Risk management of deposit insurance corporations with risk-based premiums and credit default swaps

In this paper, we propose a risk-based model for deposit insurance premiums and provide the closed-form formula for premiums, including early closure, capital forbearance, interest rate risk, and moral hazard. Our numerical analysis confirms the proposed pricing formula and the relative impact of the provisions for deposit insurance premiums. We illustrate how to use credit default swaps (CDSs) to manage the bank’s asset risk corresponding to the deposit insurance model. A failed bank, Washington Mutual, is used to demonstrate how to calibrate the model’s parameters and calculate fair premiums that are consistent with market risks on the basis of our proposed model and credit derivatives. Finally, a numerical experiment is designed to determine the optimal hedge ratio, which can minimise the variance of cash-flow of the deposit insurance corporations.     

The contribution of (shadow) banks and real estate to systemic risk in China

We empirically evaluate how accounting and financial variables affect the level of systemic risk in traditional and shadow banks, and in real estate finance services in China over the period 2006–2019. We also conduct some stability analysis by evaluating the impact of crisis sub-periods. We find that systemic risk increases in the Size of large financial institutions, particularly shadow entities, while it is insensitive to the Size of real estate finance services. Real estate finance services are instead particularly sensitive to Maturity Mismatch and Leverage. Finally, systemic risk differs across state and non state owned banks.     

Risk shifting in the US banking system: An empirical analysis

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.     

The procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks

From a sample of Islamic banks around the world from 1997 to 2012, this paper examines whether loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks is procyclical. Our empirical findings highlight that loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks remains procyclical, although the ‘expected’ loan loss model (E-LLM) has been implemented for Islamic banks in several countries. A closer investigation further documents that Islamic banks also use loan loss provisions for discretionary managerial actions, especially related to capital management in which loan loss reserves and provisions are inflated when bank capitalization declines. Eventually, this paper highlights that higher capitalization can mitigate the procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks. In other words, loan loss provisioning becomes countercyclical for Islamic banks with higher capitalization. This paper therefore casts doubts on the adoption of the E-LLM for Islamic banks to promote countercyclical effects, because the E-LLM may be influenced by managerial discretion, including opportunistic capital management using loan loss provisions that may undermine the importance of maintaining bank capitalization.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

The U.S. and Irish credit crises: Their distinctive differences and common features

Although the 2007–2008 US credit crisis precipitated it, the subsequent Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Many of the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, asset price bubbles, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four “deep” common features are quite different in the two cases.     

Empirical investigation of securitisation drivers: the case of Italian banks

This paper explores the determinants of securitisation by Italian banks over the period 1999–2006, investigating the funding, specialisation, and regulatory capital arbitrage hypotheses. According to our evidence, when we consider all securitisation types together, Italian banks seem to have securitised out of funding motives, to diversify and optimise their available funding channels. When we separately consider securitisations backed by residential mortgages and those backed by non-performing loans, we find that the main factors affecting the former type of securitisation are the need for funding and capital arbitrage motivation, whereas the latter appear to have been affected to a lesser extent by a need for funding and to have also been slightly conditioned by a desire to specialise.     

Modelling Credit Risk for SMEs: Evidence from the U.S. Market

Considering the fundamental role played by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy of many countries and the considerable attention placed on SMEs in the new Basel Capital Accord, we develop a distress prediction model specifically for the SME sector and to analyse its effectiveness compared to a generic corporate model. The behaviour of financial measures for SMEs is analysed and the most significant variables in predicting the entities' credit worthiness are selected in order to construct a default prediction model. Using a logit regression technique on panel data of over 2,000 U.S. firms (with sales less than $65 million) over the period 1994–2002, we develop a one-year default prediction model. This model has an out-of-sample prediction power which is almost 30 per cent higher than a generic corporate model. An associated objective is to observe our model's ability to lower bank capital requirements considering the new Basel Capital Accord's rules for SMEs.     

The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This ‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.     

The impact of competition on the operations of foreign banks in Australia in the post-deregulation period

In 1985, Australia removed its long-standing embargo on the entry of foreign banks. The Australian market therefore provides an opportunity to study the factors influencing multinational bank expansion in a new host country. This paper tests a model of the size of multinational banking operations in Australia in the post-embargo period. One major finding is that a push for market share in a highly competitive environment led to risky lending practices in the global boom-bust economic climate of the late 1980s, which adversely affected the foreign banks’ performance. Another is that competition from home country banks had a significantly negative effect on foreign banks’ asset volumes.     

