选择退市的原因以及海外退市对我国资本市场的启示。     

进退唯“估”

美国投资者不懂中国,在空前的中概股危机中,很多企业家都抛出了这样一句话。实际上,对于华尔街和中国企业双方来说,这都是一个在渐进相互了解之后的去魅步骤。无论是继续坚守,还是选择离开,都是一个价值选择的过程。     

中国IT企业海外“受阻”须转求盈利能力

<正>所谓"吃一堑,长一智",中国互联网企业不要再抱着上市的幻想不放,还是将眼光放在更实际的盈利能力上更为可靠。上市融资本是对企业发展有利的事情,但是从2010年中国互联网企业掀起上市潮到现在,整个局势从最初的"狂欢"急剧转变为"哀鸿一片",让人     

纽交所“盘算”中关村

位于北京西北部的中关村科技园,如今已扛起中国科技行业的大旗。2010年,中关村科技园的总收入达到1.5万亿元,有近2万家企业,这个庞大的资源向来是资本市场争抢的对象。3月31日,纽约泛欧交易所集团(以下简称为纽交所)执行副总裁史考特·卡特勒来到北京,与中关村科技园区管委会签署战略合作协议,宣布建立长期战略合作伙伴关系,通过开展各种形式的交流与合作,推动中     

众说海外上市

在最近召开的“中国资本市场开放与发展论坛”上,众多专家对于海外上市谈了自己的观点,请看本刊报道     

会计诚信“伤不起”——中国概念股做空潮始末

目前,在美国上市的中国公司正面临一场群体性的诚信危机:因涉嫌造假上市、上市后继续造假,多家中国概念公司在美国资本市场被停牌或摘牌。自2月以来,约40家中国公司或是承认自己存在审计问题,或是因审计问题被美国证券交易委员会或美国交易所暂停股票交易。中国概念股为何在国外频遭猎杀?持续暴跌的背后隐藏着投资者怎样的心理?本期财经热点关注中国概念股近日的海外尴尬。     

煤企如何穿越低谷

劳动力和资本要素推动经济发展的动力已经消失,高效率和全球化成为化解当前煤炭企业市场危机的根本途径。当前,煤炭企业面临严峻的经济形势。环渤海5500大卡动力煤平均价格报收643元/吨,较年度高点下降147元。秦皇岛港在最萧条时期一度出现无船装煤现象,这种现象自港口开航以来从未发生。综合各方信息看,国内煤炭行情正处于市场拐点,市场话语权已由卖方转向买方。国内做强、国外做大,已成为我国煤炭企业可持续发展的必经之路。     

Privatization,financial development,property rights and growth

This study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i.e., property rights, contracting rights, political institutions, and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms’ performance, capital markets development, and economic growth. Most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance, efficiency, and profitability, which percolates to economic growth. Privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks. Partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions, namely, the French civil law countries. The stronger the economic and the governing institutions, the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth. Overall, privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector.     

Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy

In this testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee on February 1, 1989 (when LBOs and other highly leveraged transactions were under fierce attack by politicians and the media), the author identified “LBO associations” such as KKR and Forstmann Little as a valuable innovation in organizational form—a new model of management and governance that was competing directly with the headquarters of large public corporations, especially conglomerates. In the author's words, LBOs “substitute incentives provided by compensation and ownership plans for the direct monitoring and often centralized decision-making in the typical corporate bureaucracy.” In illustrating his point, the author noted that whereas the CEOs of U.S. companies during the '70s and '80s saw their personal wealth go up by only about $3 for every $1,000 increase in firm value, the average CEO in an LBO experienced a change of $64 per $1,000—and for the partners of the LBO firm, the closest equivalent to a conglomerate CEO, the change was about $200 per $1,000. Based on the performance of the first wave of LBOs to return to public ownership, such dramatic concentrations of equity ownership appear to have produced large gains in operating efficiency. (And since the author's testimony, these findings have been confirmed by subsequent studies of later periods and in other countries.) The heavy debt loads in these transactions, besides making possible the concentration of equity ownership, also perform an important control function, intensifying the search for efficiencies and discouraging reinvestment in low-return projects. For those LBOs that have trouble servicing their debt loads, the author argues that the costs of insolvency should turn out to be significantly lower than for traditional public companies because LBOs provide strong incentives to keep the process of reorganizing troubled companies out of the bankruptcy court (a prediction that, although proving wrong in the early‘90s, has turned out to be true of the most recent wave of private equity deals).     

Privatization and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence, and Future Challenges

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective,privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improvedperformance with accountability. This article introduces theconcept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbinghands of public and private actors by providing informationand accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers.Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provideestimates of the relative importance and strength of privateand formal chains of governance. The framework and empiricalbenchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizationsand suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to besure to get the most out of future privatization activity.      

Partial Privatization and Firm Performance

Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non‐controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state‐owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.     

市场竞争、产权改革与商业银行贷款行为转变

本文运用2002～2007年中国省际面板数据,利用固定效应和系统广义矩估计方法考察了市场竞争与产权改革对中国商业银行贷款行为的影响。本文得出三个主要结论:一是从整体来看,中国商业银行贷款行为的商业导向仍然有待改善,表现在商业银行贷款增长率与盈利能力之间显著负相关;二是市场竞争改善了商业银行的贷款行为,推动了商业银行贷款行为向商业导向转变;三是产权改革对商业银行贷款行为没有显著的影响。本文的研究对进一步深化中国银行业体制改革具有重要的政策含义。     

Privatization and globalization: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the link between globalization-measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) – and privatization of state-owned enterprises, in a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We hypothesize that privatization has an effect on FDI/FPI as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms, and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors. Similarly, we expect FDI/FPI to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows, technology and managerial skills that accompany FDI/FPI make the environment more prone to competition, providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around. This relation is assessed in two ways, first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach, and second through panel causality tests. We find a bi-directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization, particularly in the case of FDI.     

湖南企业股份制改革的实践与思考

本文追溯了实行改革开放以来湖南企业股份制改革与发展的历程,分析了企业股份制改革对经济、社会诸方面产生的积极作用和深远影响,同时客观分析了推进企业股份制改革存在的不足,提出要通过发展来解决存在的问题.在深入研究的基础上,对今后进一步推进企业股份制改革提出了相关建议.     

Privatization,coordination and agency costs: The case for participation in Eastern Europe

In the paper, the interdependency between privatization and the growth of a new private sector is examined. While the dismantling of the omnipotent economic role of the state is a sine qua non for massive private investment, a vigorous private sector is needed to reduce unemployment and thus make further privatization possible. Since privatization is a lengthy process associated with a medium-term goal, while getting private investment started is important at the very beginning of the transition, this linkage constitutes a serious dilemma for the transformation. Multiple expectational equilibria arise and appropriate beliefs are crucial for the success of the reforms. Voucher schemes are shown to reduce agency costs of private investment and in this way may help to ensure coordination on the optimistic equilibrium.