中国银行业隐性存款保险与资本充足监管机制下的联合效率分析

作为当代银行监管的重要手段,存款保险和资本充足率的重要性不言而喻,前人对于两者各自的监管效果及用途研究得已比较透彻,但对两者间的相关性和共同作用研究明显不足,本文在回顾前人研究的基础上,通过创造性地构建两者之间相关性的模型,得出了监管者如何选定适当的资本充足率监管水平使得银行在信贷过度冒险行为与过度审慎之间找到均衡,增进社会福利。同时结合当前中国隐性存款保险的实际背景,运用计算机仿真和曲线拟合进行实证,得出存在最优的资本使得社会福利最大化,在满足社会福利最大化的条件下,监管资本最佳与资本补充的外生成本两者不可得兼的重要结论。     

Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

This study analyzes the effect of premium rates on banks’ incentives to join a deposit insurance scheme and their incentives to invest in risky projects under a voluntary deposit insurance scheme. We find that in order to maximize social welfare, the insurance agency must either set the premium rate to be low so as to attract all banks to join the insurance scheme, or not to have the deposit insurance at all. However, the low premium rate in the voluntary scheme does not balance the budget of the deposit insurance. We also show that in the compulsory deposit insurance scheme, however, it is possible to impose an optimal premium rate that can balance the insurance agency’s budget and achieve the highest social welfare. The results also present the dominance of the compulsory scheme over the voluntary scheme in terms of maximizing social welfare and balancing the budget.

国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

集团公司财务风险防范及控制

企业集团的建立是基于减少经营风险、避免法律障碍、便于技术交流和开拓国内外市场业务等有利条件,其中,减少经营风险是最直接的原因.而企业的经营风险又最终会表现为财务上的损失,因此,集团公司财务风险的防范和控制非常重要.本文重点论述广义财务风险中的道德风险和经营过程中财务风险的防范和控制措施.     

当前我国商业银行面临的主要操作风险及对策研究

随着全球经济一体化速度的不断加快,以及金融业经营规模和交易范围的不断扩大,银行的操作风险日益受到关注。本文借鉴西方商业银行操作风险分类技术,分析了目前我国商业银行发展中所面临的主要操作风险,即组织风险、执行风险、人员风险、技术风险和外部风险,并结合实际,剖析问题所在,如组织结构及管理层变化、制度设计的缺陷、随意执行、盲目执行、故意违规逆行、非主观臆行、人力资源管理缺乏科学性以及外部欺诈、竞争、突发事件和政策因素等。最后,从企业文化建设、组织体系调整及管理模式、技术和方法等方面探索操作风险管理架构及缓释风险的方法,以期提高商业银行抗御风险的能力。     

Bank runs, welfare and policy implications

This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.     

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

The U.S. and Irish credit crises: Their distinctive differences and common features

Although the 2007–2008 US credit crisis precipitated it, the subsequent Irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. The distinctive differences between them are notable. Many of the apparent causal factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice versa. At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital bonanzas, asset price bubbles, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The particular manifestations of these four “deep” common features are quite different in the two cases.     

Evergreening in banking

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.     

Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?

Introduced in 1971 as a response to the intensification in competition in the deposit-taking sector induced by the adoption of a program of liberalization and globalization, the deposit insurance system in Japan has since undergone a number of significant changes to accommodate developments in the local financial sector. The pace of such reform accelerated markedly in recent years to help stabilize the Japanese financial system in the face of systemic risk, be it due to the failure of the housing loan companies (the jusen) or other major institutions, such as Yamaichi Securities and the city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The evolution of local deposit insurance arrangements to cope with such events is explained here and an assessment of the policy responses is provided. The part played by deposit insurance in alleviating the pressures currently experienced by the Japanese banking sector also is addressed. Finally, the extent to which the Japanese authorities have learned from the U.S. experience with deposit insurance is examined.     

巨灾风险管理的困境与出路——兼论中、美洪水灾害风险管理差异

在经历了几场罕见的大灾大难之后,巨灾风险已经成为举国上下共同关注的话题。许多学者迫切要求国家尽快建立所谓的“完整制度”或“管理体系”,实现巨灾风险管理。这种想法具有代表性。本文通过对中、美两国洪水灾害风险管理实践的分析,认为巨灾是目前人类难于应对和应对不了,而又不得不应对的一种自然灾害。无奈之下,人类可以有两个选择：一...     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.