Capitalization of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented decline in leverage ratios in the United States property-liability insurance industry. The premiums-to-surplus ratio, the most commonly used leverage ratio in the industry, fell from its historical average of 2.0 to less than 1.0 by the end of 2000; and the industry-wide capital-to-asset ratio increased from an historical average of about 25% to 35%. The international reinsurance industry also experienced significant capital increases and leverage declines during the 1990s (Cummins and Weiss, 2000).¹ These unusual trends raised widespread concerns that the property-liability insurance industry had become over-capitalized (The Economist, 1999; Bowers, 2001; Seifert, 2001). To investigate the growth in capitalization and its potential causes, the Conference on Capitalization in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry was held at the Wharton School in September 2000 under the joint sponsorship of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and AON. Selected papers from the conference comprise this issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research (JFSR).     

The fall of Spanish cajas: Lessons of ownership and governance for banks

Ownership, governance, and institutional diversity among banks are a subject of public and regulatory concern. This paper addresses this issue by using a case study of Spain, where the retail banking market was split evenly between shareholder and stakeholder banks before the crisis. We examine how institutional diversity mattered in the accumulation of risk in the pre-crisis years, in the severity of losses caused by the crisis, and in the resilience to recover from the losses. The method of analysis consists in linking the risk position of the banks in the pre-crisis period and the losses arising during the crisis to the decisions of banks to migrate from business models based on deposit financing to models based on market-debt financing. We find that cajas migrated to more vulnerable business models following the strategy of the shareholder banks, but the losses in the crisis were much higher in the former than in the latter. The paper interprets this result as evidence that what matters the most about the ownership of banks is their resilience in bad times.     

The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market

This paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by Japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring. The results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates. Moreover, I find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to Moody’s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the Japanese government allowed a large city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, to fail and passed the Financial Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act in the late 1990s. These results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring. In addition, I find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile.     

中国信用风险缓释工具创新试点最新进展研究

信用风险缓释工具是中国银行间市场2010年创新试点推出的信用风险管理工具,它将短期融资券、中期票据和贷款等信用产品的信用风险剥离定价,并转移给愿意承担风险的投资者,其推出从根本上改变了商业银行等金融机构信用风险管理的传统特征。通过对信用风险缓释工具试点中投资主体培育、市场定价、做市商机制、信息披露、市场外部环境建设等问题进行研究,有利于信用缓释工具功能的充分发挥,有利于完善债券市场信用风险分担机制、有利于商业银行等投资者动态、专业地管理信用风险。     

Valuing the Potential Transformation of Banks into Financial Service Conglomerates: Evidence from the Citigroup Merger

The merger between Citicorp and Travelers Group on April 6, 1998 could have emitted two relevant signals for firms that provide financial services. The first signal is the endorsement by two prominent financial institutions that benefits from cross‐selling of bank services with insurance services, brokerage services, and other financial services can be realized. The second signal is that regulators will allow the combination of commercial banking with insurance underwriting and full‐service brokerage, paving a path for similar combinations in the future. We document a favorable share price response for commercial banks, insurance companies, and brokerage firms, which supports the argument that the merger sets a precedent for other combinations between banks and nonbank financial services that will facilitate cross‐selling and efficiencies.     

Banking on the Boom,Tripped by the Bust: Banks and the World War I Agricultural Price Shock

How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines (i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; (ii) the impact of regulation; and (iii) how bank closures exacerbated the postwar bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new banks). Deposit insurance amplified the impact of rising crop prices on bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Banks that responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing in the bust, and counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices.     

The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements

Capital requirements play a key role in the supervision and regulation of banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in the process of changing the current framework by introducing risk sensitive capital charges. Some fear that this will unduly increase the volatility of regulatory capital. Furthermore, by limiting the banks’ ability to lend, capital requirements may exacerbate an economic downturn. The paper examines the problem of capital-induced lending cycles and their pro-cyclical effect on the macroeconomy in greater detail. It finds that the capital buffer that banks hold on top of the required minimum capital plays a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the volatility of capital requirements.